(thread) the narrative that Eisenhower, JFK, and Johnson pursued the militarization but not weaponization of space is flawed. It marginalizes the hedging strategy behind nuclear ASAT deployment and places weapons "in space" in a special category (1)
(2) securing freedom of space for sat recon was the overriding priority, but there was also a view (esp. in JFK and Johnson admin) that the US needed to be able to destroy "hostile space systems"
(3) FOBS was not viewed as a serious threat, but there was a public outcry and Program 437 was viewed as a means of reassuring the public
(4) the US did test inspector satellites that had ASAT applications. They did not become "operational" but the US maintained low level R&D investment to ensure the capability could be developed and deployed
(5) Vietnam wiped out a lot of the funding and support for ASATs more so than lofty ambitions about the nature of space
(6) BL: The US made preparations for space warfare, but they were limited in scope because the threat was limited.
one addended, the US deployed two nuclear ASAT systems between 1963 and 1975
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(thread) Historical context on the US reaction to Soviet FOBS and why it matters: in short, public hysteria can lead to overreaction by political leaders
1) After Khrushchev made the comment "we sent Gagarin and Titov to Space, but we can replace them with other load and send it anywhere on Earth” some U.S. officials began to raise fears about Soviet orbital nuclear weapons
2) the Kennedy admin examined its options...at the time, U.S. intel did not have strong indications of Soviet intent to develop a full-scale orbital nuclear delivery capability