1. Whiteness and Blackness are not constants. They reflect the socioeconomic order, not the other way around
2. When we say "Blacks" (черные), whom do we imagine? Hairy smelly brownish wetbacks of course. Ergo, Blackness combines both anthropological and socioeconomic qualities
3. In a sense "Blackness" is a tool for othering and dehumanising the working class, thus reinforcing the socioeconomic hierarchy. Those on the bottom of the social ladder are obviously subhuman. How do we know it? Just look at their skin. Honestly we are too kind to them
4. Until the late 20th c most Russian cities did not have the anthropologically different working class. There were exceptions ofc, like the Chinese immigrant workers who played a major role in the Civil War as the Bolshevik force. But nobody cares of pre-revolutionary era anyway
5. In fact, Tsardom and then the Empire used to have lots of *higher* status newcomers from the South. For example, since 1650s a few Georgian kings immigrated to Muscovy and brought with them masses of aristocracy. Who were all awarded lands and (Russian) serfs. E.g. in Novgorod
6. Here you can see a Georgian prince Alexander Bagration, the first Russian Generalfeldzeugmeister (= commander of artillery) who fought against the Swedes in the Great Northern War
7. Georgian aristocracy occupied a very peculiar "Tsarevich" niche in the Muscovite hierarchy. "Tsarevich" is literally a son of a Tsar. In Muscovy though it could refer to the foreign royalty who stood beneath the Tsar but above the Russian bojar aristocracy. A Prince étranger
8. Tsarevich were immigrant royalty from wherever whose role largely consisted in maintaining the God-like status of a Moscow ruler. He has royalty on his service, he must be really great then
9. Before Georgians it were mostly Tatars and Circassians who played this role. In the 16th c. it was very common. But in the 17th c Muscovy changed fundamentally and now was much more militantly Christian and more importantly *consistently* Christian. That was no longer possible
10. Georgian aristocracy occupied an important position of the immigrant Tsarevich royalty who confirmed the rank and status of the Tsar. They were showered with wealth and privileges of course. Their Christianity was very much of an advantage in a quickly Christianising Muscovy
11. Btw, I never read a consistent argument about the Russian militant Christianity of the 17th c. being the offshoot of the Counterreformation and specifically of the Jesuit movement. This is very obviously true and yet, I never saw a nice narrative that would make that point
12. Anyway, Georgians enjoyed relatively high status in the pre-revolutionary Russia as providers of the Christian aristocracy. Circassians weren't really Christian, Armenians were associated with commerce which was shameful. Georgians were probably the highest status Caucasians
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Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.