Thread by @Thomas__Weber

1/ The fall of German historical literacy, attitudes towards Russian/Soviet aggression & the war in Ukraine: Here is a short 🧵on diminishing German engagement w. past Russian/Soviet aggression, which seems a specifically German phenomenon, if ngram data is to be trusted

2/ Since the mid-2000s, there seems to have been a steep fall in engagement w. the darker side of the Russian past. This is also supported by falling engagement with 'Stalin' and the June 17, 1953 uprising.

3/ This is,however,not a phenomenon specific to engagement w. the darker side of the Russian past. It's also matched by steep falls of engagement w. German aggression in the 20th century.
BTW,worrying that there might be sthg. wrong w. the data,I ran tests using non-history terms

4/ The steep fall of engagement w. past German & Russian aggression does not appear to be chiefly a function of falling engagement w. history, as there are no matching post-2000 fluctuations in German engagement in late-18th c. & early 19th c. history

5/ And this appears to be a German phenomenon, as evident. e.g. in developments in Spanish-language literature.

6/ Similarly, in English-language literature, there has been no fall in the engagement with past German aggression.

7/ More significantly for the purpose of this 🧵, unlike in Germany, there has been no fall in English-language literature in its engagement with Stalin.

8/ Crucially, the same is true of engagement in English-language literature w. past Russian/Soviet aggression. So, the fall of engagement w. past Russian/Soviet aggression is a German phenomenon, which might well help to explain German myopia towards Putin's Russia.

9/ Of course, there a many reasons for German myopia towards Putin's Russia, but a falling unwillingness or interest to engage w. past aggression might well fit into the mix.

10/ This may help to explain why those of us who have invoked past Russian/Soviet aggression for years to warn against Putin were at best met with stony silence, as happened, e.g., to me when in 2013 when I made the case for deterrence in Berlin
nzz.ch/international/…

11/ And I can assure you, invoking history in 2017, to make the case that arming Ukraine was the best way of keeping the peace was not a popular position.

End/ Nor was it to call out “a geopolitical pursuit of Russia’s national interest, marked by a disregard for human life and dignity.”
washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-h…