Kremlin may not have a grey cardinal. But it has a bald engineer. The Kinder Egg is a major architect of Putinism. In 1998 he made Putin the FSB Chief. In 2000s he dismantled the regional autonomy imposing the centralised rule. Now he manages Putin's domestic policy and Ukraine🧵
Sergey Kirienko was born as Sergey Israitel in a mixed Russian-Jewish family. After the divorce his mother changed his surname from father's "Israitel" to her own "Kirienko". That could be a pragmatic decision. A boy with a Slavic name would have better career chances in the USSR
In childhood Kirienko lived with his mom in subtropical Sochi. Here he started the bureaucrat career as a Komsomol manager (комсорг) of his high school class. NB: the role of Komsomol in Soviet to post-Soviet transition is underrated. Komsomol management were its main benefactors
After finishing high school he went to the uni in Nizhny Novgorod, majoring in shipbuilding. By coincidence his dad was leading a sub-department (кафедра) at the same shipbuilding department (факультет). Of course he presided over the department Komsomol Committee in uni as well
After the uni he served in the army for two years. This may be an indication that he wasn't recruited by the KGB back then. Indeed, Kirienko was a descendant of the minor Soviet nobility and the KGB wasn't really allowed to recruit nomenklatura kids as their informers or agents
In 1986 Kirienko becomes a foreman at the shipyard Krasnoye Sormovo in Nizhny Novgorod. But he was more interested in a bureaucratic Komsomol career than in production processes. In 1987 he becomes a "liberated" [from work] full time Komsomol secretary at the shipyard
Perestroika gave Komsomol managers lots of new financial opportunities and Kirienko couldn't miss them. He becomes a Komsomol supervisor of NTTM centres. NTTM = Center for Scientific and Technical Creativity of the Youth. Unbelievably lucrative position by the late 1980s
Kirienko, @mbk_center and so many of the Russian elite came from the NTTM. Why? In 1988 NTTMs got the right to cash out the non cash money, making it the unique place for plunder. In order to get how it happened, you must understand Soviet monetary system
Kirienko went into business becoming a criminal entrepreneur in Nizhny Novgorod. In 1991 for example he sent gangsters to beat a businessman Abuladze and threaten to kill him unless he relinquishes control over a tennis court on Timirazeva Street flb.ru/infoprint/7217…
Kirienko was also known for his interest in scientology. When leading a local bank he sent his employees to do courses in a Hubbard College evolkov.net/cults/scientol… That created some controversy once he became the PM independent.co.uk/news/russia-s-…
Through his business activities Kirienko became close to the governor of Nizhny Novgorod Nemtsov. In 1997 Nemtsov became the Deputy PM of Russia and simultaneously the Minister for energy. Nemtsov takes Kirienko to Moscow and makes his deputy. Kirienko joins the government
In Moscow Kirienko begins his incredible rise:
13.05.1997 Deputy Minister for Energy
20.11.1997 Minister for Energy (instead of Nemtsov)
23.03.1998 President Yeltsin appoints him as an acting PM
He was only 35 and a noname. Journalists called him the "Kinder surprise"
Parliament which used to have some agency back then refused to confirm him twice. Third time they agreed though. According to the Article 111 of the Constitution, if Parliament refuses to confirm the President's candidature for the PM three times in a row, it сan be dissolved
Why was Kirienko chosen as a PM? Probably as a scapegoat. Russia was spiralling into a massive crisis and someone had to be held responsible for that. A Ponzi scheme of government short-term obligations ГКО was to blow up soon and someone had to be sacrificed. Why not him?
During his short PM service, Kirienko made a decision of a crucial importance. He appointed Putin as the new FSB Director: chief of the state security. It was ofc done by the President's order. But Yumashev's memories mention that it was Kirienko who lobbied Putin's candidature
Putin later recalled:
"I'm sitting in my office. There's a call from Yumashev [Yeltsin's son in law and Presidential Administration Chief]:
- Can you to to the airport, meet Kirienko?
- Yes
"What has happened?" - I wonder. I was concerned something went wrong
Kirienko is coming out of the plane:
- Volodya, I congratulate you!
- With what?
