Great statistics, awful analysis. The fact that the majority of Russians will support either escalation or peace shows that they *do* have a clue. And the clue is - submission to the supreme power in whatever. The culture of obedience in Russia is unimaginable to a Westerner
That's why discussion about Putin's "rate of approval" figures is so dumb. It just doesn't matter. Yeltsin ruled perfectly with a rate of approval of like 6%. He waged wars, and won elections and commanded a perfect obedience being almost universally hated. Culture of obedience
It's analysts making arguments like "it's all Putin's fault, Russian people would accept whatever decision of the Supreme Ruler" who are clueless. It's not Bad Putin who is the problem here. It is the culture of perfect obedience to the ruler and his *whatever* decisions
That's why changing "bad" Tsar for a "good" Tsar isn't solution. Good Tsar will command just as perfect obedience. And he'll break the bones of the disobedient just as diligently as the Bad one. Except media won't notice it this time, because they're already too invested into him
Russians often say "we can't bear any responsibility for this war, we can't do anything really" and that makes Ukrainians very angry. But this observation is not technically wrong, there's a lot of truth in it. It just means that Russia should not exist as a political structure
Enfranchisement of the Russian empire's population requires scaling down. Right now perfect obedience is the only evolutionary stable strategy for its subjects. To gain sense of responsibility for their lives, they must be physical taken from under the power of Kremlin
Btw, don't you feel that "we bear no responsibility, we couldn't and still can't do anything" arguments are kinda... infantile? Because they're. In a sense subjects of a tyranny do behave and reason like kids, because they never really grew up
I think that Russian political and institutional culture can change relatively quickly. But for that to happen its political structure must be dismantled and Moscow must have no power over the periphery. Because it's Moscow that keeps the empire in its current degeneracy. The end
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I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.