The war in Ukraine and the regional divergence in Russia
1. It will be a long war
2. Hostilities can be localised or interrupted with ceasefires. Doesn't matter. The fighting will resume again. And again
3. Contrary to the popular opinion, it will be Russia that breaks first🧵
4. Russian regime is hard and fragile
5. Regime consists of courtiers and barons: central and regional elites
6. Courtiers have the upper hand when the regime is strong, barons - when it's weak
7. Many courtiers have personal interest in the military victory, but barons don't
8. You can't judge official's view by his public stance. That's dumb. Only private stance matters
9. Lots of courtiers over 35 genuinely support the war
10. Almost no regional barons genuinely support the war. But there's a major exception in the South
11. The war led not only to the general economic downturn, but also to the massive regional divergence in Russia
12. Most of the regions lose, but they lose unevenly
13. In the past the center was an arbiter, redistributing resources from winners to losers. Now it won't
Biggest Losers in European Russia:
13. Large industrial & machinery cluster on Volga. Tatarstan, Samara, Ulyanovsk
14. The window to Europe in the Northwest. St Petersburg, Karelia, Pskov
15. The North. Arkhangelsk and the ancient Pomorye country. The old window to Europe
One of the biggest economic losers in Russia is the major machinery cluster on Volga. Tatarstan, Samara, Ulyanovsk are three regions with very similar economic model. They focused on improving the investment climate and attracting the FDIs. Obviously, they are being obliterated
Another loser is the North, which broadly overlaps with the borders of Pomorye land. Until 1703 it was the richest, the most commercially oriented part of Russia and of course the main taxpaying region. Even now Arkhangelsk was one of the most FDI-dependent regions in the country
Finally, it is the modern window to Europe, the Northwest that is especially affected employment-wise. St Petersburg economy was heavily oriented to Europe and those of nearby regions - on Europe and the megapolis of St Petersburg
Winners
14. Agrarian producers. With the food prices increased agrarian barons of Krasnodar or Rostov may have even benefitted. Plus they're involved in plundering Ukraine
15. Cannon fodder suppliers. Dagestan or Astrakhan are doing well, because the extra males went to Ukraine
We see a massive regional divergence in European Russia. Baronial groups that focused on the machinery or the FDI attraction lose massively. However, the barons of the poorest regions may even benefit by selling their surplus population as the cannon fodder to Putin
Interestingly enough, we see the negative correlation between the good unemployment situation of a region and its level of economic complexity. Check this map. The most complex regions are doing the worst, while the least complex - the best researchgate.net/figure/c-RIA-i…
And yet, cannon fodder suppliers don't export anything. The only regional interest group that was interested in prolonging the war were the agrarian barons of the South. First, they obliterated their Ukrainian competitors. Second, they were involved in plundering Ukraine
Third, they benefited from the food prices going into the stratosphere till this month. They had every reason to support the policy of Kremlin. And yet, now food prices are crashing. Which means their export profits will decrease and even worse, expropriated by Kremlin
With prices on almost all commodities dropping Kremlin will be forced to expropriate the export earnings of southern agrarian barons. It could let them cash out when the oil was expensive but now it just can't afford that. Which means agrarian barons will join the ranks of losers
Which leaves Kremlin with the only baronial group having a genuine interest in supporting its policies. The cannon fodder suppliers. But their loyalty is assured only for as long as the Kremlin can pay them. With the commodities going down, this is far from guaranteed. End of 🧵
Sources:
Central Bank and the CSR (Kudrin-led pro-Kremlin think tank) as well as the HH recruitment company statistics are open, anyone can access them. I used one more source, but not gonna name it. Also it's unpublished yet
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The primary weakness of this argument is that being true, historically speaking, it is just false in the context of American politics where the “communism” label has been so over-used (and misapplied) that it lost all of its former power:
“We want X”
“No, that is communism”
“We want communism”
Basically, when you use a label like “communism” as a deus ex machina winning you every argument, you simultaneously re-define its meaning. And when you use it to beat off every popular socio economic demand (e.g. universal healthcare), you re-define communism as a synthesis of all the popular socio economic demands
Historical communism = forced industrial development in a poor, predominantly agrarian country, funded through expropriation of the peasantry
(With the most disastrous economic and humanitarian consequences)
Many are trying to explain his success with some accidental factors such as his “personal charisma”, Cuomo's weakness etc
Still, I think there may be some fundamental factors here. A longue durée shift, and a very profound one
1. Public outrage does not work anymore
If you look at Zohran, he is calm, constructive, and rarely raises his voice. I think one thing that Mamdani - but almost no one else in the American political space is getting - is that the public is getting tired of the outrage
Outrage, anger, righteous indignation have all been the primary drivers of American politics for quite a while
For a while, this tactics worked
Indeed, when everyone around is polite, and soft (and insincere), freaking out was a smart thing to do. It could help you get noticed
People don’t really understand causal links. We pretend we do (“X results in Y”). But we actually don’t. Most explanations (= descriptions of causal structures) are fake.
There may be no connection between X and Y at all. The cause is just misattributed.
Or, perhaps, X does indeed result in Y. but only under a certain (and unknown!) set of conditions that remains totally and utterly opaque to us. So, X->Y is only a part of the equation
And so on
I like to think of a hypothetical Stone Age farmer who started farming, and it worked amazingly, and his entire community adopted his lifestyle, and many generations followed it and prospered and multiplied, until all suddenly wiped out in a new ice age
1. Normative Islamophobia that used to define the public discourse being the most acceptable form of racial & ethnic bigotry in the West, is receding. It is not so much dying as rather - failing to replicate. It is not that the old people change their views as that the young do not absorb their prejudice any longer.
In fact, I incline to think it has been failing to replicate for a while, it is just that we have not been paying attention
Again, the change of vibe does not happen at once. The Muslim scare may still find (some) audience among the more rigid elderly, who are not going to change their views. But for the youth, it is starting to sound as archaic as the Catholic scare of know nothings
Out of date
2. What is particularly interesting regarding Mamdani's victory, is his support base. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that its core is comprised of the young (and predominantly white) middle classes, with a nearly equal representation of men and women
What does Musk vs Trump affair teach us about the general patterns of human history? Well, first of all it shows that the ancient historians were right. They grasped something about nature of politics that our contemporaries simply can’t.
Let me give you an example. The Arab conquest of Spain
According to a popular medieval/early modern interpretation, its primary cause was the lust of Visigoth king Roderic. Aroused by the beautiful daughter of his vassal and ally, count Julian, he took advantage of her
Disgruntled, humiliated Julian allied himself with the Arabs and opens them the gates of Spain.
Entire kingdom lost, all because the head of state caused a personal injury to someone important.
One thing you need to understand about wars is that very few engage into the long, protracted warfare on purpose. Almost every war of attrition was planned and designed as a short victorious blitzkrieg
And then everything went wrong
Consider the Russian war in Ukraine. It was not planned as a war. It was not thought of as a war. It was planned as a (swift!) regime change allowing to score a few points in the Russian domestic politics. And then everything went wrong
It would not be an exaggeration to say that planning a short victorious war optimised for the purposes of domestic politics is how you *usually* end up in a deadlock. That is the most common scenario of how it happens, practically speaking