1/ Avid readers of the ILJ are in for a treat when the next issue is released, as the high priests of #ukemplaw@thebigbogg & @MichaelFordQC have written a superb article covering the Art 11 ECHR cases of Foster Carers & Deliveroo, employment status & substitution clauses.
2/ To whet your appetites, some vague clues to highlights. They argue there was a much simpler route to victory for the Foster Carers than looking to Art 11 ECHR, in that in fact foster carer relationships were governed by contract & the earlier case law to the contrary was wrong
3/ They argue the earlier case law (W v Essex) relied too heavily on the fact foster care agreements were governed by statutory obligations - that should only negate the existence of a contract where it leaves no space for the contract to occupy.
4/ That wasn't so with foster carers generally, & specifically those in the NUPFC case, where the statute did no more than provide a minimum level of allowances to cover the cost of care, & left unrestricted contractual decisions on additional payments or fee levels.
5/ B&F argue Uber provides impetus against W with its purposive approach & focus on drivers' autonomy, & noting the significant autonomy of foster carers whilst also subject to oversight - the type of situation the SC in Uber stressed the statutory regime was there to protect.
6/ B&F move on to approve of Underhill LJ's reliance on ILO Recommendation 198's multi-factorial balancing approach in determining whether the foster carers were in an employment relationship to which collective bargaining rights applied via Art 11 ECHR.
7/ Having approved of this, B&F move on to distance themselves from Underhill LJ's restrictive use of that approach to the question of a union getting listed. They argue for the sense of a unified approach to employment status where core Art 11 rights are engaged under TULRCA.
8/ B&F then comment on Underhill LJ's reliance on EU case law in determining whether there was an employment relationship for Art 11 purposes. They note a marked difference in approach between the ECtHR & CJEU, with the former never having aligned itself to the latter's approach.
9/ They note in particular the independent autonomy of approach in the CJEU, with status cases often decided by the court without referring back to the national court, bolstered by numerous references in EU legislation to the term 'worker'.
10/ By contrast, the ECHR has no definition of worker, nor of trade union & trade union rights are merely a small aspect of the Art 11 rights rather than its focus. Moreover the ECtHR can retreat behind the margin of appreciation & Art 11(2) to fudge matters & render them hazy.
11/ Notwithstanding all of the marked differences of approach, B&F consider Underhill LJ's reliance on CJEU case law (Sindicatul) justified given a shared central core to the 2 regimes such that those meeting the CJEU's worker criteria almost certainly fall within Art 11 ECHR.
12/ Next up, B&F turn to Deliveroo (which still awaits a permission decision in the Supreme Court) & the approach to its widely drafted substitution clause (redrafted shortly before the CAC determined IWGB's application for formal recognition by Deliveroo).
13/ In Deliveroo, the CAC found the modified mega-wide substitution clause not a sham & that it negated the undertaking to do work personally & thus worker status wasn't made out. IWGB JR'd the decision, but were restricted to Art 11 grounds. This reached the Court of Appeal.
14/ The CA (Underhill LJ leading again) relied once more on the ILO Recommendation criteria & found the substitution clause fatal to any finding of employment relationship for Art 11 ECHR purposes. The authors disagree.
15/ They note the ILO Rec emphasises the "fact" of work being carried out personally, suggestive that operative facts trump contractual entitlements. They also focus on the ILO's emphasis on indicators of whether an employment relationship exists, with no indicator being decisive
16/ Moreover, the ILO recommends a purposive approach to the indicators in much the same way as the Sup Ct's purposive approach applies in Uber, with the focus on whether the substitution clause demonstrates a level of independence not vulnerable to contractual exploitation.
17/ B&F find that purposive analysis missing from the CA's judgment in Deliveroo, with its very narrow focus on the contractual nature of the substitution clause & its treatment of decisive rather than merely indicative even when other factors pointed strongly the other way.
18/ They suggest the correct approach would be to take look at the indicative factors cumulatively & ask whether they point to a situation where subordinate/dependent workers needed the statutory protection or were an independent party capable of looking after their own interests
19/ Such an approach wouldn't give substitution clauses a superpower above all other indicators, but would invite its assessment in the broader context to see which way it pointed. Notably in Delivery the riders had no influence over the inclusion of this wide substitution clause
20/ B&F also suggest that the purpose of Deliveroo modifying the substitution clauses was to impermissibly contract out of statutory rights - a motivation which calls for particularly strong adherence to a purposive approach, all the moreso where fundamental rights are at stake.
