If Byzantium can be given a starting date, it’s today’s date in 636, when it suffered one of its worst ever defeats at the Battle of the Yarmouk.
This marked the end of a cosmopolitan Mediterranean hegemon and left a mostly Greek, Orthodox holdout of the Roman state. Thread.
Islam’s expansion out of Arabia in the 630s came on the heels of the massive Roman-Sasanian War, which exhausted both empires. By the end of 634 the Muslims had conquered southern Syria and most of Palestine, and in 636 they reached as far as Homs.
These early reverses did not mean the Romans were by any means broken. That same year Heraclius summons an enormous army, composed of elements from the standing armies of Armenia, the East, and various mercenary contingents, even Persians.
There’s a ton of conflicting evidence about events, so I’ll largely follow Kaegi’s “Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests” and Haldon’s “The Byzantine Wars”, which are the best reconstructions.
Beginning in the spring of 636, the elements of the Roman army march south and drive the Arabs out of first Homs (Emesa) and then Damascus. This is a large-scale campaign, consisting of many independent smaller actions.
Eventually they drive the Muslims back to the Hauran, a fertile region east of the Jordan which could sustain large concentrations of troops.
By the end of July, the Romans are positioned on the southern slopes of the Golan Heights, while the Muslims encamp just north of the Yarmouk River.
They are separated by the steep gorges of the Wadi'l Ruqqad.
There is skirmishing over the next few weeks, and the Romans divide their forces into two wings:
-The right is encamped just west of the Wadi’l Ruqqad’s confluence with the Yarmouk.
-The left is east of the Wadi’l Ruqqad, with open country to its rear.
One point to be emphasized is that the battlefield was *huge*—the two Roman camps are separated by about 20 miles (30 km). Yarmouk should not be understood as a single battle, but as a large-scale operation designed to entrap the Arab army.
Although the Arabs often liked to fight with the desert to their backs, this was usually as an expedient, not a special weapon. It would still be very costly if they were forced to retreat over the Yarmouk and through the desert.
Numbers are impossible to estimate. Muslim sources range between 40,000 and 400,000 for the Romans, while both sides agree the Arabs had fewer. Kaegi & Haldon estimate no more than 20,000 Romans against rather fewer for the Muslims.
Given the size of the battlefield, the ability of the region to sustain large armies, and the need to draw troops from as far away as Armenia, however, I suspect the true number was a good bit larger.
The two sides appear to have faced off for several weeks, probably skirmishing the whole time. But on August 18 or 19, the Romans advance: the left moves south, the right crosses the Wadi’l Ruqqad, and their Ghassanid Arab allies occupy a bridge in the center.
The main attack comes in the east. The Muslims make a great show of abandoning their camp, but then counterattack from a hidden position. Arab cavalry outflanks the Romans and drives the Ghassanids off the bridge, cutting the Roman left off from its other wing.
Meanwhile Muslim forces on the left get around the western flank of the Roman position and attack the right’s camp. As night falls, the Roman right is completely isolated.
Over the next day or two, the Muslim forces converge on the isolated Roman right and strangle it. A sandstorm whips up on the 20th, and all remaining discipline is lost: desperate soldiers try to scramble down the steep ravines of the Wadi’l Ruqqad and are slaughtered.
It’s a complete disaster for the Romans, as their entire field army has effectively been destroyed. The Arabs go on to besiege Damascus, Jerusalem, Homs, and the entire coast.
Heraclius raises an army from allies to recapture Homs two years later, but this fails.
By the end of 638, the Romans have lost all of Syria, Mesopotamia, and Armenia, and are fighting off incursions into Anatolia itself.
By 650, the empire is reduced to Anatolia, part of the Balkans, parts of Italy, and North Africa.
The Lombards are expanding in Italy, while the Arabs will soon capture the entire African coast.
This means that most of the remaining population is Greek-speaking and orthodox Chalcedonian. The large heterodox Egyptian, Syrian, and Armenian miaphysite populations have been shorn away, while Constantinople still controls the papacy—and Italy is increasingly peripheral.
It is this core, Greek in language, Orthodox in religion, and Roman in government, which will survive and rebound over the next few centuries, creating a distinctive and new civilization in the process—what we now call Byzantium.
Florence hosted a major church council in 1438-1445 which futilely sought to reconcile Constantinople & Rome and thereby save Byzantium.
But at the same time, Florence was at the center of another conflict which ultimately determined the fate of the east Mediterranean.
All participants at the Council of Florence hoped that a successful church union would result in much-needed military assistance to Constantinople.
And for this, there was one power whose wealth and naval power would be critical: Venice.
Since 1350, Venice had been caught in a long cycle of freewheeling conflict with other Italian city-states and dominions, what one historian called the Italian Hundred Years’ War. Like the real 100YW, it was a number of separate conflicts that all bled into one another.
Christian and Muslim armies used basically the same siege techniques during the Crusades, even though they fought with completely different styles in open field. The reasons why are pretty interesting, short thread.
There are only so many ways to overcome the massive stone walls of a castle:
-Go over the walls with siege ladders or towers
-Undermine them then collapse the tunnels
-Batter them down with artillery
Plus various stratagems or just starving them out.
Whatever worked, worked. Armies saw what techniques were successful and imitated those.
There were some minor differences: Muslims adopted the counterweight trebuchet earlier, for example.
One of the most enduring myths about Byzantium is that it was primarily a “defensive” empire, one which preferred to pay off its adversaries or use cat’s paws rather than fight.
While it did make effective use of both, this has to be put in context of its grand strategy. Thread.
For 400 years, from ~640 to 1071, Byzantium fought wars in two primary theaters: the Balkans, where they faced Bulgars, Slavs, and other invaders from beyond the Danube; and the Anatolian/Syrian frontier, where they fought several Arab dynasties and later the Turks.
Although the empire was rich, it rarely had enough troops to fight a major war on both fronts simultaneously. For this reason, it kept its best units—the tagmata—around the capital so that they could rush to whichever theater was most threatened.
Despite the enormous barrier of the Alps, a large part of the medieval trade between Italy and Germany was carried by riverboat—two river networks were connected overland by the Brenner Pass.
The river Inn becomes navigable just below Innsbruck. The Adige was once navigable starting just below Bolzano.
Passing from one to the other entails an 800 meter climb over the Brenner Pass followed by a 1100 m descent over 120 km.
This ultimately connected the river system of the northern Italian plain….
Monopolies, not competition, are what characterize capitalism at the highest levels. This is an inherent feature of all economies since the dawn of trade, and will continue well into the future. Thread.
No matter how competitive markets are, many essential products will always have a long value chain. This means that SOMEwhere along the way there’s bound to be a bottleneck—a huge opportunity to take profit.
Bottlenecks come in two basic forms:
-Control of essential resources
-Control of access to the resource (transportation, infrastructure, geographic chokepoints, etc.)
The last few decades of Byzantium were similar in a lot of ways to the end of the Crusader states. Both were reduced to a few coastal strips whose commercial centers were fought over by outside powers, with very little hinterland.
Constantinople's markets had always been a major foreign policy lever and had provoked wars in the past. But until the loss of Thrace and coastal Anatolia, the empire's true source of wealth had always been agriculture.
After the recovery of Constantinople from the Fourth Crusade, the empire was much weaker. Genoa and Venice competed fiercely for control of its markets, frequently embarrassing emperors who were caught in the middle.