This thread seeks to give a historical perspective to cadre management by taking a peek into some critical periods in the evolution of the @IAF_MCC officer cadre. It throws up some real-life fascinating insights that planners might want to consider. #IAFHistory (1/17)
Between 1932 and 1939, IAF had 20 officers commissioned - all having been trained at Cranwell. With an aspiration to expand the IAF, the IAF Volunteer Reserve was announced – a kind of an Emergency Commission without any institutional commitment of service length. 2/
With WWII in full swing, the British Indian Govt increased the IAF’s intake to a record 680 officers in 1943, equal to the size of all the officers already in the IAF at that time-thereby doubling the IAF’s Nos. This bulge was necessitated by the mil requirement of the times. 3/
Opportunity starved Indian youth lapped up the jobs as they sought employment in the IAF, despite the very high risk to life and the limited life expectancy thereof. All of them joined under the Emergency commission scheme, without assured long term prospects. 4/
Once the War was over, a massive demobilization was ordered. This was a financially-driven requirement. Consequently, in the period 1946-48, over 400officers were discharged - mostly in their 20s or early 30s. The total No shed was approx 20% of the IAF strength at that time. 5/
The institutional & human impact of such a demob was immense & in some cases, unfortunate, a case in point being Flying Officer Howe, who was demobbed in 1947 & left without any job. His story of later earning a DFC flying for the RAAF is here -tinyurl.com/4mfevtes 6/
Paradoxically, the IAF found itself demobbing & recruiting at the same time. With partition imminent, the need for trained manpower had re-emerged. What was still not on offer – was a sufficient No of Permanent commissions. 7/
Consequently, the intake did not improve - only 44 officers signed up in 1947 & another 90 in 1948. The Govt came up with an “Extended Service Commission” to those already on “Emergency Commission” to overcome the crisis. Still no comt was made to having longer serving offrs. 8/
It was only in 1949 that IAF again offered Permanent Commission to aspiring officers. Across the 1950s, an avg 225 offrs joined per yr, while the bleed rate was approx 75- finally achieving some stability after the devastating demob of the late 40s. 9/
However, the intake was still kept depressed. For ideological & financial reasons, the newly indep India chose to keep the size of its Armed Forces limited. It had hoped that diplomatic measures would be deterrent enough. The 1962 war was a rude awakening. 10/
The aftermath of the war enforced a drastic increase in Nos of the IAF. From the earlier annual avg of 250, IAF commissioned ~800 offrs/yr in the pd 1963-67. This intake is referred to as “the bulge”. Being a reflex action, it had a long-term effect on the morale of the IAF. 11/
The IAF felt the high cost of trg necessitated the continuation of Permanent Commissions. This would haunt them in later years. To train so many, IAF opened up new academies, marshalled civil aviation resources. Standards were also reportedly compromised. 12/
The newly commissioned officers faced much hardship – Infrastructure had not kept pace and was woefully short. Young officers often did not get adequate fg due to shortage of aircraft - a very demoralizing impact. 13/
This problem would continue to plague the IAF for 25 yrs. In the mid-70s, it led to promotion bottle-necks, further demoralising the force. A revised “deep selection” policy was adopted to allow younger promising offrs to be promoted – arguably at the cost of some sr offrs. 14/
But the most devastating effect was seen only in the mid-1980s, when the bulk of the offrs from the bulge retd in their mid-40s as Wing Commanders. The quantum of such discharges, coupled with the ltd civ avtn in India meant they struggled with re-employment. 15/
National imperatives may change, 1940s&60s may not be the same as 2020s, but lessons from history remain the same – tinkering with military recruitment has lasting irreversible impact. Fg offr Howes & the suddenly unemployed Wg Cdrs of bulge should never face hardship again. 16/
This is not a political thread, nor does it seek to judge decision makers, then & now. It merely seeks to place facts as they were because numbers never lie. 17/
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This, right here 👇🏽—is the real reason the MiG-21 earned the "flying coffin" tag. No, it wasn’t the LCA delay. No it wasnt the machine or spares itself.
