Chris Krebs Profile picture
Jul 12 8 tweets 2 min read
I can’t believe I have to say this, but just so we’re on the same page, the notion Exec Order 13848 (or any Exec Order) would allow the POTUS to rerun an election, seize election machines, or otherwise allow the Executive Branch to subvert a Federal election is lunacy.
EO 13848 lays out the workflow for agencies to analyze foreign interference, assess impact, and implement consequences. What are the consequences? Sanctions. It’s literally in the EO’s title. That’s it.
The CISA reports mentioned by the Kraken? Alerts we issued in October on Iranian and Russian efforts. Aha! you might say, proof! Not so fast. Those alerts were part of our efforts to spot & stop interference efforts, we assessed quickly & reported out quickly.
Iranian report: cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/cu…
Russian report: cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/al…
All of this is to say conspiracy theories that reinterpret & reimagine govt authorities/directives/alerts are part & parcel of fringe movements & are exploited by information operators. The fact this one got to the Resolute Desk and was received uncritically is harrowing.
So what’s the take away? The StopTheSteal effort and its moving parts were just one massive multi-pronged info op. All for power, influence, and money. Trying to overturn a free & fair election, irrespective of the damage caused. For purely self-serving anti-democratic reasons.
Coda: We prepared for foreign interference in our elections. We did our jobs and we did it right. For all that we got stabbed in the back by our own leaders. By a bunch of grifters and charlatans. How’s that for a performance review?

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More from @C_C_Krebs

Jun 28
Hung out w/ Ukrainian fighter pilot callsign Juice last week. He & wingman Moonfish were in DC to brief the Pentagon & Congress on state of play in the skies of Ukraine. It was an incredible honor to spend time with a real hero defending his homeland from Russian war criminals.
Not clear the visit had any impact here, but a positive development nonetheless, particularly in the wake of the latest crimes: thedrive.com/the-war-zone/u…
How can you help the 🇺🇦 Air Force? Support Wingmen for Ukraine by donating here: wingmenforukraine.com
Read 4 tweets
May 2
Today seems to be "write a story on the DHS Disinfo Board day," perhaps b/c of @SecMayorkas's Wednesday hearing in Senate Homeland. I'm already on the record (whatever that's worth) in support of coordination w/n @DHSgov on counter-disinfo work.
Mainly b/c an internal coordination & governance mechanism is what DHS SHOULD be doing. The group is NOT operational, instead, designed to develop & feed 1A, civil liberties/rights, & privacy protections into operational activities, & ensure department equities are synched.
But also DHS has been pre-bunking, debunking, & clarifying for years, including in the Trump & Obama admins. One difference is that it wasn't always called "counter disinfo" work. Sometimes it was just FAQs, or Rumor Control, or simply a comms strategy.
Read 18 tweets
Feb 18
It's pretty remarkable how far the US intel community has come in counter-active measures efforts in the last few years. The analysis paralysis of the past has been replaced by an intentional workstream declassifying intel to expose plans before they're set in motion. Kudos.
There's risk, of course, like "hey, it didn't happen, so you were just making it up!" or "where's the evidence?" But I expect for most, that's fine, b/c there's a very specific audience, i.e., Putin. The message is: "we know what you're up to, you've got leaks, don't do this."
The leaks/leaky comms thing is important, as it can create internal strife, including kicking up counterintelligence hunts in the Russian ranks. Puts some sand in their gears, creates mistrust, and can slow down planning and operations.
Read 5 tweets
Jul 4, 2021
Ugh. I watch this garbage bc it’s important to know what the superspreaders of disinfo are saying. This one single individual is responsible for an embarrassing assault on democracy. He doesn’t give a shit about America. He only cares about himself. We suffer in the meantime.
Along the way he has enthralled a political party too scared of the base to speak up and do what’s right. This must end. Tomorrow is the day we celebrate the establishment of America. Of our democracy. We have work to do or this is going to slip through our fingers.
America isn’t perfect. But it isn’t this hateful, lying, racist version you see on TV. I am confident that if we embrace our diversity - racial, gender, neuro - we have incredible promise. We can overcome anything and help us all move forward.
Read 4 tweets
Jun 3, 2021
On ransomware, why are things so bad? h/t @ciaranmartinoxf
1) security posture of businesses making it too easy for the bad guys.
2) it's a profitable business model w/ low barriers to entry.
3) no meaningful consequences against the criminals or their hosts to date.
Why would the Russian govt allow this to flourish? A few thoughts:
1) builds a cyber workforce they can call on later
2) creates well-paying jobs (& keeps them off the streets)
3) undermines confidence in western citizenry of their govt's ability to defend.
What stood out in the DepNatSecAdv's letter? 3 things:
1) all companies are in play as r'ware is opportunistic
2) r'ware is a business disruption risk, not just theft risk.
3) I can't recall a letter like this from a senior WH natsec official; they're taking this seriously.
Read 7 tweets
Apr 1, 2021
As a contributor and sometime stunt double in the Commission process, I have a lot respect for the work led by Sen. King and Rep. Gallagher. I particularly appreciated that the Commission recommended new authorities for @CISAgov, many subsequently enacted in the ‘21 NDAA.
The main area where we differed in opinion was with the National Cyber Director, also enacted in the NDAA. I firmly believed (still do) clarifying and strengthening existing agencies was the area that would have the most immediate impact.
There is a role for an NCD, but I believe the appointment of Anne Neuberger as Deputy NatSec Advisor to @POTUS addressed many of the concerns that prompted the creation of the NCD.
Read 5 tweets

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