I saw a grain of a factual counterpoint in your comment, so I'll answer
I think you are delusional. This war won't end with some moral catharsis with all the bad guys punished proportionately to their guilt. Nope. The unlucky ones will. But that's only because they're unlucky
I understand that you would like to interpret some war criminal getting a shell to his trench as a moral retribution. But it isn't. He just was unlucky enough to get a shell, that's it. Were he more lucky, he would return home with a handsome loot
*Any* regimes that may emerge on the territory of the Russian Federation or what used to be the Russian Federation will have to employ people with guns. And they will depend upon those who either fought in Ukraine, or guarded the Putin's regime back at home. That's reality
*Any* regime change in Russia will depend upon the explicit/implicit help of people with guns. A successful regime change includes a nonzero element of the military coup. Like it was in 1991. If those with guns stand by the regime faithfully, regime won't change. That's reality
Now let's forget about those with guns. Let's look at the general population. The elderly have been the main electorate of Putin for years. And in Russian conditions, the elderly = grannies. They were electing Putin again and again. Will they be punished for what they did? No
This war absolutely can have a positive conclusion. But it won't end with some Domesday with all the guilty punished proportionately. Those that will suffer, will suffer without any regard to the measure of their guilt. Because they're unlucky and not because they're guilty
Consider the following. A 18 y.o. Russian conscript KIA bears *some* guilt. But I will argue that his guilt is less than that of his parents. A soldier had not had much time to make a change. He burnt alive. His parents had plenty of time to make a change. They get a white car
There will be no Domesday, no moral retribution, only some of the guilty ones will suffer and they will suffer with no regard to the measure or nature of their guilt. It just gonna happen to the unlucky ones. And turn off the Netflix, please
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It's a correct message to the Russian public opinion
Any moral or humanitarian criticism of Putin is usually dismissed in Russia as демшиза (demshiza). Reasonable people support the regime and only a few schizophrenics stand against it. Healthy people are too busy with consumption, so only the mentally ill would do anything against
Limiting tourism = limiting the consumption choices of the better-off population. It hurts those who have influence and whose voice may matter. It is sending them a signal that something may *not* be going right. Consumption choice has been limited and will be limited even more
Yes. There's another thing. Do you *personally* feel the danger or not? If you do, you'll be genuinely interested in what's happening. If not, you'll engage into abstract rhetorical exercises. That may explain the difference between Western vs Eastern Europe's attitude to the war
There's a lot of hatred towards the Western media/NGO in the Third World. Their negative image is too generalised and often unfair. But if I had to summarise this common feeling, I'd say:
"They don't give a damn of what's happening. They're busy with their rhetorical exercises"
When a Western journalist or consultant talks about the "principles", locals might not say anything. But their blood will be boiling. Because the fucker is committed the virtue signalling, no matter the cost for them. He won't have to deal with the consequences. They will have to
Yes, but that is very gentle mode of war from the Russian perspective. Those who decry happening as "madness" or call it "unimaginable" are either clueless (Westerners) or liars (Russians). Russian war in Ukraine is going on *extremely* soft mode. Because Ukraine has air defence
Soviet Union had the largest and the most comprehensive air defence system in the world. It was largely developed as a countermeasure against the U.S. airforce superiority. You have a large and great airforce? Fine, we'll build the large and great air defence. And they did
After the collapse of the USSR, the bulk of the Soviet military was inherited by Russia. But Ukraine also got a substantial part of it, including the air defence. It declined through the 1990-2000s and by 2014 Ukraine was effectively demilitarised. Its army was dysfunctional
We presume that history moves by "reasonable" things happening. More importantly though, it moves through crazy stuff nobody had expected. That stuff may seem reasonable now, retrospectively, but previously it would have been dismissed as impossible/improbable. Until it happened
That's crucial for understanding both economy and politics. In fact, many seemingly reasonable scenarios had not happened and won't happen *exactly* because they are too reasonable = foreseeable = preventable. Consider the October Revolution. It happened *because* it was insane
In March 1917 Tsar was overthrown and a coalition of various oppositional forces became the Provisional Government. What could they legitimately fear? A military coup and a subsequent military dictatorship ofc. Experience of English and French revolutions suggested exactly that
Analysts may be focusing too much on restricting the Russian fossil fuels export and too little on restricting the Russian import of:
1. industrial equipment 2. components
necessary to keep the Putin's war machine going. Most of it is probably coming from Europe, not from China
Russian import dynamics suggest that import from China has actually *decreased* since the start of the Special Operation. In other words, individual Chinese companies might have avoided doing business with Russia to avoid repercussions. Those that remained boosted the prices
Meanwhile, the export from Turkey increased significantly. It is partially the Turkish production, including the foodstuff, etc. But much of it is probably the Western European technological export. In this case Turkey probably serves as a proxy and as a smuggling hub
I feel it may be an even more virgin field. Administrative documents are written on a dead language of a dead culture and thus are inaccessible even for the modern Turks. Once you learn modern Turkish, you'll need years to start reading the Ottoman. In some cases - many years
Add to that that reading legal and especially fiscal documentation may take many years of excruciating training. There are very few people who can read them, including in Turkey itself. So yes, I believe there may be lots of potential to introduce new sources in this field
Discontinuity between the modern Anatolian Turkish and the literary language of 1900 is far greater than in any big European language that I'm aware of. 1900 literature is almost completely inaccessible. The same goes for many other Turkic languages such as my native Tatar