The war in Ukraine and the regional divergence in Russia
1. It will be a long war
2. Hostilities can be localised or interrupted with ceasefires. Doesn't matter. The fighting will resume again. And again
3. Contrary to the popular opinion, it will be Russia that breaks first🧵
4. Russian regime is hard and fragile
5. Regime consists of courtiers and barons: central and regional elites
6. Courtiers have the upper hand when the regime is strong, barons - when it's weak
7. Many courtiers have personal interest in the military victory, but barons don't
8. You can't judge official's view by his public stance. That's dumb. Only private stance matters
9. Lots of courtiers over 35 genuinely support the war
10. Almost no regional barons genuinely support the war. But there's a major exception in the South
11. The war led not only to the general economic downturn, but also to the massive regional divergence in Russia
12. Most of the regions lose, but they lose unevenly
13. In the past the center was an arbiter, redistributing resources from winners to losers. Now it won't
Biggest Losers in European Russia:
13. Large industrial & machinery cluster on Volga. Tatarstan, Samara, Ulyanovsk
14. The window to Europe in the Northwest. St Petersburg, Karelia, Pskov
15. The North. Arkhangelsk and the ancient Pomorye country. The old window to Europe
One of the biggest economic losers in Russia is the major machinery cluster on Volga. Tatarstan, Samara, Ulyanovsk are three regions with very similar economic model. They focused on improving the investment climate and attracting the FDIs. Obviously, they are being obliterated
Another loser is the North, which broadly overlaps with the borders of Pomorye land. Until 1703 it was the richest, the most commercially oriented part of Russia and of course the main taxpaying region. Even now Arkhangelsk was one of the most FDI-dependent regions in the country
Finally, it is the modern window to Europe, the Northwest that is especially affected employment-wise. St Petersburg economy was heavily oriented to Europe and those of nearby regions - on Europe and the megapolis of St Petersburg
Winners
14. Agrarian producers. With the food prices increased agrarian barons of Krasnodar or Rostov may have even benefitted. Plus they're involved in plundering Ukraine
15. Cannon fodder suppliers. Dagestan or Astrakhan are doing well, because the extra males went to Ukraine
We see a massive regional divergence in European Russia. Baronial groups that focused on the machinery or the FDI attraction lose massively. However, the barons of the poorest regions may even benefit by selling their surplus population as the cannon fodder to Putin
Interestingly enough, we see the negative correlation between the good unemployment situation of a region and its level of economic complexity. Check this map. The most complex regions are doing the worst, while the least complex - the best researchgate.net/figure/c-RIA-i…
And yet, cannon fodder suppliers don't export anything. The only regional interest group that was interested in prolonging the war were the agrarian barons of the South. First, they obliterated their Ukrainian competitors. Second, they were involved in plundering Ukraine
Third, they benefited from the food prices going into the stratosphere till this month. They had every reason to support the policy of Kremlin. And yet, now food prices are crashing. Which means their export profits will decrease and even worse, expropriated by Kremlin
With prices on almost all commodities dropping Kremlin will be forced to expropriate the export earnings of southern agrarian barons. It could let them cash out when the oil was expensive but now it just can't afford that. Which means agrarian barons will join the ranks of losers
Which leaves Kremlin with the only baronial group having a genuine interest in supporting its policies. The cannon fodder suppliers. But their loyalty is assured only for as long as the Kremlin can pay them. With the commodities going down, this is far from guaranteed. End of 🧵
Sources:
Central Bank and the CSR (Kudrin-led pro-Kremlin think tank) as well as the HH recruitment company statistics are open, anyone can access them. I used one more source, but not gonna name it. Also it's unpublished yet
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I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.