Yes. That's a complete misunderstanding of how categorisation and statistics work in Russia. My family used to have relatives: three brothers from the same parents: Kurt, Walter and Horst
According to their passport data, Kurt was German, Walter was Tatar and Horst was Bashkir
Discussions on "percentage" miss one key factor. In most regions population is heavily mixed. In reality you gonna have many ancestries and many bloodlines. So who you identify with is mostly a matter of choice. And the question is - on basis of what is this choice made
For example, in Tatarstan around half marriages are mixed marriages. Who will the children identify with? USSR era was characterised by the heavy domination of ethnic Russians, so almost all children from mixed marriages would become "Russian" - the higher status community
In 1989-1991 the ethnic hierarchy changed quickly. That partially resulted from the renegotiation of political balance and partially from the fact that till 1991 Tatarstan was poor, but after 1991 it lived way better than most regions in Russia. The hierarchy changed accordingly
This is the only author that I am aware of that managed to adequately describe what happened in Tatarstan after 1991. She noticed that the program of Beautification of Kazan for example wasn't merely "urbanism". It was a political project of massive importance
Beautification of Kazan (and smaller towns) was political because it helped to renegotiate the ethnic hierarchy. Let's be honest, if Tatarstan cities objectively look better than most Russian ones, that does lead to renegotiation of status, both internally and externally
With the renegotiation of ethnic hierarchy, behaviour changed accordingly. Previously almost 100% of Tatarstan kids from mixed marriages had Russian names. But not anymore. In a heavily mixed area ethnicity is a matter of choice. In the unmixed area, too, it's just less obvious
That becomes even more obvious if you go in Siberia. Consider a very popular "chanson" (criminal songs) singer Ivan Kuchin. You can hear him very often in provincial cabs or cafes. On this photo he looks more "European"
On this older photo, much less so. You can be quite sure he has Asian blood
Which makes total sense if you consider that he is from the Chita region. Almost on the border with Mongolia and with heavily mixed population. When you think of Russia, think about the Iberoamerica. Much of the Urals and Siberian hinterland is the country of Mestizos
When you think about Russia imagine the following. Imagine that we still have the Spanish empire that is run by the Bourbon king from Madrid in the same old ways with peninsulares ruling over everyone else. That wold be the closest analogue to the modern Russia
Arguing that Russia should remain intact because "80% are Russian" is like saying that 90% of the Spanish Empire are actually Spanish, because they are all Castilian speaking Catholics and therefore should stay under the power of Madrid forever. Sounds good, doesn't work. The end
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In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.
Literacy rates in European Russia, 1897. Obviously, the data is imperfect. Still, it represents one crucial pattern for understanding the late Russian Empire. That is the wide gap in human capital between the core of empire and its Western borderland.
The most literate regions of Empire are its Lutheran provinces, including Finland, Estonia & Latvia
Then goes, roughly speaking, Poland-Lithuania
Russia proper has only two clusters of high literacy: Moscow & St Petersburg. Surrounded by the vast ocean of illiterate peasantry
This map shows how thin was the civilisation of Russia proper comparatively speaking. We tend to imagine old Russia, as the world of nobility, palaces, balls, and duels. And that is not wrong, because this world really existed, and produced some great works of art and literature