Kamil Galeev Profile picture
Jul 23 35 tweets 14 min read
Kremlin may not have a grey cardinal. But it has a bald engineer. The Kinder Egg is a major architect of Putinism. In 1998 he made Putin the FSB Chief. In 2000s he dismantled the regional autonomy imposing the centralised rule. Now he manages Putin's domestic policy and Ukraine🧵
Sergey Kirienko was born as Sergey Israitel in a mixed Russian-Jewish family. After the divorce his mother changed his surname from father's "Israitel" to her own "Kirienko". That could be a pragmatic decision. A boy with a Slavic name would have better career chances in the USSR
In childhood Kirienko lived with his mom in subtropical Sochi. Here he started the bureaucrat career as a Komsomol manager (комсорг) of his high school class. NB: the role of Komsomol in Soviet to post-Soviet transition is underrated. Komsomol management were its main benefactors
After finishing high school he went to the uni in Nizhny Novgorod, majoring in shipbuilding. By coincidence his dad was leading a sub-department (кафедра) at the same shipbuilding department (факультет). Of course he presided over the department Komsomol Committee in uni as well
After the uni he served in the army for two years. This may be an indication that he wasn't recruited by the KGB back then. Indeed, Kirienko was a descendant of the minor Soviet nobility and the KGB wasn't really allowed to recruit nomenklatura kids as their informers or agents
In 1986 Kirienko becomes a foreman at the shipyard Krasnoye Sormovo in Nizhny Novgorod. But he was more interested in a bureaucratic Komsomol career than in production processes. In 1987 he becomes a "liberated" [from work] full time Komsomol secretary at the shipyard
Perestroika gave Komsomol managers lots of new financial opportunities and Kirienko couldn't miss them. He becomes a Komsomol supervisor of NTTM centres. NTTM = Center for Scientific and Technical Creativity of the Youth. Unbelievably lucrative position by the late 1980s
Kirienko, @mbk_center and so many of the Russian elite came from the NTTM. Why? In 1988 NTTMs got the right to cash out the non cash money, making it the unique place for plunder. In order to get how it happened, you must understand Soviet monetary system
Kirienko went into business becoming a criminal entrepreneur in Nizhny Novgorod. In 1991 for example he sent gangsters to beat a businessman Abuladze and threaten to kill him unless he relinquishes control over a tennis court on Timirazeva Street flb.ru/infoprint/7217…
Kirienko was also known for his interest in scientology. When leading a local bank he sent his employees to do courses in a Hubbard College evolkov.net/cults/scientol… That created some controversy once he became the PM independent.co.uk/news/russia-s-…
Through his business activities Kirienko became close to the governor of Nizhny Novgorod Nemtsov. In 1997 Nemtsov became the Deputy PM of Russia and simultaneously the Minister for energy. Nemtsov takes Kirienko to Moscow and makes his deputy. Kirienko joins the government
In Moscow Kirienko begins his incredible rise:

13.05.1997 Deputy Minister for Energy
20.11.1997 Minister for Energy (instead of Nemtsov)
23.03.1998 President Yeltsin appoints him as an acting PM

He was only 35 and a noname. Journalists called him the "Kinder surprise"
Parliament which used to have some agency back then refused to confirm him twice. Third time they agreed though. According to the Article 111 of the Constitution, if Parliament refuses to confirm the President's candidature for the PM three times in a row, it сan be dissolved
Why was Kirienko chosen as a PM? Probably as a scapegoat. Russia was spiralling into a massive crisis and someone had to be held responsible for that. A Ponzi scheme of government short-term obligations ГКО was to blow up soon and someone had to be sacrificed. Why not him?
During his short PM service, Kirienko made a decision of a crucial importance. He appointed Putin as the new FSB Director: chief of the state security. It was ofc done by the President's order. But Yumashev's memories mention that it was Kirienko who lobbied Putin's candidature
Putin later recalled:

"I'm sitting in my office. There's a call from Yumashev [Yeltsin's son in law and Presidential Administration Chief]:

- Can you to to the airport, meet Kirienko?
- Yes

"What has happened?" - I wonder. I was concerned something went wrong
Kirienko is coming out of the plane:

- Volodya, I congratulate you!
- With what?
- The executive order is signed. You are the FSB director

