Fair enough. While Crimea had separatist attitiudes, Donbass did not. In fact, it was a major power center of pre-2014 Ukraine. While Russia is picturing Ukrainian political system as dominance of Galicia, picturing it as Donetsk & Dnipro dominance may be more factually accurate
I would argue that the actual political influence of the West Ukrainian interest groups on Kyiv politics had been exaggerated. While the influence of interest groups from the large industrial cities of the South East: especially Dnipro and Donetsk had been vastly underrated
In 2014 Donetsk interest group lost massively. They chose to welcome the Russian involvement. A dog was losing in a fight and called for the wolves to help. As a result, the Donetsk group not only lost everything but the Donbass itself turned into the country of depopulated ruins
Azovstal where the Ukrainian defenders of Mariupol took their last stand was the major asset of Rinat Akhmetov. The richest businessman of Donetsk, who was the force standing behind Yanukovich and who was a big loser of the 2014 Maidan
There is a strong reason to believe that the "Owner of Donetsk" as he was styled helped the Donetsk People's Republic on its very early stages, securing the smooth switching of allegiance by the local police and state security. But then Russia took direct control, kicking him out
When discussing the "separatism" of Donetsk we miss the elephant in the room: the massive switching of colours by the local state security and the cops. Which was massive. It was probably orchestrated by the businessmen of the Donetsk interest group who lost during the Maidan
Consider the following. All of the "heroes of the Russian spring", separatist commanders in Donetsk were later cleansed by Russia. Kremlin killed every single of them, even those who left to Russia. Yes, they were kinda useful but too chaotic and unruly from Kremlin's perspective
Only two early DPR commanders are still alive: Strelkov and Khodakovsky. Two things in common between them:
1. They're both alive. Russians did not kill them like the rest 2. They're both from the state security. Strelkov from the FSB, Khodakovsky from the SBU
Yeah, the only Donbass separatist commander of Ukrainian origin the Russians did not kill used to be a career officer of the Ukrainian state security. From the FSB perspective it makes him socially adjacent. He will be spared and allowed to command, he is kinda one of us
The elephant in the room is that the institutional gap between Russian and Ukraine before 2014 was not great. It was basically the same military industrial complex. Dnipro played the key role in Russian missiles production, Zporizhya in engines, Mykolaiv in shipbuilding
Russian army and state security worked very closely with the Ukrainian ones and in a sense comprised one organism. It was in 2014 when these ties were finally broken. Some would argue that the USSR fall in 1991. I would argue that the Soviet Union died for real only in 2014
The end
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.