The real cause lies deeper. The data and context are all there. Few connect the dots. Read On. (1/19)
#IAFHistory
I wrote about this in a @timesofindia editorial a few years ago. The MiG-21 earned the “Flying Coffin” tag not because of its airframe—but because we made it carry the weight of our institutional failure between 1980s -2000s. 2/
The MiG-21 entered IAF service in 1963, our first supersonic jet. It demanded a steep learning curve—especially in landing, where speeds exceeded 300 km/h. That was 2–3x faster than subsonic jets like the Vampire. It was not beginner-friendly. 3/
1/ There's growing confusion between two important systems:
👉🏽 Akashteer
👉🏽 IACCS
Both play crucial roles in India’s air defence.
But let’s be clear — they operate at different altitudes — literally and metaphorically.
Here’s how 👇 (1/8)
#IAFHistory
But, let’s get some history, geography and law right.
History: The Network Centric Warfare (NCW) concept was first developed by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (US Navy) and John Garstka in 1998. It envisioned linking forces digitally to enhance situational awareness and increase warfighting effectiveness.
2/
📕 Let’s talk law — the Union War Book is India’s master document on war responsibilities.
Until 1993, there was no single agency for air defence.
Each service did its bit, and consequently the Army built up significant frontline/terminal AD assets.
Then came a historic shift:
🛡️ “Air Defence of the country is the responsibility of the IAF.”
As we rightly marvel at the IACCS Air Defence system in action earlier this month…
What many forget is that the trigger for IACCS wasn't war.
It was this:
➡️ The Purulia Arms Drop of 1995.
🛩️ Crates of AKs parachuted into Bengal, and no one saw it coming.
🧵👇
#IAFHistory
17 Dec 1995. A Latvian AN-26 aircraft drops weapons over Purulia.
Undetected. Unchallenged.
India was stunned.
A Group of Ministers review followed—and a national embarrassment turned into a call for reform.
At the heart of it: India’s airspace surveillance. 2/
Among the key recommendations -
✅ Procurement of an Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) for the IAF.
Initial approval: ₹585 Cr for 5 systems.
Approved in principle by Raksha Mantri (1999) & CCS (2001).
I promised to be back with the @IAF_MCC and Sargodha love affair.
Yes, @akshaykumar's Sky Force showed 1965 — but let me tell you about 1971.
This time, it was India’s newly formed Top Gun school — TCDTS — that painted the skies above Sargodha.
Buckle up. 🧵👇
What’s TCDTS?
Formed in 1971, the Tactics and Combat Development & Training Squadron was the IAF’s brainchild for fighter combat.
Based at Adampur, it was packed with the crème de la crème — handpicked MiG-21 and Su-7 pilots who’d go on to rewire enemy expectations.
Before war broke out, these elite pilots were already tasked with rewriting air combat playbooks.
But in December 1971, they were ordered to do something unheard of:
Fly low-level night strikes on heavily defended PAF bases — including the crown jewel: Sargodha.
SAVING FISH OIL: THE BATTLE FOR AMRITSAR RADAR, 1965 🇮🇳
29 PAF missions. Napalm. Rockets. Machine guns.
And the first-ever combat use of the now famous L-70 gun— in the world.
Col Mandeep Singh’s riveting account is a must-read. Sharing the highlights 🧵(1/18)
#IAFHistory
During the Indo-Pak war of 1965, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched multiple missions to destroy the Indian Air Force's (IAF) radar installation near Amritsar, codenamed 'Fish Oil'. Here's how the IAF's defenses stood firm. 2/
The Amritsar radar, a Soviet-made P-30(M), was operated by 230 Signal Unit and was crucial for early warning, covering deep into Pakistani territory. Its strategic importance made it a prime target for the PAF. 3/