21/ Thus B&F argue Deliveroo was wrongly decided. Ultimately (if permission in Deliveroo is granted) they urge the Sup Ct to take a simple, unified, purposive domestic law approach to status, in a manner that's also consistent with EU & ECHR law, to simplify this area for us all
22/ The article is unmissable. No Twitter thread can fully do it justice. Look out for it when released.
Its legal argument is invaluable & its prose worthy of being written by the greatest of authors (by which of course mean Dan Brown, Jeffrey Archer & John Grisham) #ukemplaw
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The Women and Equalities Committee report on 'Menopause and the Workplace' is out: committees.parliament.uk/publications/2…
It's a well-written & researched report with useful information & brings an important issue to the fore, but does it come up with the right proposals? #ukemplaw
The committee raises concerns that menopause-related discrimination has to be shoehorned into sex, age or disability discrimination protection, & there are difficulties with each. /2
For age & sex discrim, the committee identifies the comparator issue. Unlike pregnancy discrim, where the test is 'unfavourable' rather than 'less favourable' treatment, for menopause-related sex/age discrim you need a comparable (real or hypothetical) man/younger person. /3
1/ Trentside Manor Care v Raphael: EAT finds it's not appropriate for ET to order a party to provide to the other side's lawyers documents over which privilege is claimed so that they can argue whether they are privileged!
Also useful on legal advice privilege & non-lawyers.
2/ R was a registered care nurse at TMC. She made a flexible working request as a result of ill-health (which she considered a reasonable adjustment for disability). It was granted on a trial basis. A couple of weeks later, R was suspended & then dismissed for gross misconduct.
3/ It was R's position that conduct wasn't the real reason for dismissal, but her flexible working request/reasonable adjustment was. She brought claims including unfair dismissal, direct disability discrim & discrim arising from disability.
1/ Arian v The Spitalfields Practice: The EAT wasn't bound by its decision in Pruzhanskaya to find no new time limit for adding a s.103A to a s.98 ERA claim, but rather time limits may be of limited weight in line with Abercrombie et al. assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62dff920… #ukemplaw
2/ A was a healthcare assistant at a GP practice. He raised various concerns about their health protocols. As a LiP, he brought 2 claims including an ordinary unfair dismissal claim & a protected disclosure detriment claim, but not a s.103A automatic unfair dismissal claim.
3/ He provided a list of issues a few months later which included as an issue whether his dismissal was connected to the grievance in which he'd raised his protected disclosures, though when the R professionally redrafted the list, it didn't include a s.103A claim.
1/ Scottish Federation of Housing Associations v Jones: The exception to the 2 years qualified service requirement under s.108(4) ERA concerns dismissal for political opinions/affiliations & not mere breach of a political neutrality clause. assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62dad6c0… #ukemplaw
2/ J was head of membership & policy for the SFHA. Her employment contract contained a 'Political Activity' clause preventing her from having a formal role of a political nature.
3/ J told her employer she wished to stand for Scottish Labour at the next general election. The SFHA advised that it didn't consent to this. J then withdrew her candidature. At a meeting, the CEO expressed concern J had sought permission to stand. J was subsequently dismissed.
1/ Harpur Trust v Brazel: Sup Ct dismisses the appeal, holding part-year workers on year-round contracts are entitled to 5.6 weeks' annual leave per year, with a week's pay determined by s.224 ERA, rather than 12.07% of earnings in the year. supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uks… #ukemplaw
2/ This case is concerned with those who work for varying hours, only working during certain weeks, but under a contract continuing throughout the year.
The question is whether leave for them should be counted proportionately or by ignoring that there are weeks they don't work.
3/ B teaches the saxophone & clarinet as a visiting music teacher at a school run by HT & is accepted to be a worker in that capacity. Her hours vary dependent on the number of pupils needing her music lessons, with B normally working 10-15 hours a week during term time.
1/ FDA v Bhardwaj: EAT dismisses appeal against refusal of costs orders (& cross-appeal against making of 1), & derides issue-by-issue costs claims & discourages pernickety costs appeals. assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62cea659… #ukemplaw
2/ This is lengthy litigation by B against her former union & 5 of its members. She started the litigation in 2008, lost it & then lost at the EAT & CA before the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal. The FDA applied for costs & partially succeeded. Both sides appealed.
3/ The EAT (Griffiths J) started by bemoaning how great the resources taken up by the case, & how litigation taking up the most resources seem to create their own chain reaction of further & more strenuous fighting. (It was a case in which FDA raised 50 points on costs alone!)