You could add Russia to the list. Strange it may sound, its pattern of expansion was similar. Except it was potamic rather than oceanic. In this respect it kinda resembled Portugues expansion in what is now Brazil. And yes, Russia struggled to go far away from the rivers, too
Consider the map of Russian admiralties till 1680-1800s. Some of them look "logical" being located at the cost, like in St Petersburg or Arkhangelsk. But Kazan or Voronezh are deep inland. They would build ships there and then go down the river to the sea. Irkutsk is even better
Irkutsk admiralty didn't build ships. But it prepared all the equipment & components for the Okhotsk shipyard. It was a very northern Okhotsk that was the initial Russian stronghold on the Pacific. Alaska was colonised from there. What is now Vladivostok was annexed only in 1850s
That's a very sketchy map of how Russian transport routes changed over time. It reflects the general trend of Russia going south. Older centres of population and economy were situated much further north than they lie now. That happened in Siberia with the Transsiberian railway
European Russia used to be a much more northern country, too. Consider a single parameter - a number of households from provincial cities who paid the musketeers tax in 1682-1683. That doesn't reflect the population numbers but may kinda reflect the size of the middle class
Until 1700s Pomorye, literally the "land by the sea" located by the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean was by far the richest and the most commercial part of Russia. Then the St Petersburg was founded and Peter I prohibited foreign trade through Pomorye, so it gradually declined
Pomor people are the exception being the only originally seafaring culture the Russia had. They were indeed sea going and ocean going people. Russia however was super potamic and overwhelmingly relied on rivers as the means of communications. At least till the railways were built
What is important to understand is that historically since at least 1600 Russia has been going south, with its demographic and economic centre shifting closer and closer to equator. But back then it was *expanding* south, expanding not only geographically but also demographically
Now Russia is shrinking. It's ageing and depopulating. But it is depopulating unevenly. The North, Siberia and the Far East are getting empty with people leaving en masse, while Krasnodar is the fastest growing city not only in Russia but possibly in Europe. Russia's moving south
That makes total sense. First, climate. Siberia is hard to live in. Yes, it has tons of resources and industry, but with Moscow taking everything, it keeps Siberia in poverty. As a result people are voting with legs and moving to the warmer places. Like the Black Sea coast
Second, logistics. Most all of Russian trade is being done via seaports located in only three regions - St Petersburg, Vladivostok and Krasnodar. Three points of access to the relatively warm seas that Russia has. And Krasnodar is the warmest of all. It's usually not freezing
No wonder that now most of Russian internal migrants go to one of three centres. It's either Moscow, St Petersburg or Krasnodar. While Moscow and St Petersburg are old imperial centres and Moscow is super unsustainable, being a geographic anomaly, Krasnodar grows naturally
Siberia getting empty, Russia is shrinking southwest. In this context war with Ukraine makes sense. It lies too close to new Russian demographic and economic centres. Indeed, Krasnodar & Rostov interest groups are major beneficiaries and supporters of this war. They're doing well
Two conclusions. First, policy makers hoping to use Russia against China may be delusional. The war in Europe is natural with Russia shrinking southwest. Conflict with China though would be unnatural. The rule of Moscow depopulates Siberia leaving it empty. No ground for conflict
With the demographic and economic centres shifting southwest, Southwest has too powerful interest groups, which Moscow now has to negotiate with. Which is not the case with Siberia. Krasnodar has way more saying in Kremlin than any Siberian region
Second. Many presume that the disintegration of Russia should it take place, will start with some ethnic republics. I don't think so. It will probably start in one of these ones. The end of🧵
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The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum