Fair enough. While Crimea had separatist attitiudes, Donbass did not. In fact, it was a major power center of pre-2014 Ukraine. While Russia is picturing Ukrainian political system as dominance of Galicia, picturing it as Donetsk & Dnipro dominance may be more factually accurate
I would argue that the actual political influence of the West Ukrainian interest groups on Kyiv politics had been exaggerated. While the influence of interest groups from the large industrial cities of the South East: especially Dnipro and Donetsk had been vastly underrated
In 2014 Donetsk interest group lost massively. They chose to welcome the Russian involvement. A dog was losing in a fight and called for the wolves to help. As a result, the Donetsk group not only lost everything but the Donbass itself turned into the country of depopulated ruins
Azovstal where the Ukrainian defenders of Mariupol took their last stand was the major asset of Rinat Akhmetov. The richest businessman of Donetsk, who was the force standing behind Yanukovich and who was a big loser of the 2014 Maidan
There is a strong reason to believe that the "Owner of Donetsk" as he was styled helped the Donetsk People's Republic on its very early stages, securing the smooth switching of allegiance by the local police and state security. But then Russia took direct control, kicking him out
When discussing the "separatism" of Donetsk we miss the elephant in the room: the massive switching of colours by the local state security and the cops. Which was massive. It was probably orchestrated by the businessmen of the Donetsk interest group who lost during the Maidan
Consider the following. All of the "heroes of the Russian spring", separatist commanders in Donetsk were later cleansed by Russia. Kremlin killed every single of them, even those who left to Russia. Yes, they were kinda useful but too chaotic and unruly from Kremlin's perspective
Only two early DPR commanders are still alive: Strelkov and Khodakovsky. Two things in common between them:
1. They're both alive. Russians did not kill them like the rest 2. They're both from the state security. Strelkov from the FSB, Khodakovsky from the SBU
Yeah, the only Donbass separatist commander of Ukrainian origin the Russians did not kill used to be a career officer of the Ukrainian state security. From the FSB perspective it makes him socially adjacent. He will be spared and allowed to command, he is kinda one of us
The elephant in the room is that the institutional gap between Russian and Ukraine before 2014 was not great. It was basically the same military industrial complex. Dnipro played the key role in Russian missiles production, Zporizhya in engines, Mykolaiv in shipbuilding
Russian army and state security worked very closely with the Ukrainian ones and in a sense comprised one organism. It was in 2014 when these ties were finally broken. Some would argue that the USSR fall in 1991. I would argue that the Soviet Union died for real only in 2014
The end
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In 1927, when Trotsky was being expelled from the Boslhevik Party, the atmosphere was very and very heated. One cavalry commander met Stalin at the stairs and threatened to cut off his ears. He even pretended he is unsheathing he sabre to proceed
Stalin shut up and said nothing
Like obviously, everyone around could see Stalin is super angry. But he still said nothing and did nothing
Which brings us to an important point:
Nobody becomes powerful accidentally
If Joseph Stalin seized the absolute control over the Communist Party, and the Soviet Union, the most plausible explanation is that Joseph Stalin is exercising some extremely rare virtues, that almost nobody on the planet Earth is capable of
Highly virtuous man, almost to the impossible level
Growing up in Russia in the 1990s, I used to put America on a pedestal. It was not so much a conscious decision, as the admission of an objective fact of reality. It was the country of future, the country thinking about the future, and marching into the future.
And nothing reflected this better than the seething hatred it got from Russia, a country stuck in the past, whose imagination was fully preoccupied with the injuries of yesterday, and the phantasies of terrible revenge, usually in the form of nuclear strike.
Which, of course, projected weakness rather than strength
We will make a huuuuuuge bomb, and drop it onto your heads, and turn you into the radioactive dust, and you will die in agony, and we will be laughing and clapping our hands
Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.