Thread by @JasonBraier

1/ Arian v The Spitalfields Practice: The EAT wasn't bound by its decision in Pruzhanskaya to find no new time limit for adding a s.103A to a s.98 ERA claim, but rather time limits may be of limited weight in line with Abercrombie et al.
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62dff920…
#ukemplaw

2/ A was a healthcare assistant at a GP practice. He raised various concerns about their health protocols. As a LiP, he brought 2 claims including an ordinary unfair dismissal claim & a protected disclosure detriment claim, but not a s.103A automatic unfair dismissal claim.

3/ He provided a list of issues a few months later which included as an issue whether his dismissal was connected to the grievance in which he'd raised his protected disclosures, though when the R professionally redrafted the list, it didn't include a s.103A claim.

4/ 3 months later, at a PH, A raised sought to add a s.103A claim & another PD, which was then considered as an application to amend at a later PH. The EJ rejected the application, relying on it being 1st raised at the previous PH, 6 months post-presentation of the ET1.

5/ Integral to A's application had been his illness when submitting the claims (resulting from a cancer diagnosis) and that the R had anticipated a s.103A claim, seeking clarification on the point in the GoR & correspondence.
A sought reconsideration but this was rejected too.

6/ A appealed principally on bases that erred in (1) rejecting the application almost exclusively due to delay; (2) considering it a new claim &/or needing consideration of time limits; & (3) finding A 1st raised at the PH rather than the list of issues.

7/ Dealing with the s.103A amendment 1st, the EAT agreed that there was a material error of fact in the extent of delay in raising it, given that the matters were raised in the list of issues. Thus the 3rd ground of appeal was allowed.

8/ On the delay point, the EAT stressed the importance of considering the specific implications of the delay/timing in the context of balance of hardship, which was something the ET hadn't done. The ET also hadn't taken account of the R's early anticipation of the s.103A claim.

9/ Ground 2 is the more interesting. A relied on Pruzhanskaya where the EAT held where a C has brought an in-time ordinary unfair dismissal complaint, alleging a further automatic reason for dismissal doesn't involve a new complaint with new time limit.

10/ The EAT found that judgment out of kilter with other EAT/CA authority, & thus the EAT wasn't bound to follow Pruzhanskaya. It seems that the distinction is that those authorities focus on the very limited weight of consideration of time limits rather than there being none.

11/ However, the EAT found in A's favour in any event that the ET erred in the decisiveness it gave to the time limit point in circumstances where the disclosures & reason for dismissal were both already in play.

12/ The EAT moved on briefly to the added disclosure point, finding the position more finely balanced but allowing the appeal on the basis of over-emphasis on delay as against other relevant features. I suspect this may have been rejected had there not been the s.103A grounds.