π·πΊ attacks on Pisky and Avdiivka, where πΊπ¦ built up defence for 8 years.
There are no logical objectives for that.
Donbas becomes deserted, π·πΊ relocating to Kherson-Zaporizhye. Experienced π·πΊ units remaining near Izium.
Everything else - Soledar, Siversk, Bakhmut - only units on their 1st and 2nd [year of service] and private military company fighters, total about 7-8 BTGs. They will have aviation and artillery support, but they are unlike like regular forces.
π·πΊ might attempt to push at Mykolaiv.
- Russia's potential near-future plans:
1) Switch to a complete defence, short counter-attacks, making πΊπ¦ spend reserves on attacks, lose and not capture anything significant, finish with Minsk-3 agreement.
2) do counter-offensive against πΊπ¦, force πΊπ¦ to spend reserves on defence, grab more land and possibly create conditions for future offensive in half to several years. 3) Combine - first offensive, then defence, which judging by the amount of forces looks to be π·πΊ intent.
Such plan looks very complicated - main offensive, 2 side offensives, fake offensive (possibly 2), then return to Donetsk, then possibly Kharkiv. Complicated plans, which Russian are drawing now don't work, but simpler, 2-move plans do work.
Russian offensive expected approximately on 5th-6th August. Expecting battles in steppe. Medium-positive prognosis for πΊπ¦ win.
πΊπ¦ military is being modest, they have learned their lessons, they plan according to resources, while π·πΊ military are still forced to realize drunken fantasies, often adjusting to the circumstances.
- Kherson:
π·πΊ VDV is equipped for attack, not defence.
Their rear structures are half of normal army, which might have some advantage considering only 2 supply points, that πΊπ¦ will attack. Looks like π·πΊ wants to get rid of their paratroopers completely.
There were 12-15 BTGs already, now added 10 more, possibly can expect more.
Bad news: πΊπ¦ offensive delayed a bit. Good new: perspective is better, as there will be nobody left to defend Kherson. π·πΊ offensive is th emost stupid thing, they can do (besides all-out mobilisation). It will save πΊπ¦ 2 months of battles.
π·πΊ will attempt to reach Kherson district borders before planned referendum in September.
- Olenivka
Phase of war is changing after massacre, which is probably not intentional.
On June 5 π·πΊ propaganda channel discusses possible attack on PoW camp in Olenivka:
"Mi 6 is considering three possible options for using the MLRS supplied for Ukraine.
The delivery itself will take place on the night from Sunday to Monday, the cargo has already arrived at Rzeszow Airport.
Missions will be done by Armed Forces of Ukraine under the full control of the officers of the British Ministry of Defense, as was the case with the attack on the cruiser Moscow.
The first target is the Crimean bridge, but this is the most unlikely operation, since Crimea is closed by echeloned S-400 systems and a number of new air defense systems, and then the newest S-500 division.
The second goal is a prisoner of war camp in the village of Olenivka, where the Nazis from Azovstal and the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are located.
The British want to frame the MLRS strike as an attempt by the Russian Armed Forces to hide "the execution and torture of prisoners, and then hype Bucha thematics"
The third target is Sevastopol, the center of the city or the base of the Black Sea Fleet is being discussed, but there is a risk of crossing into the air defense coverage area on Snake Island, since the range of the MLRS set now will be enough only when launched from theβ¦
β¦Odessa region.
Kyiv is not yet considering a missile attack on Kursk or Belgorod, since the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has an understanding that the cost of this attack will be the destruction of the government city block."
Prisoners were moved to this building couple of days before. None of guards died.
Demolition experts, who evaluated photos said that explosion looks like not of external origin. Positions of bodies shows that part of them were dead before burning.
There are multiple versions about planned inspection, Prygozhin, explosives planted ahead, Grad attack after fire.
Most likely this was planned ahead, adding multiple variables - HIMARS, Azov, πΊπ¦ Presidential office.
Red cross requested visit at Olenivka camp, to check conditions.
πΊπ¦ requests to πΊπ³ U.N. and Red cross to send representatives and start investigation.
- Torture video:
There are more video like this unpublished.
π·πΊ aim is to create emotional trauma, likely to provoke πΊπ¦ into turning to the same brutality, then π·πΊ has argument for the West - two brutal countries fighting, why do you want to support someone? Expecting more of this narrative in Western media.
Emotional trauma was widely used in Balkan wars, to degrade morale.
Both events day apart is not coincidence, π·πΊ aims for emotional trauma, narratives and reaction.
End of thread.
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It is known that certain units of the so-called LPR and DPR militia are being equipped with outdated weapons if more modern arms such as the AK assault rifles are available.
Recently, several Russian military bloggers, some of whom are "in field" in Ukraine, shared concern about continued use of Mosin-Nagant rifles by units serving at the frontline.
Here, "Afanasyev Z" shares a photo of a DPR fighter, saying that his rifle is going to be 80 years old next year:
"I once heard a phrase which struck my mind - βRussia is a huge train with its locomotive in the 21st century, and its tail end in the 19th.β
Generally speaking, the frontline is stable - there were no substantial events at the frontline in the past day, however the informational and political situation became more active active.
- Volyn, Polesye, Siversk direction (North)
Continued shelling at Siversk.
At Volyn-Polesye direction, the activities and numbers of the Belarusian forces have not changed. Belarusian forces continue attempting air reconnaissance with UAVs without entering Ukrainian airspace.
Fundamental strategic changes observed - π·πΊ relocating everything from Izium and elsewhere to Kherson-Melitopol-Zaporozhye area.
π·πΊ doing frontal offensive in Donetsk front, from Marinka to Avdiivka.
π·πΊ has small achievement - captured Vuhlehirska power station.
Siversk and Bakhmut - π·πΊ is not doing well.
Russia's plans:
Assumption that Kremlin has decided to cancel the objective of capturing Donetsk district, and switching to strategic defence (along all front line).
Belarusian forces continue air reconnaissance but they do not enter Ukrainian airspace after two UAVs were taken down.
- Siversk direction
No changes. Continued shelling resulting in casualties among civilian population, and infrastructure damage.
- Kharkiv direction
Continued shelling. Along the line and in near rears, Russian forces are creating pontoon crossings over water obstacles to shorten supply lines to the frontline. This is caused by attacks on ammo caches. Kharkiv city shelled substantially.
No changes except that the Belarusian forces yesterday conducted exercises at the command and communications points. This allows to them to test communication and commanding points aimed for combat activities.
Generally speaking this may indicate preparation for hostilities so the situation occasionally shakes up. However, no forming of the strike groups is observed. The situation generally remains calm.