In modern Russia the words "musicians" and "orchestra" have acquired new connotations. In war-related materials they serve as references to the "Wagner" mercenary company which fought for Putin in Syria, Central Africa and now in Ukraine
Wagner is founded by Evegeny Prigozhin, a St Petersburg businessman close to Vladimir Putin. Prigozhin either made his fortune in restaurant business or used restaurants as a cover. Later he would organise catering for the Russian leadership, so Prigizhin was called Putin's cook
Wagner company grew big. A list of their job openings from their Vkontakte page. That gives some idea about the idea and variety of equipment they are using. That's a full scale private army vk.com/pmcworld
Being named after Richard Wagner, this company calls itself an "orchestra" and its mercenaries - "musicians". On the right you see the Wagner recruitment billboard in Yekaterinburg:
"Orchestra W is waiting for you"
This photo pretty much summarises the Wagner iconography. "Musical references". "Brat" movie - I wrote about its enormous impact on the modern Russian state cult. And of course the hammer
The hammer is a reference to the Wagner mercenaries in Syria executing a Syrian deserter from Bashar Assad's army. They beat him with a hammer, cut off his head and hands and burnt whatever remained from the body
Here you can find the photos (graphic) and if you want, google translate the material
A Syrian's execution became a well-known meme, which many try to cosplay
Here you see Wagner musicians on the ruins of Severodonetsk, Ukraine
Professionals from Wagner are more often used on risky missions than those in the regular Russian army. On the other hand, they are better compensated - and making memes about Wagner service being more lucrative than the regular army service
But in order to train their troops, Wagner uses the same Rheinmetall-built military infrastructure. Look at their advertisment, where they call volunteers to a "Molkino" village. They mean Mulino
A journalist of Meduza called Wagner introducing himself as a volunteer. And they told him that for the first month of service they're gonna train on the Mulino training ground and only then go to Ukraine meduza.io/feature/2022/0…
Wagner mercenaries are being trained on the same Rheinmetall-built Mulino training ground as the regular Russian army. The end of a short 🧵
PS clip in the beginning is Лето и арбалеты you can watch it on YouTube
An earlier thread on the Brat movies that are constantly referred to by Putin, Rogozin and ofc Wagner. That's the canon of the modern Russian state cult
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.