Tourism issue is not just tourism issue. Russian public opinion interprets it as the marker of the *real* attitude of Europe. When Macron/Scholz express a deep concern, Russian public either laughs over it or interprets it as the de facto endorsement. Empty words, no action
Visa ban may be a small action, but it is an action. Unlike words visa ban has nonzero value. This can and will be interpreted as Europe being *actually* upset about what's happening in Ukraine and probably even somewhat angry. It's a sign of actual, unironic disapproval
When you read complaints about the visa ban, keep in mind that when Russia attacked Georgia in 2008 the future leader of opposition Navalny called for deportation of all Georgians (whom he called "rodents") from Russia.
To sum up. Any signs of business as usual, including tourism, are viewed as acceptance/endorsement of Russia's policies. Russian people are no idiots. They get that if Russia's behaviour is unpunished, it means Russia got away with it. Putin is genius, his critics are imbeciles
European policies, including the visa policies have a great impact on the Russian discourse and internal politics. The better life in Russia will be, the more business as usual continues, the more Russian population will believe that everything's fine. Just chill down
Russia is extremely pragmatic and individualistic culture. Extremely. Considerations of abstract morals or humanism have *negative* value here, they're nearly universally mocked. Considerations of personal comfort and pleasure have enormous value, far more than in the West
Personal comfort is much more of a political factor in Russia than in Western Europe. If we don't feel significant discomfort, that means Putin is 100% right. It's personal comfort or discomfort that determines support of Kremlin or lack of it, not some BS moral considerations
To sum up, Russian public opinion is not influenced by pictures of the dead, of destroyed cities, of the cut off heads and hands. Nobody gives a fuck. They do give a fuck about personal comfort though. And the level of comfort directly correlates with the support of regime
If you want Kremlin to go on, minimise the personal discomofort of the Russian population. If you want Kremlin to reconsider, you need to act the other way around. Even small actions like stopping tourism have huge political significance as markers of *real* attitude of Europe
Saying all of this, I find it very important to keep a one way door to *somewhere* open for the Russian citizens who want to leave. I also think it's very important to work out a viable way of surrender with a green corridor to somewhere for the Russian soldiers in Ukraine
Effect will be non-linear. I don't think that the bulk of Russian forces will surrender. They won't or at least they won't for now. But even 1% of troops actually surrendering will have a huge damaging effect on the morals, destroying the mutual trust and arousing suspicion
Add to that reasonable monetary payments for sabotage guaranteed by rich countries/organisations and it may have a paralysing effect on the fighting force. All social systems operate on trust and that will be destroying it, especially when the first saboteurs get their payment
NB: these guarantees should be made by *rich* countries or institutions. Slavs don't believe in Slavic financial guarantees, but they do believe in the Western ones. German financial guarantee is way better than the Ukrainian one in this regard. The end
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.