"There's now a shortage of places on Nizhny Tagil graveyards"
Nizhny Tagil is located in the Urals. It's one of the most heavily industrialised Russian cities. Metallurgy, chemicals, machinery. Uralvagonzavod which is usually considered to be the largest Russian military producer is located in this city
Despite its massive industrial production, Nizhny Tagil is one of the most quickly shrinking cities in the region. People die or leave. All the revenues from the industry are sucked by the insatiable Moscow, while the locals get only the poisoned air and water
As pretty much the entire eastern part of the country, the Yekaterinburg Oblast where Tagil is located became a massive supplier of the cannon fodder the Putin's Special Operation in Ukraine. See the number of confirmed deaths by region by Mediazona zona.media/casualties
Geographic asymmetry of Russian casualties in Ukraine is impressive. Consider the following example. So far Moscow has less confirmed deaths (11) than Kamchatka (14). Population of Moscow - 11.9 million, Kamchatka - 312 thousand. Moscow has 38 times more ppl but less casualties
This is Kamchatka. It is located half the world away from Ukraine, just across the Bering Sea from Alaska. And this sparsely populated region that has 38 times less people than Moscow, lost more people in Ukraine than the capital
How is that possible?
Russia is not a "nation". It's the last colonial empire. Its metropole is localised in the Furstenstadt of Moscow. It is the northernmost megapolis of the world, located furthest from the waterways and on the infertile soil. It is too expensive to feed
In such a centralised empire as Russia, opinion of Muscovites is of critical importance to Kremlin. They invest every effort and resource so that Moscow wouldn't feel any discomfort at all. The rest of empire will be sucked dry for the benefit of Moscow
Even the most productive regions are sucked dry to feed Moscow. So Moscow can use them again as the cannon fodder suppliers. Go through all the adverts with "short term army contracts" and you'll notice they focus on material benefits. 200 000 a month, zero ideology. Money talks
Still that doesn't explain all the casualty asymmetry. Yes, it's very much easier to lure the destitute provincials than Muscovites with the few thousand bucks. Still, even in the peace time Moscow had *tons* of military and paramilitary quartered there. Why no casualties then?
Most probably, because Siloviki from Moscow are spared from the war. If Moscow suffer almost zero casualties, it means they're probably in the most privilege position in Russia. They're not sent to the frontline
Even their St Petersburg colleagues are less lucky
Meanwhile, provincial Siloviki suffer massive casualties, including the senior officers. On March 20 in one day the buried the entire leadership of the Vladimir SOBR - the National Guard SWAT branch. All four Vladimir lieutenant colonels were KIA in Ukraine
Photo of the funerals
Russia is not a nation. It is the empire with a metropoly - the Fürstenstadt of Moscow. Moscow is too expensive to feed, so its massive colonial empire is being sucked dry. Which gives an additional perk: since they're so destitute, you can buy cannon fodder from there cheaply
There's nothing unusual about it. It's a typical behaviour of a colonial empire, British did the same
“We don’t want to fight,
But by Jingo, if we do,
We won’t go to the front ourselves,
But we’ll send the mild Hindoo”
As formulated in the popular parody to the Jingo Song
What is peculiar about Russia is not that its practices are unprecedentedly evil or hideous. They very much remind of what Western powers did with their colonies. It is that Russia is the last European colonial empire that still exists. The end
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum