(1/6)
While Russiaβs main operational focus remains the Sieverodonetsk-Lysychansk pocket, a week of consistently heavy shelling suggests Russia is now trying to regain momentum on the northern Izium axis.
(2/6)
Ukrainian forces continue to hold the line in that sector, making good use of forested terrain to assist their defence.
(3/6)
Over the coming weeks, Russiaβs campaign will highly likely increasingly rely on echelons of reserve forces. These consist of several distinct components which Russia has almost certainly already started to field.
(4/6)
Russiaβs Combat Army Reserve is a recent innovation of part-time but volunteer reservists, which deploy as whole units typically ear-marked for rear area security tasks.
(5/6)
The Human Mobilisation Resource is the sizable pool of all veterans who have served in the regular military in the last five years. Russian authorities are likely using volunteers from this category to fill out the third battalions within regular brigades.
(6/6)
Despite a continued shortfall in the number of deployable reservists for Ukraine, the Russian leadership likely remains reluctant to order a general mobilisation.
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(2/7) Russian forces continue to make incremental advances in their efforts to encircle the town of Lysychansk. Since 25 June 2022, Russian forces have advanced a further 2km near the Lysychansk oil refinery, south of the town.
(3/7) There is a realistic possibility the missile strike on the Kremenchuk shopping centre on 27 June 2022 was intended to hit a nearby infrastructure target.
Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate their positions on higher ground in the city of Lyschansak, after falling back from Sieverodonetsk. Ukrainian forces continue to disrupt Russian command and control with successful strikes deep behind Russian lines.
(2 of 5)
Over 24-26 June, Russia launched unusually intense waves of strikes across Ukraine using long-range missiles. These weapons highly likely included the Soviet-era AS-4 KITCHEN and more modern AS-23a KODIAK missiles, fired from both Belarusian and Russian airspace.
(1/3) Most Ukrainian forces have likely withdrawn from their remaining defensive positions in the Donbas city of Sieverodonetsk. In April 2022, Russia revised its immediate campaign plan from aiming to occupy the majority of Ukraine, to a more focused offensive in the Donbas.
(2/3) Russiaβs capture of the city is a significant achievement within this reduced objective. The settlement was a major industrial centre and it occupies a strategic position on the Siverskyi Donets River.
(1/5) Ukraine is likely re-configuring its defence of the Sieverodonetsk-Lysychansk sector, as Russian armoured units continue to make creeping gains on the southern edge of the build up area.
(2/5) Since the start of June, the Russian high command has highly likely removed several Generals from key operational command roles in the war in Ukraine.
(1/6)
Ukrainian forces have announced that the pilot of a Russian Su-25 FROGFOOT ground attack aircraft shot down on 17 June was captured shortly afterwards.
(2/6)
The pilot has confessed to being a former Russian air force Major, who had taken employment as a Wagner military contractor and had flown several missions during the conflict.
(1/3)
Since 19 June, Russian forces have highly likely advanced over 5km towards the southern approaches of the Donbas city of Lysychansk.
(2/3)
Some Ukrainian units have withdrawn, probably to avoid being encircled. Russiaβs improved performance in this sector is likely a result of recent unit reinforcement and heavy concentration of fire.