Yes, but that is very gentle mode of war from the Russian perspective. Those who decry happening as "madness" or call it "unimaginable" are either clueless (Westerners) or liars (Russians). Russian war in Ukraine is going on *extremely* soft mode. Because Ukraine has air defence
Soviet Union had the largest and the most comprehensive air defence system in the world. It was largely developed as a countermeasure against the U.S. airforce superiority. You have a large and great airforce? Fine, we'll build the large and great air defence. And they did
After the collapse of the USSR, the bulk of the Soviet military was inherited by Russia. But Ukraine also got a substantial part of it, including the air defence. It declined through the 1990-2000s and by 2014 Ukraine was effectively demilitarised. Its army was dysfunctional
After Crimea and the start of the war in Donbass, the army improved significantly, including the air defence. Old Soviet air defence system was reinforced by the modern digital equipment and software, specifically the PLC industrial computers
In 1991-2014 Russia fought in countries with zero or weak air defence. Thus it resorted to the indiscriminate use of airforce, bombing cities like Grozny or Aleppo to the ground. Neither Chechens, nor Syrians could do anything against the airforce turning their cities to the dust
Syrian example illustrates the Russian mode of war and its consequences. Syrian war was *way* worse than the Iraq or Afghanistan. Look at the population graphs for all three countries and you may notice a very particular trend for Syria. Russia enters the game
If Ukraine didn't have significant air defence, Russia could have resorted to the same indiscriminate use of the airforce as in Syria or Chechnya. But it can't. A thorough air defence system made the use of the airforce very risky and difficult. Russia will just lose its aviation
Russian war in Ukraine is unprecedentedly soft and gentle. Consider this. They are raising a Peski town with thermobaric artillery rather than with a bomber. Why? Ukraine has air defence. That's why Russia is so gentle and slow. It can't bomb everything to the dust as in Syria
To sum up:
1. Russian war in Ukraine isn't cruel. It's very gentle, because Ukraine has means of defence. Previous victims of Russia did not
2. Russian mode of war is pure evil
3. Russian public opinion preferred not to notice or condone that evil till they got hurt themselves
4. The strange softness of the Russian army in Ukraine results from Ukraine being armed. Therefore, arming Ukraine is the single best way to deescalate this conflict. The better is Ukraine armed, the more Russia will deescalate. At some point they'll try to back off
5. Russia is a large and strong military machine without *any* ethical or humanitarian concerns. In Syria they literally depopulated a large country. Russian public opinion ignores or endorses it. Ergo, Russia must be demilitarised to minimise the danger it poses to the world
6. Demilitarisation of Russia requires its breakup. Should Moscow keep control over its colonies, it will endure through the hard times and then rebuild its military again. The only way to prevent it is to allow the colonies to break away from under the power of Moscow
7. Russian Federation is the extreme anomaly. It is the last European colonial empire that still continues to exist. Some of these colonies are predominantly white, others are POC-populated. All of them however, should receive a chance for independence from the metropole. The end
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The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum