The war in Ukraine and the regional divergence in Russia
1. It will be a long war
2. Hostilities can be localised or interrupted with ceasefires. Doesn't matter. The fighting will resume again. And again
3. Contrary to the popular opinion, it will be Russia that breaks first🧵
4. Russian regime is hard and fragile
5. Regime consists of courtiers and barons: central and regional elites
6. Courtiers have the upper hand when the regime is strong, barons - when it's weak
7. Many courtiers have personal interest in the military victory, but barons don't
8. You can't judge official's view by his public stance. That's dumb. Only private stance matters
9. Lots of courtiers over 35 genuinely support the war
10. Almost no regional barons genuinely support the war. But there's a major exception in the South
11. The war led not only to the general economic downturn, but also to the massive regional divergence in Russia
12. Most of the regions lose, but they lose unevenly
13. In the past the center was an arbiter, redistributing resources from winners to losers. Now it won't
Biggest Losers in European Russia:
13. Large industrial & machinery cluster on Volga. Tatarstan, Samara, Ulyanovsk
14. The window to Europe in the Northwest. St Petersburg, Karelia, Pskov
15. The North. Arkhangelsk and the ancient Pomorye country. The old window to Europe
One of the biggest economic losers in Russia is the major machinery cluster on Volga. Tatarstan, Samara, Ulyanovsk are three regions with very similar economic model. They focused on improving the investment climate and attracting the FDIs. Obviously, they are being obliterated
Another loser is the North, which broadly overlaps with the borders of Pomorye land. Until 1703 it was the richest, the most commercially oriented part of Russia and of course the main taxpaying region. Even now Arkhangelsk was one of the most FDI-dependent regions in the country
Finally, it is the modern window to Europe, the Northwest that is especially affected employment-wise. St Petersburg economy was heavily oriented to Europe and those of nearby regions - on Europe and the megapolis of St Petersburg
Winners
14. Agrarian producers. With the food prices increased agrarian barons of Krasnodar or Rostov may have even benefitted. Plus they're involved in plundering Ukraine
15. Cannon fodder suppliers. Dagestan or Astrakhan are doing well, because the extra males went to Ukraine
We see a massive regional divergence in European Russia. Baronial groups that focused on the machinery or the FDI attraction lose massively. However, the barons of the poorest regions may even benefit by selling their surplus population as the cannon fodder to Putin
Interestingly enough, we see the negative correlation between the good unemployment situation of a region and its level of economic complexity. Check this map. The most complex regions are doing the worst, while the least complex - the best researchgate.net/figure/c-RIA-i…
And yet, cannon fodder suppliers don't export anything. The only regional interest group that was interested in prolonging the war were the agrarian barons of the South. First, they obliterated their Ukrainian competitors. Second, they were involved in plundering Ukraine
Third, they benefited from the food prices going into the stratosphere till this month. They had every reason to support the policy of Kremlin. And yet, now food prices are crashing. Which means their export profits will decrease and even worse, expropriated by Kremlin
With prices on almost all commodities dropping Kremlin will be forced to expropriate the export earnings of southern agrarian barons. It could let them cash out when the oil was expensive but now it just can't afford that. Which means agrarian barons will join the ranks of losers
Which leaves Kremlin with the only baronial group having a genuine interest in supporting its policies. The cannon fodder suppliers. But their loyalty is assured only for as long as the Kremlin can pay them. With the commodities going down, this is far from guaranteed. End of 🧵
Sources:
Central Bank and the CSR (Kudrin-led pro-Kremlin think tank) as well as the HH recruitment company statistics are open, anyone can access them. I used one more source, but not gonna name it. Also it's unpublished yet
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The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.