The thing is: we don't really understand other societies. We don't really understand their realities, balance of power or mechanics of functioning. There is always a cultural barrier preventing this understanding. We tend to assume that a foreign society works just like ours
Smart PRmaxers can leverage this assumption to brand themselves abroad more successfully than at home. Consider a Ukrainian (pro-Russian) oligarch Medvedchuk. In Ukraine he is always styled as Putin's "kum". If A baptised B's child, A and B become "kum" after that
Indeed, Putin baptised Medvedchuk's daughter. And a PRmaxer Madvedchuk leveraged it to the fullest for PR purposes. I'm the Putin's kum, the Putin's kum I am! Very important!
In reality he leveraged a cultural barrier. Because in Ukraine being kum matters. In Russia it doesn't
Russia and Ukraine seem to be very close culturally. They can speak the same language, share the same cultural memes, profess the same religion (mostly). So most Russians and Ukrainians often assume that things in their countries work alike
But they don't. They're very different
In Ukraine being "kum" is very important. The term for nepotism "kumovstvo" must be understood literally. In Russia the same word must *not* be taken literally. When discussing "kumovstvo" nepotism networks, Russians do not mean they are actually kums. That is just unimportant
Medvedchuk weaponised the cultural barrier between Ukraine and Russia. He became Putin's kum. Russians do not take being kum seriously, but Ukrainians do. So he persuaded the Ukrainians that he is super close to Putin, has influence on him, represents him
That backfired
I agree that Medvedchuk is Putin's agent of influence. But I will also argue that the Ukrainian public opinion tends to exaggerate his importance. Why? Because Medvedchuk himself successfully exaggerated his own importance weaponising the cultural barrier between two countries
I do not have any evidence of who organised the yesterday's attack, but the factor of Dugin having successfully exaggerated his own importance on the world arena might have played a role. He made his surname a global brand, far more successful abroad than in Russia
His daughter Darya weaponised the dad's brand and tried to act as an intermediary between:
1) Kremlin and the European far right 2) interest groups in Russia
Both of which could have had her killed. The first one, for financial reasons. The second, for political ones. The end
The younger guy on the previous photo is Akim Apachev, a Wagner-connected musician. Both Alexander and Darya Dugina took pro-war stance and were very active in the Z-movement. Neither of them was innocent
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No offence, but this is a completely imbecile, ignorant, ridiculous framing. I have no explanation for all this debate except for a complete & determined ignorance of the foreign policy making class, and their refusal to learn literally anything about the material world.
"Components" framing makes sense when we are discussing drones. Why? Because drones are literally made from the imported components. You buy like 90% of them in China, and may be you make like 10% domestically. For the most part, you just assemble what you bought in China.
Not the case with missiles. Most of what the missile consists of, including its most critical, hard to make parts is produced domestically. Why? Because you cannot buy it abroad. More often than not, you cannot buy it in China. You can only make it yourself, domestically.
Contrary to the popular opinion, Andrey Belousov's appointment as a Minister of Defense makes perfect sense. From the Kremlin's perspective, war is primarily about industry & economy. Now Belousov is the central economic & industrial thinker (and planner) in the Russian gov.
Born into a Soviet Brahmin economist family, Belousov is an exceedingly rare case of an academician making a successful career in the Russian gov. Even more noteworthy, he rose to the position of power through his academic work and publications.
This is unique, ultra rare.
Belousov's career track:
1976-1981 Moscow State University ("economic cybernetics"). Basically, economics, but with the heavy use of then new computers.
1981-1986 Central Economic Mathematical Institute
1986-2006 Instutute of Economic Forecasting
2006-2024 Government
If you want to imagine Russia, imagine a depressive, depopulating town. Now on the outskirts of a town, there is an outrageously over-equipped, overfunded strategic enterprise that has literally everything money can buy in the world. It feels like a spaceship from another planet
Strategic industry is extremely generously equipped. Western companies look scoundrels in comparison. That’s why I am so sceptical about the whole “corruption” narrative. Not that it’s wrong. It’s just that it is the perspective of a little, envious bitch.
What needs to be funded, will be funded. It will actually be overfunded and most literally drowned in money. Obviously, overfunding the strategic sector comes at the cost of underfunding almost everything else (like urban infrastructure). That’s why the town looks so grim.
We have successfully documented the entire Russian missiles industry, mapping 28 of its key enterprises. Read our first OSINT sample focusing on the Votkinsk Plant, a major producer of intercontinental ballistic missiles. How does it make weaponry?
The strategic missiles industry appears to be highly secretive and impenetrable to the observers. And yet, it is perfectly OSINTable, based on the publicly available sources. This investigation sample illustrates our approach and methodology (31 p.)
Our first and invaluable source is the state propaganda, such as the federal and regional TV channels, corporate media, social media and so on. It provides abundant visual evidence, particularly on the hardware used in the production of weaponry.
In August 1999, President Yeltsin appointed his FSB Chief Putin as the new Prime Minister. Same day, he named him as the official successor. Yet, there was a problem. To become a president, Putin had to go through elections which he could not win.
He was completely obscure.
Today, Putin is the top rank global celebrity. But in August 1999, nobody knew him. He was just an obscure official of Yeltsin's administration, made a PM by the arbitrary will of the sovereign. This noname clerk had like 2-3% of popular support
Soon, he was to face elections
By the time of Putin's appointment, Russia already had its most favoured candidate. It was Primakov. A former Yeltsin's Prime Minister who broke with Yeltsin to contest for power. The most popular politician in Russia with massive support both in masses and in the establishment.
In Russia, the supreme power has never ever changed as a result of elections. That simply never happened in history. Now that is because Russia is a (non hereditary) monarchy. Consequently, it doesn't have any elections. It has only acclamations of a sitting ruler
Obviously, there has been no elections of Putin in any meaningful sense. There have been only acclamations. And that is normal. His predecessor was successfully acclaimed with an approval rate of about 6%. Once you got the power, you will get your acclamation one way or another
Contrary to the popular opinion, Russia doesn't have any acclamation ("election") problem. It has a transition of power problem. Like Putin can get acclaimed again, and again, and again. But sooner or later, he dies. What next?