The British Army took a lot of criticism from the press, public opinion, and - eventually - Chilcott over its continued use of Snatch Land Rover, and late development of Protected Patrol Vehicles.
Was it justified?
🧵 1/13
During summer ‘04, the threat in SE Iraq really began to ramp up beyond the usual SA/RPG/Molotov attacks - mostly driven by imported EFP IEDs.
2/13
These were ‘high end’ threats - way beyond usual daisy-chained shells. Capable of penetrating between 0.5-1CDs at long stand-off.
Shortly after they were discovered, Warrior was upgraded with Additional Protection (WRAP) - invisible to the observer behind bar armour. 3/13
that WRAP has to be fitted to a vehicle as well protected as WR in the first place, indicates just how severe the threat was - and how little could be done at lighter weights.
4/13
US Humvees were uparmoured several times against IEDs, but in many cases the extra steel was just grist to the behind armour debris mill - so where EFPs were the driving threat, the situation wasn’t necessarily improved…
5/13
By contrast, the composite armour of Snatch was only proof against low-end ballistic threats - but when overmatched by an EFP, it would tend to allow a ‘through and through’ penetration. Clearly bad news for anyone on the shot line, but also a good chance of a miss.
6/13
There were many calls for the Army to bring back it’s Mamba mine protected vehicles - or buy COTS RG-31/32 - but these would have made no difference against an EFP, and models available at the time could not support extra GVW needed for suitable appliqué armour.
7/13
When Mastiff hit the streets in 06/07,it was a massive step up for wheeled PPVs -contrary to popular opinion, the US had only been using them for EOD teams - not general protected mobility.
But it was a big beast, and it still couldn’t replace Snatch in all environments.
8/13
Foxhound was developed specifically for Afghanistan - where threat was mainly buried blast - and was a different beast entirely.
Designed to achieve high levels of underbody protection whilst achieving Snatch-like manoeuvrability in the urban, it did exactly what was…
9/13
…needed in Afghanistan, but probably a few years too late. As a result, I think people died unnecessarily from *this type* of threat in a hodge-potch of barely (underbody) protected vehicles.
10/13
In summary:
The BA reacted fairly quickly in Iraq, but the threat was such that the answer was always going to be big wheeled or tracked vehicles - which couldn’t replace light PPVs. In the latter case, best defence was ECM and tactics.
11/13
In Afghanistan, the Army failed to predict a different sort of threat early enough - and the race to develop LPPV began too late.
When the answer came, we were almost done with the campaign- and the product was excellent but niche/expensive in the utility market.
12/13
All in all - a mixed bag - criticism is warranted in places, but (IMHO) often misplaced when the devil is in the detail…
13/13
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Lots of us have been commenting negatively on the British Army’s Future Soldier structures - and specifically the lack of ‘punch’ in its Heavy Bde Combat Teams.
I suspect new fantasy fleets isn’t on the cards anytime soon - so what might be a realistic get-fit plan now?
🧵 1/7
First off - let’s make some realistic assumptions as to what would be achievable with minimal impact:
- no ‘new’ equipment acquisition
- no change in overall liability
- no change to Arms & Services liability
- no (major) change to basing 2/7
With that in mind, I’m going to propose 3 ‘quick wins’ that could be implemented relatively quickly, and within existing delegations - based on opportunities that exist already. 3/7
In some recent threads about sending MBTs to 🇺🇦, the possibility of a ground-zero approach to MBTs has been discussed, followed by a suggesting to go all-in on a ‘next-gen’ tank.
I’ve been a bit sniffy on some of these, but prompts the question “what’s a next-gen MBT?” 🧵 1/
Tanks such as Challenger 2, M1A2 Abrams, Leopard 2 (to name but a few), are generally considered 3rd generation.
No real convention to this, but they generally share similar characteristics:
- Integrated ‘complex’ armour
- >120mm high-pressure gun
- Digital FCS
- TI sights
With the exception of a few, most weigh in at ~60-70t.
The question is - what would a next-gen tank need to be able to do that the current generation couldn’t - and is it even possible within the next 10-20 years? 3/
Bit of talk about Mastiff recently. Lots of pros and cons for ditching the fleet - which I’m not going to get into (at least initially!) - but I thought this might be an opportune moment for a trip down memory lane before another Christmas makes it too fuzzy…
🧵
Note of caution: this is all from memory, and given that my official records from the time would have been classified - and inappropriate as a source - this is more a personal perspective than official record.
In light of the Snatch Land Rober controversy (on which I’ve commented previously), Des Brown had ordered a review of protected mobility for Op Telic in June 2006, but things really kicked off seriously in July - when orders given to acquire a *wheeled* PPV to augment Snatch…
Any officer or soldier joining the RAC in the last 5-10 years could be forgiven for assuming that Lt Cav is a traditional role, and that the Jackal platform was designed for the job...
Light but heavily-armed vehicles have been part of the Army’s DNA for years - including the iconic vehicles of the SAS and LRDG in North Africa during WW2...
‘Cut-downs’ continued to play a role in one form or another for years, but by the eighties and nineties these vehicles were largely to be found in the Recce platoons of Lt role Bns, and Yeomanry Regts in the ‘National Defence’ role - where they were known as ‘Dougals’ (obvs)...