Protests in Nukus, Karakalpakstan continue. Uzbek President Mirziyoyev already suggested not to amend the articles 70, 71, 72, 74, 75 of the constitution on the sovereignty and status of Karakalpakstan. But his forces are suppressing the protests. Emergency declared till August 2
International community should pressure Uzbek President Mirziyoyev to deescalate the situation. Karakalpak minority sees the entire "constitutional reform" project, especially regarding the Chapter XVII as highly provocative. That's a video from the yesterday's protests in Nukus
Keep in mind that Uzbekistan is:
1) Diverse 2) Young 3) Poor
Average age in Uzbekistan (29) is not much higher than in Syria (25). GDP per capita not much higher than in Cambodia. Most of territory is desert so almost everyone lives in a few overcrowded oases and river valleys
Uzbek government tries to picture the country more homogenous than it really is. For example they pretend that Khwarezmian language (Oghuz) is a dialect of Uzbek (Karluk) which is an obvious lie. Country is way more diverse & heterogenous than you may think looking at statistics
Young, poor and diverse population of Uzbekistan is very much affected by the rapid inflation. What is worse, previously the poor rural youth could travel to Russia to take some low paid manual jobs. That was a way for Uzbekistan to relieve its demographic pressure and earn cash
Many (myself included) feared that Russian-Ukrainian war would lead to explosion Central Asia. It was the imbecile move of president to grasp even more powers and reduce regional autonomy of Karakalpakstan that triggered the crisis. But it has more fundamental underlying reasons
I am very much concerned that Karakalpakstan may be only the starting point of a major Central Asian crisis. The next obvious point for explosion is Khorezm. Khorezm viloyet is located in oasis on the lower Amu Darya. By Uzbek standards it's very poor, rural and densely populated
It is also ethnically different. Uzbek government pretends Khwarezmians are Uzbeks but that is a lie. Uzbeks are Karluk, Khwarezmians are Oghuz. Uzbeks look down upon Khwarezmians and the latter resent that being being such an ancient culture they are ruled by alien Uzbeks
What is happening in Uzbekistan looks like the very beginning of the Syrian war. It can also trigger a general Central Asian crisis. All these countries are affected by pretty much the same socioeconomic factors and now can't send their excess rural youth to work to Russia
I think that the international community should pressure President Mirziyoyev to:
1. Stop the "constitutional reform". No amendments at all 2. Choose scapegoats among his own administration and police and jail them for massacring the protestors in Nukus. Make a show out of it
Political deescalation however won't solve the structural socioeconomic problems of Uzbekistan which are many. It's necessary to find employment for excessive rural youth, at home or abroad. So far South Korea has been a preferable alternative to Russia rferl.org/a/uzbekistans-…
Contrary to the popular perception, Uzbekistan has been developing fairly well. It showed some of the highest rates of industrial growth in the former USSR. But again, contrary to the popular perception, growing rapidly doesn't prevent you from spiralling into chaos and violence
President Mirziyoyev must be urged to stop the constitutional reform. He must be urged to appoint scapegoats for the massacre and jail them. That can deescalate it for now. But in the long run it's vital to find/create employment for the rural youth that now can't go to Russia
Labour contracts with South Korea or with other East Asian countries can be a very good idea. Cash transfers of labor migrants could keep the rural economy afloat, creating many jobs at home. That could allow Uzbekistan to survive through the current global recession
Finally, international community should help Tashkent to work out a more fair, decentralised and inclusive political system. The extreme dissatisfaction of many Khorezmians with the alien rule of Tashkent was obvious when you talked to them privately. The system must be reformed
PS While the political system of Uzbekistan is too centralised and unfair, underrepresenting the regions and minorities, in Turkmenistan it is *MUCH* worse than that. I don't know any other Central Asian country with so much potential for an internal war of extermination. The end
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Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.