Let's take a look at Phoenix and LA in 2010.
In neither case does closing the cyclical gap in local construction solve any actual problem. Phoenix had a collapse in demand and mass vacancies at the time, ....
...and countercyclical building in LA gets them all the way up to the level of building in Phoenix in 2010 when the metro was in crisis.
The solution we need is for LA to be MORE cyclical - for building in LA in 2005 to be 5 times what it was!
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If anyone wants to steelman the article, I'll let you have the last word, because these are two thoughtful writers on this topic and they have earned better than dismay, which is the best I can do on this.
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To recap, here, I have an estimate of the effect of mortgage access, persistent local supply constraints, and cyclical factors on the aggregate national average home price.
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Today, I want to talk about the supply factor in the Closed Access cities. These are the cities for which population growth is limited by housing supply. Basically, outmigration is driven by financial distress. The more distressing, the more people move away.
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As I mentioned the other day, in the first graph, the red line is the effect of housing supply on persistent rental costs, the blue line is the effect of mortgage access on price/rent, and the combo of the two is the effect of supply and credit on low tier home prices.
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Hearing builders talk about the effect of interest rates on their sales, I think one can see some of the disconnect between the seemingly obvious connection between interest rates and housing markets and the lack of correlation between rates and home prices.
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Certainly, some potential buyers have cancelled orders or stopped shopping. Others have changed their orders to reflect new borrowing constraints.
Commonly, a buyer might get rid of some upgrades or shift to a smaller floor plan.
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So, after those adjustments, you might have lower net sales, and buyers paying less. But, if a new buyer shifted from the $250,000 floor plan to the $225,000 floor plan, the household spending shifted while the home prices stayed the same.
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(To revisit: I have developed this model of home prices based on my research on the importance of supply constraints in housing markets. I can disaggregate supply vs. demand forces down to the local level.)
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Anyway, I consider this credit access estimate a lower bound on the importance of tightening standards.
You could think of the "supply" component as reflecting low tier rents & the credit component reflecting low tier price/rent, so that combined they reflect low tier prices.
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The "cyclical" effect reflects local population trends, etc. that can push a city's housing market up or down in ways that depend on current conditions.
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For more than a decade now, real per capita housing expenditures are flat. And, you won't believe this crazy coincidence, but rent inflation just happened to go through the roof at the same time!
Wacky!
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Keep in mind that with a decade of basement level mortgage rates, it is doubtful that buyers have been cutting back, so the story is probably worse for renters.
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Here's an updated version of home price appreciation by ZIP code since 2000, with some annotations to highlight certain points in time.
6 month home price appreciation, motion chart via @YouTube
The most recent 5 years have a lot of differences from earlier years. Among them: (1) previously expensive places were becoming even more expensive. Now it’s more broad based. (2) not as much idiosyncratic change in individual metro areas as there was before.
Im probably a broken record on this, but if loose credit drives housing bubbles on the extensive margin, it’s odd that pre-2008 price appreciation was mostly in the places that were already the expensive but today when lending is almost all to 760+ credit scores, it’s less so.
Continuing to reference the Eurodollar yield curve. Here showing the January 2019 curve as a reference point. That's what it looked like before the Fed previously had to engage in lower rates to avoid recession. I consider that the benchmark for current yield inversion.
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In February, the curve looked recessionary. The bump up in inflation has led the Fed to raise rates, which have retracted a bit since the meeting. But, the return of the neutral, slightly upward slope remains. That's good news, relative to February.
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The rate hikes have newly anchored inflation expectations at their long-term norms. So far, I feel like the Fed is arguably still relatively neutral, considering the host of challenges they face.