Nothing would hamper the Russian war efforts more than the disconnection of German machines and software on the military plants. Is it possible? It's difficult to prove. What is easy to prove is that Russian industrialists feared such a backstabbing. Fortunately, they were wrong
The debate on a possibility of disconnection started in 2019. It was triggered by the Austrian LMF forcibly turning off their compressors on the Gazprom facility:
"they just turned them off through the satellite and it all turned into the scrap metal"
"Typically contracts for compressor maintenance include the possibility of fixing its malfunctioning or turning it off remotely"
He made it clear that the old American or Swiss produced Gazprom compressors also risk being disconnected
Russian military industry works under a much harder secrecy regime and we don't know details of their contracts with equipment suppliers. But what we do know is that Russian industrialists and academicians fear it. Just one example from 2021 cyberleninka.ru/article/n/prob…
In 2021 the CEO of an Institute for the digital intellectual systems A. Zelensky argued that foreign machine tools might have undocumented capacities such as an option to remotely turn it off, establish its geolocation, get an info about the products made with this machine
In Zelensky's opinion the CNC dependency is a major weak point of the Russian industry. Almost all CNC systems used in Russia are foreign produced. Which made him fear of the undocumented ways of remote control installed there
Do I have direct evidencee that Western, mostly German suppliers could, turn off their equipment on the Russian military plants? That's very difficult to prove. What we do know is that Russian engineers feared that. Fortunately, Germany didn't backstab the Russian army. End of🧵
PS Daily reminder that most of software used on the Russian military plants is either #Siemens or #Heidenhain which are not questioned nearly enough for their role in keeping the Russian military industry afloat
Example from the КБ-1, Almaz-Antey corp. They produce air defense
Where I did take it from? Well, from YouTube. Who did post it? Igor Ashurbeyli, the Director for Science of the said КБ-1 and the CEO of the entire Almaz-Antey corporation
I'm absolutely serious. The (ex)CEO of a massive military Almaz-Antey corporation Ashurbeyli is uploading videos with unblurred tools and CNC from a secret facility to his YouTube for likes
That's a powerful counterpoint for "They are not that dumb to do X/Y" arguments. They are
The funniest thing is that he originally posted this video on his personal website ashurbeyli.ru but then posted in on YouTube, too
So basically he sacrificed any pretence of secrecy and made non sourcing too easy to get more views, likes, and comments. The end of 🧵
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The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.