🧵Highly significant statements by SECDEF Austin at the #SLD (1) there is no change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan. (2) we committed to our 'One China' policy as enumerated in the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, the Three Joint Communiques," defense.gov/News/News-Stor…
Austin also made it clear that the United States does not support any unilateral changes to the status quo, and the United States does not support Taiwan independence.
These are the reassurances that are often neglected in today’s strategic discourse. They are under-appreciated, but critical aspects of deterrence. Yes, maintaining a coercive disincentive to the use of force is critical. But it is most effective when combined with reassurances.
Hat’s off to the SECDEF.
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Chinese military officials in recent months have repeatedly asserted that the Taiwan Strait isn’t international waters during meetings with US counterparts, generating concern within the Biden administration
...Such assertions are absurd. 🧵 bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
China is a party to UNCLOS, which sets the rules on coastal state zones, such as how to draw baselines, internal waters, territorial sea, EEZ, and high sea. It also establishes the international freedoms in the various zones. 2/6
And let's dispense with the old US-has-no-right-to-comment-because-it's-not-a-state-party-to-UNCLOS argument. These rules were recognized by the ICJ as customary international law-applying to all states-and the US accepted them as such during the Reagan administration. 3/6
During the Alaska meetings, China appears determined to play power politics to back up its confrontational attitude. First, there were the trials of Michael Spavor on Friday and Michael Kovrig today. Now, it is clear they are pressuring a US ally in the SCS. 1/n
These acts represent direct pressures on Canada and the Philippines, two US allies. Other SE Asian claimants will also take note in the wake of stalled, perhaps failed, COC negotiations. These negotiations failed because China wants what law rightfully gives its neighbors. 2/n
China's implicit message to them? 'We are strong and will take what we want if we must, without regard to law or prior commitments. Might as well make your best deal now.' 3/n
1/n My view of Pompeii’s Statement on the SCS is: 1) In a legal sense, I don't see this as quite as dramatic as some others do. In my view it makes explicit a policy which was already implicit. It has consistently been US policy that China should abide by the arbitration ruling.
2/n 2) The arbitration ruling covers these areas. Further, it has always been our view that we do not take sides on sovereignty claims to islands, including in the SCS.
3/n. The Chinese routinely, purposely conflated our policy of neutrality on questions of sovereignty over features as a promise not to “take sides" as to any aspects of the SCS disputes. But that was never US policy, which has always been based on application of international law
"A Natuna fisherman, complained ... that during the night “when there are no Indonesian navy patrols, foreign fishing vessels with trawls enter [Indonesian waters] and catch fish." They are accompanied by China Coast Guard vessels. thediplomat.com/2020/03/indone…
“the problem is China maintains that they have ‘traditional fishing rights’ there. Lately they also mentioned ‘maritime rights,’ although they never detail what these terms entail.”
"Jakarta ... has strongly rejected those arguments. “China’s claims to the EEZ on the grounds that its fishermen have long been active there … have no legal basis and have never been recognized by the UNCLOS 1982,” its foreign ministry said in a statement in January 2020."
CDC Coronavirus Press Briefing:
1/"Our goal continues to be slowing the introduction of the virus into the U.S. This buys us more time to prepare our communities for more cases and possibly sustained spread. This new virus represents a tremendous public health threat."
2/ "We don’t yet have a vaccine for this novel virus, nor do we have a medicine to treat it specifically. We are taking and will continue to take aggressive action to reduce the impact of this virus, that it will have on the communities in the U.S."
3/"We are working with state, local, and territorial health departments to ready our public health work force to respond to local cases and the possibility this outbreak could become a pandemic." cdc.gov/media/releases…
The significance of the news that Malaysia made a second submission (its first was in 2009 jointly with Vietnam) to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to define its continental shelf rights in the SCS should not be overlooked. un.org/Depts/los/clcs…
So here is a year end reminder for you:
Despite China's refusal to acknowledge, participate in, accept, or implement the SCS arbitration, international law continues to be used by Southeast Asians to build a wall of legitimacy that China will be unable to scale.
In 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted their claim to the UN-CLCS. It made clear that these two countries do not accept any EEZ or continental shelf rights for any of the Spratly islands. It further made clear that these countries do not accept any validity to China's 9DL.