Rumours about Trump being a Russian agent may be exaggerated. It is a fact though that the Russian propaganda perceived him as a potential ally. Consider this patriotic song. On 0:25 you can hear laments about the "President beyond the ocean [Trump] being stripped of his power"
That's song "Uncle Vova [Putin], we're with you" released in November 2017, just ten months after Trump's inauguration. Therefore, laments about Trump being "stripped of his power" refer to the constitutional checks on his power rather than anything else
Within the official Russian discourse, President is perceived as a quasi monarchical figure and as the only source of legitimacy. He is casually referred to as "Sovereign". All the civil servants are Sovereign's men. All the federal or municipal budgets - the Sovereign's money
In 2016 Russian propaganda celebrated the Trump's election. Just one example
Medals on the Trump's election produced in Zlatoust, Russia. Level of Trumpophilia in 2016-2017 Russia was insane. In mid 2016 one blogger joked that judging from the official TV propaganda, in November Trump gonna be elected as the President of Rusia
What exactly should have happened with the Trump's elections? Some hoped for the Russian-US rapprochement. Others, for the US political system drifting towards Russia, evolving into yet another quasi monarchical order. Both were mistaken. Soon Russian loyalists were disappointed
Wild videos with the "Putin's squads" grannies beating Trump, capturing him, burning Trump's dummy, burying his portrait become more understandable if you consider that they were very emotionally invested in him from the beginning. That's why they were so much disappointed later
That makes sense in the context of Russian quasi monarchic political culture. As a quasi monarchy with all the federal or regional budget being the Sovereign's money, with all the civil servants being the Sovereign's men, Russia finds it easier to deal with other quasimonarchies
Claims about a supposed "coup" in Kyiv, 2014 should be viewed in this context. President Yanukovich was impeached by his own parliament, according to the written law. But from the Russian perspective they broke a more important unwritten law. You can't impeach your President
From the perspective of the written law, President is a public servant, who can be questioned, protested against or impeached. But according to the informal, unwritten Russian law, President is the Sovereign. He is the sole source of power and legitimacy in the country
From the perspective of Kremlin however, Parliament ousting Yanukovich was illegitimate (despite being legal). People rebelled against their Sovereign. The mutiny must be crushed so that neither Ukrainians or Russians would ever think of rebelling against their Sovereign. The end
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Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.