Nothing would hamper the Russian war efforts more than the disconnection of German machines and software on the military plants. Is it possible? It's difficult to prove. What is easy to prove is that Russian industrialists feared such a backstabbing. Fortunately, they were wrong
The debate on a possibility of disconnection started in 2019. It was triggered by the Austrian LMF forcibly turning off their compressors on the Gazprom facility:
"they just turned them off through the satellite and it all turned into the scrap metal"
"Typically contracts for compressor maintenance include the possibility of fixing its malfunctioning or turning it off remotely"
He made it clear that the old American or Swiss produced Gazprom compressors also risk being disconnected
Russian military industry works under a much harder secrecy regime and we don't know details of their contracts with equipment suppliers. But what we do know is that Russian industrialists and academicians fear it. Just one example from 2021 cyberleninka.ru/article/n/prob…
In 2021 the CEO of an Institute for the digital intellectual systems A. Zelensky argued that foreign machine tools might have undocumented capacities such as an option to remotely turn it off, establish its geolocation, get an info about the products made with this machine
In Zelensky's opinion the CNC dependency is a major weak point of the Russian industry. Almost all CNC systems used in Russia are foreign produced. Which made him fear of the undocumented ways of remote control installed there
Do I have direct evidencee that Western, mostly German suppliers could, turn off their equipment on the Russian military plants? That's very difficult to prove. What we do know is that Russian engineers feared that. Fortunately, Germany didn't backstab the Russian army. End of🧵
PS Daily reminder that most of software used on the Russian military plants is either #Siemens or #Heidenhain which are not questioned nearly enough for their role in keeping the Russian military industry afloat
Example from the КБ-1, Almaz-Antey corp. They produce air defense
Where I did take it from? Well, from YouTube. Who did post it? Igor Ashurbeyli, the Director for Science of the said КБ-1 and the CEO of the entire Almaz-Antey corporation
I'm absolutely serious. The (ex)CEO of a massive military Almaz-Antey corporation Ashurbeyli is uploading videos with unblurred tools and CNC from a secret facility to his YouTube for likes
That's a powerful counterpoint for "They are not that dumb to do X/Y" arguments. They are
The funniest thing is that he originally posted this video on his personal website ashurbeyli.ru but then posted in on YouTube, too
So basically he sacrificed any pretence of secrecy and made non sourcing too easy to get more views, likes, and comments. The end of 🧵
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No offence, but this is a completely imbecile, ignorant, ridiculous framing. I have no explanation for all this debate except for a complete & determined ignorance of the foreign policy making class, and their refusal to learn literally anything about the material world.
"Components" framing makes sense when we are discussing drones. Why? Because drones are literally made from the imported components. You buy like 90% of them in China, and may be you make like 10% domestically. For the most part, you just assemble what you bought in China.
Not the case with missiles. Most of what the missile consists of, including its most critical, hard to make parts is produced domestically. Why? Because you cannot buy it abroad. More often than not, you cannot buy it in China. You can only make it yourself, domestically.
Contrary to the popular opinion, Andrey Belousov's appointment as a Minister of Defense makes perfect sense. From the Kremlin's perspective, war is primarily about industry & economy. Now Belousov is the central economic & industrial thinker (and planner) in the Russian gov.
Born into a Soviet Brahmin economist family, Belousov is an exceedingly rare case of an academician making a successful career in the Russian gov. Even more noteworthy, he rose to the position of power through his academic work and publications.
This is unique, ultra rare.
Belousov's career track:
1976-1981 Moscow State University ("economic cybernetics"). Basically, economics, but with the heavy use of then new computers.
1981-1986 Central Economic Mathematical Institute
1986-2006 Instutute of Economic Forecasting
2006-2024 Government
If you want to imagine Russia, imagine a depressive, depopulating town. Now on the outskirts of a town, there is an outrageously over-equipped, overfunded strategic enterprise that has literally everything money can buy in the world. It feels like a spaceship from another planet
Strategic industry is extremely generously equipped. Western companies look scoundrels in comparison. That’s why I am so sceptical about the whole “corruption” narrative. Not that it’s wrong. It’s just that it is the perspective of a little, envious bitch.
What needs to be funded, will be funded. It will actually be overfunded and most literally drowned in money. Obviously, overfunding the strategic sector comes at the cost of underfunding almost everything else (like urban infrastructure). That’s why the town looks so grim.
We have successfully documented the entire Russian missiles industry, mapping 28 of its key enterprises. Read our first OSINT sample focusing on the Votkinsk Plant, a major producer of intercontinental ballistic missiles. How does it make weaponry?
The strategic missiles industry appears to be highly secretive and impenetrable to the observers. And yet, it is perfectly OSINTable, based on the publicly available sources. This investigation sample illustrates our approach and methodology (31 p.)
Our first and invaluable source is the state propaganda, such as the federal and regional TV channels, corporate media, social media and so on. It provides abundant visual evidence, particularly on the hardware used in the production of weaponry.
In August 1999, President Yeltsin appointed his FSB Chief Putin as the new Prime Minister. Same day, he named him as the official successor. Yet, there was a problem. To become a president, Putin had to go through elections which he could not win.
He was completely obscure.
Today, Putin is the top rank global celebrity. But in August 1999, nobody knew him. He was just an obscure official of Yeltsin's administration, made a PM by the arbitrary will of the sovereign. This noname clerk had like 2-3% of popular support
Soon, he was to face elections
By the time of Putin's appointment, Russia already had its most favoured candidate. It was Primakov. A former Yeltsin's Prime Minister who broke with Yeltsin to contest for power. The most popular politician in Russia with massive support both in masses and in the establishment.
In Russia, the supreme power has never ever changed as a result of elections. That simply never happened in history. Now that is because Russia is a (non hereditary) monarchy. Consequently, it doesn't have any elections. It has only acclamations of a sitting ruler
Obviously, there has been no elections of Putin in any meaningful sense. There have been only acclamations. And that is normal. His predecessor was successfully acclaimed with an approval rate of about 6%. Once you got the power, you will get your acclamation one way or another
Contrary to the popular opinion, Russia doesn't have any acclamation ("election") problem. It has a transition of power problem. Like Putin can get acclaimed again, and again, and again. But sooner or later, he dies. What next?