That's how Putin got the control over the state security. Kirienko 1) made decision 2) personally informed Putin of it 3) introduced him
The GKO state obligations Ponzi scheme bursted soon. Kirienko wasn't really responsible for crisis but he was appointed as a scapegoat. One day before Russia declared the default he tried to resign. President didn't allow him to. Five days after the default he just fired him
Kirienko suffered a catastrophe. After becoming the youngest PM in Russian history at just 35, he lost everything. He tried to run for a mayor of Moscow, but unsuccessfully. Tried to launch his own party (the SPS), but with limited success either. His career seemed to be over
It was the Putin's succession that made Kirienko's fortune. First of all, Putin never forgot a man who made him the FSB Chief. Second, with Putin's succession rules of game changed. Public politics were over, and the era of management and technocracy commenced. Kirienko loved it
In 2000 Putin started to reorganise the country dismantling the regional autonomy and imposing the centralised rule. The problem was that many regions were run by independent governors, who didn't fully submit to the new regime. They needed to be put in line
In order to put governors in line, Putin invented the new institution: the Federal Districts. The country was divided into the Federal Districts, each run by the appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary who was responsible for aligning the elected governors with Kremlin's policy
Kirienko was appointed to the very difficult Federal District: the Volga. It included a few ethnic republics, including two very problematic ones - Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. They were both less than enthusiastic about bending the knee. Largely because they were rich
Tatarstan was especially problematic from the Moscow standpoint. In 1992 it refused to sign the Federation Treaty (like Chechnya) and launched a referendum on sovereignty. 61% voted for, so Tatarstan was proclaimed a "sovereign state associated with Russia" rather than a province
Kirienko immediately got into conflict with the Tatarstan President Shaymiev. The latter repeatedly refused to meet Kirienko (unless he comes with Putin). That was a demonstration against Kirienko himself and also against the entire institution of Presidential Plenipotentiaries
Kirienko was a centraliser and thus the enemy of the regional elites. His position of a Moscow appointee shaped his policies. And yet, back in the 2000s he weaponised the "liberal" rhetorics in his centralising crusade. For example, he accused Tatarstan of "state capitalism"
"In many economic respects Tatarstan Republic is acting as the Tatarstan, Inc. It plays by the market rules with the outside world, and by non-market rules inside. For example, in petrochemical industry enterprises have to sell raw materials to refineries at below market prices"
It's a good illustration of how the Moscow elites would weaponise whatever fashionable rhetorics in their quest to grab more powers. Back in the 2000s economic liberalism was fashionable, so they would present themselves as the true market-oriented force. Rhetorics don't matter
While Tatarstan could (initially) resist Kirienko's encroachment, his home Nizhny Novgorod couldn't. He made Nizhny his capital in the region and yet, acted here as a coloniser. He helps Moscow companies to appropriate local industry, creating the absentee landlordism system
In 2005 Kirienko was appointed as the CEO of Rosatom, the state Nuclear Corporation. This should be interpreted in historical context. In the 1990s Soviet military industrial complex was in disarray. Most facilities became independent (but in ruins)
In 2000s Putin reorganised the military industrial complex uniting the plants into vertical integrated holdings. Rostec - the key military producer. KTRV - tactical missiles. Almaz Antey - air defence. Roskosmos (created later) - ballistic missiles. Rosatom - nuclear warheads
NB: *all* of these corporations have both civilian and military production. That's the legacy of Soviet industry which was initially built as dual use. Rosatom has civilian production, too (e.g. nuclear power plants). But it has huge military importance for the deterrence system
On his position, Kirienko became known as not bad manager. Don't take me wrong, he's not brilliant. He'd never be able to build a complex company himself. But at least he was able not to destroy the one he was appointed to. That's something. That makes him better than many others
Kirienko was unhappy about the Rosatom job, seeing it as an exile. In 2016 he had a chance to return to Kremlin, as the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration. On this position, Kirienko concentrated power far exceeding the one of his better known predecessors like Surkov
Until 2022 Kirienko didn't invest much in his PR, preferring to stay in shadow. I would thus argue that his role is underrated, he's a key player of the late Putinism and one of the major driving forces behind this war. But I'll cover it next time. The end of 🧵

