It might be more accurate to describe Daudov (Lord) as the commander-in-chief (вице-премьер по силовому блоку)
Regarding his rhetorics the level of religious observance in Chechnya is vastly exaggerated. I'd even say that being really observant is a sign of nonnocformity there
The large mosque in the centre of Grozny is nearly empty with exception of Friday and religious holidays. Theoretically everyone is supposed to pray five times a day. Very few do that in reality. You might think they pray at home, but majority doesn't. It's certainly an exception
I find that most discussions about Chechnya amount to savagery-porn. Like some paint Chechens as "evil savages". Some as "noble" ones. But that's all projections, because they're neither. Not that much of traditional society or culture survived through the 20th century
Not much of economy either. When visiting Chechnya I was surprised how little subsistence farming and animal husbandry I saw. Much less than in some neighbouring regions. I asked about it:
"Yeah, twenty years ago we had it. Now every house has the Wifi and TikTok instead"
If you think that Chechnya is an oasis of some uninterrupted tradition whether good or bad one, you are wrong. Traditional society was thoroughly uprooted. Tribal system for example. Now yeah everyone knows which clan they belong to and you are weird if you don't. But that's it
Clans (teips) do not serve as real structures that can be use for armed mobilisation as it was in the 19th c. Thinking that Chechen clans act this way and tribal leaders can call their men to war is like thinking the modern Highland chiefs in Scotland have this power. They don't
Chechnya is not a traditional tribal society anymore and Kadyrov's regime is *not* tribal. It's also not that religious. Btw Chechnya never was especially religious. Religion was imposed there from North Dagestan. Which indeed is the centre of Islamic knowledge. Like Khasavyurt
"Traditional religious tribal Islamist that are gonna kill us all" it's largely savagery porn aimed at Westerners. And Chechen authorities play this card, cuz it works. They're wise enough to understand that Western journalists don't need any information. They need confirmation
I think that pretty much every non Westerner with half a brain already figured out how to build a stable partnership with Western media:
1. Identify their preconceptions (that's easy, they don't even try to hide them) 2. Confirm them all
This is the way
Kadyrov is smart enough to understand this and he purposefully target the Western media space - both institutional media and the social media. In March re shared a post by a TV host Kandelaki in his Telegram channel:
"Ramzan confidently entered the social media space and realised it is the modern battlefield. Elon Musk and Pavel Durov are responding to Ramzan. We are in one step from Biden himself starting to publicly react to Kadyrov's Telegram - a unique case in political technologies"
Chechnya lives in the same social media space as the West. It's really important there. And Kadyrov is craving for attention. See example here. Attention in Russia is good. But attention in the West would be much better. Elon Musk reacting to him is a big victory for example
Interviewers of the Harvard Project were aware of the power asymmetry between them and their Soviets respondents. They guide for interviewing stated that respondents "may distort their answers in order to tell Americans what they think Americans want to hear". Well, ofc they will
What modern journalists don't seem to understand that the same power asymmetry exists between them and the Putin's satrap in North Caucasus. He lives in the same social media space as them and works hard to build his image there. He'll go at great lengths to achieve that. The end
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.