Regarding the video with a castration of a Ukrainian POW, comments from the Russian ДШРГ Русич may give some context to the story:
"I have seen up to ten such clips. They're usually published 1-2 years after the events though to make perpetrators more difficult to identify"
Русич (Rusich) is a Russian Neonazi group fighting in Ukraine. They're reportedly closely associated with the Wagner mercenary company
A Rusich fighter who told he had seen "up to ten such clips" is Evgeny Rasskazov (Topaz). Here you see his post commemorating Hitler's birthday:
"Today is birthday of out comrade who became example for many of us... his Word and Deed inspires us to beat the Ukro-Bolshevik scum"
That's Topaz with Egor Prosvirnin, the editor of *the* most important Russian nationalist media Sputnik and Pogrom which played an important role in setting the ideology of this war. When Putin made his speech, ppl described it as "Putin repeating Prosvirnin's talking points"
Weirdly enough, Western media make very, very few mentions of the main Russian nationalist media, Sputnik and Pogrom when discussing this war. That leads to either intentional or unintentional massive representation of the Russian internal debates. Which led to what we have now
The cultural influence of Sputnik and Pogrom (Спутник и Погром) in Russia is massive. It's so noticeable that the careful omission of them in almost any debate on this war looks almost intentional. Why would they avoid talking about them so carefully?
Because Prosvirnin was an integral part of the Moscow political and media establishment. Once you bring him and the Sputnik and Pogrom up, too many important people get associated. Here you see Prosvirnin hugging Ksenia Sobchak and political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky
Random photos with other media personalities. Nationalist leader Belov, internet guru Nosik, writer Akunin. Regarding the first two, they might share lots of common agenda, I doubt about the third guy. I post this photos to show associations and a level of his connections
Few key media personalities of the "Russian spring". They are little known in the West but very well - in Russia. Some commenters from Russia may deny it, but they 100% heard about them. Prosvirnin, Olshansky, Kholmogorov. They all stand for the war and escalation of violence
I follow pro-war media personalities with great interest, because they're very talkative. For example, in an interview with a Ukrainian journalist Gordon Khodorkovsky @mbk_center wept on camera very persuasively, begging forgiveness. Forgiveness for what?
Perhaps Russian nationalist Kholmogorov may shed some light
Feb 28, 2022
"... we both know you're not pro-Ukrainian. We discussed this in Brussels long after the Crimea. We have no big disagreements except for your conviction that it's you and not Putin who should be in charge"
Any comments from @mbk_center on that would be helpful. Kholmogorov's testimony seems to fit well to what we know about Khodorkovsky. In his interview to @albats he openly proclaimed himself a nationalist. But then she *deleted* this statement from the printed version. Why?
My answer: Moscow media establishment like @albats is systematically whitewashing the figures like @mbk_center or @navalny . She knows that much of what they say isn't gonna be accepted well in the West. So she cuts it out or as I'll show later helps them to avoid responsibility
The theme of Sputnik and Pogrom is avoided so carefully, because once it's brought up, one may wonder in which way Moscow "liberal" opposition is different from Kremlin and how was their positive image constructed. I'll cover it in next material on the Russian liberals. The end
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The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum