Some believe that the current escalation between Russia and the West is just a personal decision of Putin. Not quite. Watch this Yeltsin's speech in Beijing in 1999 before meeting Li Peng. Three weeks later Yeltsin abdicated, leaving the PM Putin as the acting President of Russia
Many in Russia presumed that "good" Yeltsin made a horrible mistake, accidentally appointing "bad" Putin as his successor. I don't believe that. Three last Yeltsin's PMs were all career intelligence officers. He was actively looking for such an heir and was vetting the candidates
Putin's track was kinda typical. Consider his predecessor Stepashin. The FSB Chief. Then Minister for Internal Affairs under Kirienko. Then the Prime Minister. It's a track very similar to Putin's except in the end the Tsar made a different choice. Poor Stepashin (on the right)
Would Stepashin be any different? Doubt. In this interview he basically admits that in 1991 when the KGB was under a risk of dissolution he preserved the state security intact
The problem is not in Putin. The problem is not in Yeltsin making a wrong choice (he knew perfectly well what choice he was doing). The problem is in Tsar's uncontested right to just appoint an heir at his own discretion
The Tsar's power is the real problem here
It's also wrong to paint Putin as some sort of dark & powerful personality who just submitted everyone to his will. Watch this interview upon his appointment President's Property Management Service in 1996. Humble, shy. Proud of his acquaintanceship with Chubais and Berezovsky
Putin's badass image is not based on his personality. It's based on his position. It's based on him being the Tsar in a political system that grants the unconstrained power to the Tsar
The foundation of Putin's power is the quasimonarchic political culture which is very common in Russia and absolutely dominant among the central political elite, the courtiers. This culture is well reflected in the language. Consider this famous quote by Matvienko
Or the answer of Miller, CEO of Gazprom to a journalist's question on whether his contract gonna be renewed:
"I am a Sovereign's [государев] человек. If I am offered to stay on my job, I'll stay"
Some would argue that Russian courtiers call Putin the "Sovereign" ironically. I'm not so sure. I'd argue that these casua and not well thought remarks reflect their real way of thinking. Sovereignty is an attribute of the the Sovereign who is the only source of power in Russia
The problem is not in Putin. The problem is in the quasi monarchic political structure of Russia. Therefore, this problem can not be solved by changing Putin to "someone better". It can be solved only by dismantling the system of imperial power entirely
Why is quasimonarchic culture so prevalent in Russia? Well, it all comes to leverage and incentives. Tsar's Court has leverage to obliterate anyone who raises a voce against them and they will use it. So others are incentivised to never object. That's why Russia is so obedient
The entire discussion about whether the Russians "support" or "not support" the regime is insane. First, it treats Russia as something homogeneous. Second, it is based on assumption that raising a voice against the regime is even an option. It is not
Yeah, theoretically supporting the regime or standing up against it are both free choices. In reality though there's a huge asymmetry here incentives-wise. You don't lose much by supporting the Kremlin or just shutting up. But if you stand up you can lose hella lot
That doesn't mean everyone will actually work hard for the regime. It just means that you won't see a public dissent of the elites because anyone who raises a voice will be selected out immediately. Any real dissent will go only in the form of silent sabotage
It's not gonna be open, idealistic and collective action that gonna destroy the Russian Federation. To the contrary, it gonna be the silent, pragmatic and individual actions by elites. Such as the growing economic protectionism of regions, breaking the national economic cohesion
Dismantling the Russian empire is a necessary prerequisite for enfranchising the Russian people. "Support" of the regime is not so much a support as learnt helplessness due to anyone objecting to the Tsar's Court being destroyed. Thus destruction of a Court is necessary
*Any* politician who takes Putin's place in Kremlin will act much like Putin. Absolute power corrupts absolutely. Human beings of such integrity, selflessness and humility that won't be corrupted by the Tsar's power just don't exist
Tsar's power is based on the quasi-monarchic political culture in Russia. And the quasi-monarchic culture is based on anyone raising the voice against being crushed. The Tsar's Court has the leverage, others have an incentive to shut up. That's a vicious cycle. It must be broken
The only way to break it is for as may regions as possible breaking free, thus getting out of the reach of Kremlin. If you are independent, it becomes much harder for Kremlin to crush the dissent and silence other voices. That's a necessary prerequisite for enfranchisement
For some reason inconceivable to me, the potential dissolution of Russian Federation is being viewed purely through the ethnic lenses, as "minorities breaking away" and Russians staying under the agency-extirpating power of Kremlin. But Russians deserve agency, too. End of 🧵
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I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.