What is happening in Uzbekistan is very serious. Amendments proposed into the Chapter XVII of the Uzbekistan Constitution are viewed as highly provocative by the Karakalpaks. If they are really passed, this may exacerbate the situation even further, escalating the conflict
International community should dissuade President Mirziyoyev from amending the Chapter XVII of the Constitution before it's too late. Deescalating the conflict now is absolutely possible and relatively easy. In a week or two it may be too late, if a lot of blood is shed by then
Uzbekistan is lingustically heterogenous. Uzbeks are Karluks (like Uyghurs). Karakalpaks are Kipchaks (like Kazakhs). Khwarezmians are Oghuz (like Turks in Turkey). Almost all rural population is Turkic, but cities like Bukhara or Samarkand still have many Persian speakers
In the course of the Turkic migration, countryside was Turkified first. Meanwhile some of the cities continued to speak Persian for many centuries, remaining the Iranian islands among the Turkic sea. Not unlike some of the old urban centers of Anatolia after the Seljuk invasion
Karakalpaks live in the northwest and thus are very much affected by the disappearance of the Aral Sea. They used to be coast dwellers and their mode of life heavily dependent upon the sea that is ceasing to exist. Water that used to feed it was directed to the cotton fields
Cotton production was introduced to the region by the Russian Empire to create a source of raw materials for the Russian textile industry. Later Soviets would greatly expand the cotton production to produce gunpowder. But the cotton consumes too much water to grow
Soviet cotton production consumed too much water, depleting the rivers. And it killed the Aral Sea. What used to be the sea bottom is now desert. Wind is blowing the salt and the chemicals brought to the former sea from the fields by the rivers all around the neighbouring areas
Even worse, Soviets used the former Vozrozhdeniye Island as a polygon for biological weaponry for decades. Now it is a peninsula, because the water from the Uzbek side is draining quickly. Kazakstan which is much richer took some efforts to save its own part of the sea
The Aral shore is a location of the enormous man made catastrophe. Basically the Aral desert is a byproduct of the Soviet cotton production. Cotton (=gunpowder) production was prioritised while keeping the environment and the economy of locals was not
In 1990, even before the collapse of the USSR, Karakalpakstan declared its sovereignty. In 1993 it signed a treaty with Uzbekistan. It agreed to remain as part of the country for 20 years, if it keeps its sovereignty and will have a right to later secede through a referendum
Basically in 1993 Uzbekistan signed a treaty agreeing to allow Karakalpaks the independence referendum in 2013. Of course, later the central government would concentrate all the powers and never allow it. In 2013 it simply arrested those idiots who really advocated for it
Now it introduced new amendments to the Constitution (see here, Chapter XVII, you can google translate it) gazeta.uz/ru/2022/06/30/… which strip the region from the remaining rights. That provoked the mass unrests
Uzbekistan ministry of interior claims they already suppressed them. They did not. But if the unrests continue, the government wil escalate the violence which may lead to the unpredictable consequences in a very young and poor society with rapidly rising cost of life
International community should persuade President Mirziyoyev to abstain from amending the Chapter XVII of the Constitution. Deescalation is still possible, before a lot of blood is shed. The end
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The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum