BREAKING: A Booth Level Officer (‘BLO’) called an IFF Staffer today, directing them to give their Aadhaar Number or else they'll be deleted from the electoral roll. On digging deeper, the BLO provided the IFF Staffer with a letter that we're making public in this exclusive🧵1/7
The letter we received from the BLO refers to a previous letter dated August 16, 2022 that asked BLOs to start house-to-house visits for ‘voluntary’ collection of Aadhaar details. But clearly, our Staffer's experience shows that this process is not voluntary at all.
2/7
This process is happening under the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021. When this Act was passed in Parliament, @KirenRijiju had told @ndtv that the process will be voluntary. So, what happened?
In fact, @MLJ_GoI went one step further away from the 'voluntary' promise & recently amended Form 6, introducing Form 6B to the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. These forms make it compulsory for those who have Aadhaar to provide their Aadhaar Numbers in order to vote. 4/7
This is alarming as:
👉Having Aadhaar doesn't mean you want to link it & all its data with your Voter ID
👉All adult citizens have the right to vote & it can't be restricted due to a reluctance to give Aadhaar when there are other reliable ways to ID 5/7
*Aadhaar is neither proof of citizenship nor residence.*
So, it's worth asking: why are individuals, who are already on electoral rolls & have previously voted, being asked to prove their identity by giving Aadhaar? Does @ECISVEEP not trust the electoral rolls it prepared? 6/7
We urge you to start a conversation on this today & spread the word to be more aware of your fundamental rights. The @ECISVEEP *must not* engage in this illegal, unnecessary exercise which may disenfranchise lakhs of eligible voters and affect their right to privacy.
7/7
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
We filed RTIs with every state and Union Territory to find out how they’re dealing with online “misinformation.”
What we found is deeply disturbing: police crackdowns, secretive fact-check bodies, and widespread use of RTI exemptions, revealing a quiet but dangerous escalation in digital censorship. (1/5)
In several states, it’s the police who are deciding what counts as “misinformation.” Some districts in Karnataka run proactive surveillance while others wait for complaints. With no publicly available criteria outlining what constitutes "harmful" or "misleading" content, there are risks of subjective interpretation and misuse. (2/5)
In Faridabad, authorities admitted to removing content but said they don’t keep any records. Arunachal Pradesh refused to explain why 55 social media profiles were taken down. Andaman and Nicobar authorities opt for internet shutdowns to stifle public discourse. (3/5)
🚨 Massive Victory! 🚨
@CCI_India has imposed a historic penalty of ₹213.14 cr (approx. $25.25 M) on Meta for abusing its dominant position via WhatsApp's 2021 Privacy Policy. IFF submitted expert information as an informant. Let’s break it down 🧵👇1/10 internetfreedom.in/statement-cci-…
The 2021 policy update by WhatsApp, implemented on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' change, forcing users to accept expanded data collection & sharing within the Meta group—without any real opt-out option. 2/10
The CCI concluded that this constituted:
✅ Unfair conditions under Indian competition law
✅ A violation of user autonomy, given the lack of effective alternatives to WhatsApp
✅ An abuse of Meta’s dominant position, contravening Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Competition Act. 3/10
Here’s how your beloved DigiYatra uses facial recognition technology (FRT) Content warning: ***DYSTOPIAN USES*** ⚠️⚠️ 1/10
Now that we have your attention, here are the recent ways in which Indian public authorities and police forces used (and abused) facial recognition systems, jeorpardising the human rights and data privacy of millions of Indian citizens without much accountability. 2/10 🧵
1️⃣ @tnpoliceoffl suffered a massive data leak in its FRT portal, making 8,00,000 lines of data vulnerable. This incl. personal data of policemen & FRT reports on thousands of accused persons. IFF called for a total ban on use of FRT by police forces. 3/10
🚨 On May 4, 2024, a massive breach in @tnpoliceoffl’s Facial Recognition (FRT) Portal exposed over 8,00,000 lines of data—which include 50,000 facial IDs, personal information of police officers, & details of crimes, police stations, & FIRs filed. 🚨🧵1/8
The FRT software, developed by CDAC-Kolkata and hosted on TNSDC, which was storing facial images alongside personal details of suspected, accused, & incarcerated persons, was compromised—and the list of data leaked from it is disturbingly long. ⬇️ 2/8
FRT is an extremely invasive & dangerous surveillance tool which poses direct threats to privacy, especially at the hands of law enforcement. Police forces are able to amass & process large volumes of sensitive facial data without any checks, consent, transparency, or procedural safeguards. 3/8
Been hearing some chatter around #DigiYatra? As scary questions about ownership, transparency, and data flow emerge, here is a quick rundown of everything we know about the service, and more importantly, everything we don’t. 😶🌫️🧵1/7
1️⃣Who owns DigiYatra?
In 2019, @MoCA_GoI passed on DigiYatra's operations & data ecosystem to a *private company* created for this very purpose – DigiYatra Foundation. DYF is a joint venture between 5 Indian airports (public-private, 74% stake) & @AAI_Official (public, 26%). 2/7
2️⃣ Such a public-private venture must be answerable to citizens?
Not exactly. Neither DYF nor its security audit agency @IndianCERT fall under the RTI Act. It cannot, technically, be forced to disclose any information on its data practices & security. 3/7 medianama.com/2023/03/223-ci…
Were you among the millions of @WhatsApp users who got a DM from ‘Viksit Bharat Sampark’? 🫠🫠
The account, seeking feedback on government initiatives, is now barred by the Election Commission from sending messages.
But several concerns persist… (1/10) internetfreedom.in/whatsapp-messa…
The message, accompanied by a letter from the PM, listed the various schemes and initiatives introduced by the incumbent government and was, in many cases, sent after the ECI released its Model Code of Conduct for upcoming elections. (2/10)
It stirred a storm and how…
First, we wonder how exactly did MeitY secure the contact information of such a large number of people and when/how did it begin using this information for outreach purposes? (3/10)