- The executive order is signed. You are the FSB director
That's how Putin got the control over the state security. Kirienko 1) made decision 2) personally informed Putin of it 3) introduced him
The GKO state obligations Ponzi scheme bursted soon. Kirienko wasn't really responsible for crisis but he was appointed as a scapegoat. One day before Russia declared the default he tried to resign. President didn't allow him to. Five days after the default he just fired him
Kirienko suffered a catastrophe. After becoming the youngest PM in Russian history at just 35, he lost everything. He tried to run for a mayor of Moscow, but unsuccessfully. Tried to launch his own party (the SPS), but with limited success either. His career seemed to be over
It was the Putin's succession that made Kirienko's fortune. First of all, Putin never forgot a man who made him the FSB Chief. Second, with Putin's succession rules of game changed. Public politics were over, and the era of management and technocracy commenced. Kirienko loved it
In 2000 Putin started to reorganise the country dismantling the regional autonomy and imposing the centralised rule. The problem was that many regions were run by independent governors, who didn't fully submit to the new regime. They needed to be put in line
In order to put governors in line, Putin invented the new institution: the Federal Districts. The country was divided into the Federal Districts, each run by the appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary who was responsible for aligning the elected governors with Kremlin's policy
Kirienko was appointed to the very difficult Federal District: the Volga. It included a few ethnic republics, including two very problematic ones - Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. They were both less than enthusiastic about bending the knee. Largely because they were rich
Tatarstan was especially problematic from the Moscow standpoint. In 1992 it refused to sign the Federation Treaty (like Chechnya) and launched a referendum on sovereignty. 61% voted for, so Tatarstan was proclaimed a "sovereign state associated with Russia" rather than a province
Kirienko immediately got into conflict with the Tatarstan President Shaymiev. The latter repeatedly refused to meet Kirienko (unless he comes with Putin). That was a demonstration against Kirienko himself and also against the entire institution of Presidential Plenipotentiaries
Kirienko was a centraliser and thus the enemy of the regional elites. His position of a Moscow appointee shaped his policies. And yet, back in the 2000s he weaponised the "liberal" rhetorics in his centralising crusade. For example, he accused Tatarstan of "state capitalism"
"In many economic respects Tatarstan Republic is acting as the Tatarstan, Inc. It plays by the market rules with the outside world, and by non-market rules inside. For example, in petrochemical industry enterprises have to sell raw materials to refineries at below market prices"
It's a good illustration of how the Moscow elites would weaponise whatever fashionable rhetorics in their quest to grab more powers. Back in the 2000s economic liberalism was fashionable, so they would present themselves as the true market-oriented force. Rhetorics don't matter
While Tatarstan could (initially) resist Kirienko's encroachment, his home Nizhny Novgorod couldn't. He made Nizhny his capital in the region and yet, acted here as a coloniser. He helps Moscow companies to appropriate local industry, creating the absentee landlordism system
In 2005 Kirienko was appointed as the CEO of Rosatom, the state Nuclear Corporation. This should be interpreted in historical context. In the 1990s Soviet military industrial complex was in disarray. Most facilities became independent (but in ruins)
In 2000s Putin reorganised the military industrial complex uniting the plants into vertical integrated holdings. Rostec - the key military producer. KTRV - tactical missiles. Almaz Antey - air defence. Roskosmos (created later) - ballistic missiles. Rosatom - nuclear warheads
NB: *all* of these corporations have both civilian and military production. That's the legacy of Soviet industry which was initially built as dual use. Rosatom has civilian production, too (e.g. nuclear power plants). But it has huge military importance for the deterrence system
On his position, Kirienko became known as not bad manager. Don't take me wrong, he's not brilliant. He'd never be able to build a complex company himself. But at least he was able not to destroy the one he was appointed to. That's something. That makes him better than many others
Kirienko was unhappy about the Rosatom job, seeing it as an exile. In 2016 he had a chance to return to Kremlin, as the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration. On this position, Kirienko concentrated power far exceeding the one of his better known predecessors like Surkov
Until 2022 Kirienko didn't invest much in his PR, preferring to stay in shadow. I would thus argue that his role is underrated, he's a key player of the late Putinism and one of the major driving forces behind this war. But I'll cover it next time. The end of 🧵
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.
Literacy rates in European Russia, 1897. Obviously, the data is imperfect. Still, it represents one crucial pattern for understanding the late Russian Empire. That is the wide gap in human capital between the core of empire and its Western borderland.
The most literate regions of Empire are its Lutheran provinces, including Finland, Estonia & Latvia
Then goes, roughly speaking, Poland-Lithuania
Russia proper has only two clusters of high literacy: Moscow & St Petersburg. Surrounded by the vast ocean of illiterate peasantry
This map shows how thin was the civilisation of Russia proper comparatively speaking. We tend to imagine old Russia, as the world of nobility, palaces, balls, and duels. And that is not wrong, because this world really existed, and produced some great works of art and literature