The war in Ukraine and the regional divergence in Russia
1. It will be a long war
2. Hostilities can be localised or interrupted with ceasefires. Doesn't matter. The fighting will resume again. And again
3. Contrary to the popular opinion, it will be Russia that breaks first🧵
4. Russian regime is hard and fragile
5. Regime consists of courtiers and barons: central and regional elites
6. Courtiers have the upper hand when the regime is strong, barons - when it's weak
7. Many courtiers have personal interest in the military victory, but barons don't
8. You can't judge official's view by his public stance. That's dumb. Only private stance matters
9. Lots of courtiers over 35 genuinely support the war
10. Almost no regional barons genuinely support the war. But there's a major exception in the South
11. The war led not only to the general economic downturn, but also to the massive regional divergence in Russia
12. Most of the regions lose, but they lose unevenly
13. In the past the center was an arbiter, redistributing resources from winners to losers. Now it won't
Biggest Losers in European Russia:
13. Large industrial & machinery cluster on Volga. Tatarstan, Samara, Ulyanovsk
14. The window to Europe in the Northwest. St Petersburg, Karelia, Pskov
15. The North. Arkhangelsk and the ancient Pomorye country. The old window to Europe
One of the biggest economic losers in Russia is the major machinery cluster on Volga. Tatarstan, Samara, Ulyanovsk are three regions with very similar economic model. They focused on improving the investment climate and attracting the FDIs. Obviously, they are being obliterated
Another loser is the North, which broadly overlaps with the borders of Pomorye land. Until 1703 it was the richest, the most commercially oriented part of Russia and of course the main taxpaying region. Even now Arkhangelsk was one of the most FDI-dependent regions in the country
Finally, it is the modern window to Europe, the Northwest that is especially affected employment-wise. St Petersburg economy was heavily oriented to Europe and those of nearby regions - on Europe and the megapolis of St Petersburg
Winners
14. Agrarian producers. With the food prices increased agrarian barons of Krasnodar or Rostov may have even benefitted. Plus they're involved in plundering Ukraine
15. Cannon fodder suppliers. Dagestan or Astrakhan are doing well, because the extra males went to Ukraine
We see a massive regional divergence in European Russia. Baronial groups that focused on the machinery or the FDI attraction lose massively. However, the barons of the poorest regions may even benefit by selling their surplus population as the cannon fodder to Putin
Interestingly enough, we see the negative correlation between the good unemployment situation of a region and its level of economic complexity. Check this map. The most complex regions are doing the worst, while the least complex - the best researchgate.net/figure/c-RIA-i…
And yet, cannon fodder suppliers don't export anything. The only regional interest group that was interested in prolonging the war were the agrarian barons of the South. First, they obliterated their Ukrainian competitors. Second, they were involved in plundering Ukraine
Third, they benefited from the food prices going into the stratosphere till this month. They had every reason to support the policy of Kremlin. And yet, now food prices are crashing. Which means their export profits will decrease and even worse, expropriated by Kremlin
With prices on almost all commodities dropping Kremlin will be forced to expropriate the export earnings of southern agrarian barons. It could let them cash out when the oil was expensive but now it just can't afford that. Which means agrarian barons will join the ranks of losers
Which leaves Kremlin with the only baronial group having a genuine interest in supporting its policies. The cannon fodder suppliers. But their loyalty is assured only for as long as the Kremlin can pay them. With the commodities going down, this is far from guaranteed. End of 🧵
Sources:
Central Bank and the CSR (Kudrin-led pro-Kremlin think tank) as well as the HH recruitment company statistics are open, anyone can access them. I used one more source, but not gonna name it. Also it's unpublished yet
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Yes, and that is super duper quadruper important to understand
Koreans are poor (don't have an empire) and, therefore, must do productive work to earn their living. So, if the Americans want to learn how to do anything productive they must learn it from Koreans etc
There is this stupid idea that the ultra high level of life and consumption in the United States has something to do with their productivity. That is of course a complete sham. An average American doesn't do anything useful or important to justify (or earn!) his kingly lifestyle
The kingly lifestyle of an average American is not based on his "productivity" (what a BS, lol) but on the global empire Americans are holding currently. Part of the imperial dynamics being, all the actually useful work, all the material production is getting outsourced abroad
Reading Tess of the d'Urbervilles. Set in southwest England, somewhere in the late 1800s. And the first thing you need to know is that Tess is bilingual. He speaks a local dialect she learnt at home, and the standard English she picked at school from a London-trained teacher
So, basically, "normal" language doesn't come out of nowhere. Under the normal conditions, people on the ground speak all the incomprehensible patois, wildly different from each other
"Regular", "correct" English is the creation of state
So, basically, the state chooses a standard (usually, based on one of the dialects), cleanses it a bit, and then shoves down everyone's throats via the standardized education
Purely artificial construct, of a super mega state that really appeared only by the late 1800s
There's a subtle point here that 99,999% of Western commentariat is missing. Like, totally blind to. And that point is:
Building a huuuuuuuuuuge dam (or steel plant, or whatever) has been EVERYONE's plan of development. Like absolutely every developing country, no exceptions
Almost everyone who tried to develop did it in a USSR-ish way, via prestige projects. Build a dam. A steel plant. A huge plant. And then an even bigger one
And then you run out of money, and it all goes bust and all you have is postapocalyptic ruins for the kids to play in
If China did not go bust, in a way like almost every development project from the USSR to South Asia did, that probably means that you guys are wrong about China. Like totally wrong
What you describe is not China but the USSR, and its copies & emulations elsewhere
What I am saying is that "capitalist reforms" are a buzzword devoid of any actual meaning, and a buzzword that obfuscated rather than explains. Specifically, it is fusing radically different policies taken under the radically different circumstances (and timing!) into one - purely for ideological purposes
It can be argued, for example, that starting from the 1980s, China has undertaken massive socialist reforms, specifically in infrastructure, and in basic (mother) industries, such as steel, petrochemical and chemical and, of course, power
The primary weakness of this argument is that being true, historically speaking, it is just false in the context of American politics where the “communism” label has been so over-used (and misapplied) that it lost all of its former power:
“We want X”
“No, that is communism”
“We want communism”
Basically, when you use a label like “communism” as a deus ex machina winning you every argument, you simultaneously re-define its meaning. And when you use it to beat off every popular socio economic demand (e.g. universal healthcare), you re-define communism as a synthesis of all the popular socio economic demands
Historical communism = forced industrial development in a poor, predominantly agrarian country, funded through expropriation of the peasantry
(With the most disastrous economic and humanitarian consequences)
Many are trying to explain his success with some accidental factors such as his “personal charisma”, Cuomo's weakness etc
Still, I think there may be some fundamental factors here. A longue durée shift, and a very profound one
1. Public outrage does not work anymore
If you look at Zohran, he is calm, constructive, and rarely raises his voice. I think one thing that Mamdani - but almost no one else in the American political space is getting - is that the public is getting tired of the outrage
Outrage, anger, righteous indignation have all been the primary drivers of American politics for quite a while
For a while, this tactics worked
Indeed, when everyone around is polite, and soft (and insincere), freaking out was a smart thing to do. It could help you get noticed