We presume that history moves by "reasonable" things happening. More importantly though, it moves through crazy stuff nobody had expected. That stuff may seem reasonable now, retrospectively, but previously it would have been dismissed as impossible/improbable. Until it happened
That's crucial for understanding both economy and politics. In fact, many seemingly reasonable scenarios had not happened and won't happen *exactly* because they are too reasonable = foreseeable = preventable. Consider the October Revolution. It happened *because* it was insane
In March 1917 Tsar was overthrown and a coalition of various oppositional forces became the Provisional Government. What could they legitimately fear? A military coup and a subsequent military dictatorship ofc. Experience of English and French revolutions suggested exactly that
A reasonable analyst would've said that it is the Commander-in-Chief General Kornilov whom the Prime Minister Kerensky should legitimately fear. Indeed, the military dictatorship by Kornilov looked very plausible in summer 1917. That's why Kerensky made every effort to prevent it
Indeed, in September 1917 Kornilov attempted a military coup. Kerensky had foreseen it. He mobilised all political forces to stand against Kornilov. Including the Bolsheviks ofc. The government encouraged and assisted the mass expansion & armament of the Bolshevik paramilitary
In November 1917 Provisional Government was overthrown by a coalition of the radical left military & paramilitary, including the Bolsheviks, the anarchists, the left Socialist Revolutionaries, etc. Whose build-up the same government had encouraged just a couple of months before
October Revolution is not an exception. It is a rule. Very often, probably more often than not, a power is overthrown by those they helped, promoted, assisted, rather than by those whom they persecuted severely. Because those whom they persecuted for real had been selected out
Provisional government feared a new Bonaparte. So it prevenedt this scenario. It didn't fear the Bolsheviks that much. In September they even tried to weaponise them against Kornilov. Two months later, they were overthrown by those they had tried to weaponise. Many such cases!
Reasonable scenario had been prevented. Therefore, the unreasonable and absurd scenario turned into reality. Because it was so absurd, that the old powers did not even put much effort into preventing it. They tried to use Bolsheviks as a tool and the tool backfired
Picturing the October Revolution as purely Bolshevik is wrong. It was a broad assabiyah of various radical left that overthrew the government. In several years, Bolsheviks cleansed them all. They hadn't seen it coming either. That was too absurd to even consider. Thus it happened
History doesn't move by likely and reasonable stuff happening. In fact, those in power put great effort into preventing the negative (from their perspective) *reasonable* scenarios and usually succeed. That's why the dumb and unreasonable stuff becomes the game changer. The end
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Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.