1/4 The US and Japan have had a security alliance for decades. But they now aim to layer a deepened technology and innovation alliance atop this enduring security and economic alliance. In important twinned essays, my #CarnegieAsia teammate @kenjikushida explores what this means.
2/4 For one, while official Washington and Tokyo have committed to make technology collaboration a centerpiece of US-Japan relations, the critical step will be to enhance *private* sector–led innovation, not least in Silicon Valley. carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/09/how…
3/4 For another, both sides need to better understand the business and industry logic, not just high-minded strategic and political logic, of how and where the private sector creates value. This means cultivating enhanced ties between startup ecosystems. carnegieendowment.org/2022/06/07/how…
4/4 This week, Kenji will launch a major series of new research products under the title "Startup Japan." This important #CarnegieAsia series will explore Japan's innovation ecosystem, cross-national partnerships, policy environment, and Japanese models in new ways. Watch for it!
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1: The US and China are seriously talking past each other. This is not just about Pelosi. The US thinks this is about Chinese coercion. The Chinese think this is about a drift from “one China” to "one China, one Taiwan." That disconnect will lead to a very unstable new baseline.
2: The US line, reflected in comments by Blinken, Sullivan, and Kirby is that everything is normal, "routine," consistent with precedent, nothing to see here, and that the principal issue here is that Beijing is throwing a tantrum over a nothingburger and should knock it off.
3: Beijing, meanwhile, has been signaling from Xi, Wang, and others for 2+ years that “the US has misperceived and miscalculated China’s strategic intent” (Xi), “we want a real one China policy, not a fake one China policy” (Wang), and so on. All this predates Pelosi’s trip.
1: Thread ... Today, the US launched a new economic initiative with Taiwan. Good news. The US benefits from robust economic ties with Asia’s seventh- largest economy, America’s tenth-largest trading partner in goods, and an important link in global high-technology supply chains.
2: And Taiwan benefits too from robust economic ties to the United States—one of its top five export markets and an essential technology partner. Taiwan, incidentally, discovered Silicon Valley decades before much of the rest of the world did, driving entrepreneurial growth.
3: For years, debate about a bilateral trade agreement has sucked the oxygen out of this dialogue. Taiwan's goals were mismatched with US priorities, which emphasized longstanding market access barriers in Taiwan and a reluctance to divert focus from higher priority negotiations.
1: Good piece on competition in Central Asia with quotes from a #CarnegieAsia scholar and external author. My two cents: If the US wants to compete, it had best treat countries as subjects of their own stories, not objects of America's own competition with another external power.
2: Central Asian elites are nobody's fools about Chinese power. But they aren't naive about American power either. And with Taliban victory, much of what's happening in the region has, frankly, been de-Americanized and is instead being regionalized. They, not we, drive the play.
3: And their objectives include straightforward ones: employment, growth, development, increased bargaining power with external sources of pressure, more options, more value-added left in the region. US hectoring about China can be an abstraction; nobody is ostriching or naive.
1: A quick thread on China's policy evolution, tactical positioning, and strategic choices in the face of the Russian invasion and the dramatic events now unfolding in Ukraine. Beijing will not want Washington to frame its alternatives and choices but balance its own interests.
2: Not suprisiungly, in my view, the Chinese will be selfish about their own interests. They are in a difficult spot because they are attempting (both rhetorically and substantively) to balance three goals that, quite simply, *cannot* be reconciled ...
3: ... (1) a strategic relationship with Russia; (2) commitment to longstanding foreign policy principles around “noninterference,” and (3) a desire to minimize collateral damage to Chinese interests from economic turmoil and potential secondary sanctions from the US and EU.
1/5: For those of you speculating about what the Chinese will now say about Donetsk/Luhansk, you might look at what China said in 2008 about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For example: fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceit/ita/fy…
2: Her paper closely examines Chinese investment and loan activities in Argentina’s solar and wind power sectors. An adaptive partnership has evolved among key actors and institutions, strengthening alignment between Argentina's own development objectives and Chinese investments.
3: She also explores how Argentinian players can better assess and classify whether putative Chinese projects actually support Argentina’s economic growth and sustainable development needs, especially through technology transfers and/or joint development of energy technologies.