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More from @kamilkazani

Jul 25
I find this line of argumentation illustrative of the general state of Russian discourse, whether "patriotic" or "liberal". Everything Turkic occupies the same place in the Russian debates as everything Irish in the Imperial British. The Inner Other and the source of all the evil
Reading the Russian-Ukrainian debates with both sides accusing each other of racial impurity and having too many Steppe admixtures or influences, I noticed that their argumentation is mirroring each other. See this Russian nationalist material for example sputnikipogrom.com/history/15934/…
This mutuality and almost exact symmetry of Russian-Ukrainian accusations reminds me of a brilliant thread on the British rule over the Ionian Isles. Bach then the discourse was similar. Brits and Greeks were constantly accusing each other of Irishness
Read 14 tweets
Jul 24
Russian bureaucracy is *massive*. It's also diverse. Judging from my observations, it's less integrated than let's say the apparatus of the U.S. federal bureaucracy. Different agencies have different cultures and operate by different rules. Avoid sweeping generalisations (not🧵)
I see a very common attitude among the Russian pro-war community. It can be summarised this way:

"We expected dumb and incompetent bureaucrats to destroy our economy. But our glorious army would prevail against all odds. It turned out we were wrong. It's the other way around"
Now much of the Z-community argues that they greatly overestimated the Russian army (and the military apparatus). It's very, very much worse than anyone thought before. But they underestimated the economic bureaucracy. Which is very much better than they could have thought
Read 22 tweets
Jul 23
No. Describing Russian regime as "kleptocracy" is misrepresentation. It's not technically false, just absurdly reductionist. Let's be honest, if Putinism was *entirely* about stealing it would not be able to wage wars or produce armaments. And it produces hella lots of them
Keep in mind that public rhetorics work according to the rhetorical logic. Public position doesn't have to be factually accurate, it has to be rhetorically advantageous for it to work. They talk about "corruption" so much because it's rhetorically advantageous. That's it
When you don't have a positive agenda/vision of future or it's too hideous, you talk about "corruption". Examples - Lukashenko or Yeltsin. "Anti-corruption fight" is an ideal topic for a power hungry politician. Because talking about corruption = avoiding the actual conversation
Read 19 tweets
Jul 21
Last time I discussed Volgograd - the poorest large city in Russia. Today I read a news about relatives of a Volgograd corporal KIA in Ukraine who are fighting over 12 million rubles of compensation. His aunt illegally appropriated all the money, so other relatives are suing her
That's something that misses from most of discussions. Compensations for soldiers KIA in Ukraine are huge. They are absolutely enormous by the standards of poor Russian province. 12 million rubles is the entire fortune for Volgograd

volgasib.ru/virtual/skanda…
Average salary in the Volgograd oblast is about 38 000 rubles. So 12 million is 315 average monthly salaries (median is lower). In other words, the coffin money amount to 26 average yearly salaries in Volgograd region. Average guy will never ever earn that much money in his life
Read 8 tweets
Jul 19
Many wondered: why during the Chechen wars many families opposed the war, while now almost nobody does? Well, one answer is that during the Chechen wars monetary compensations to families were negligible, while now the "coffin money" (гробовые) are quite good. You can buy a car
Also notice the location. It's Saratov. There is a major gap between more successful Middle Volga regions like Tatarstan, Samara and Ulyanovsk (green) and much poorer Lower Volga such as Saratov (yellow) or Volgograd (red). Socioeconomic situation in the latter is *way* worse Image
The gap is not only economic, but also cultural. In some respects the Middle vs Lower Volga dichotomy resembles the nanfang vs beifang dichotomy in China. Saratov and Volgograd are paradoxically much more "beifang", Muscovite and Great Russian than regions to the north of them Image
Read 13 tweets
Jul 17
Great question. You see, many scenarios that kinda seem plausible ("Dagestan Rebellion") are unlikely to happen exactly because they're just too foreseeable. Muslim rebellion in Caucasus seems plausible not only to you, but also to Kremlin. So it took certain precautions (not🧵)
Regarding Dagestan, Kremlin identified potentially disloyal settlements. Such as Gimry for example. At the entrance to any of them they put a checkpoint with an armoured vehicle standing there 24/7. They check documents, don't allow any outsiders and kinda show they keep control
To my best knowledge, they tended to put the National Guard from Tatarstan to guard potentially disloyal settlements in Dagestan. Kinda control Muslims with Muslims. These guys stand at the most risky positions, but overall Dagestan was full of federal forces when I visited it
Read 16 tweets

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