Darya Dugina's assassination was almost certainly organised by the Russian FSB. Assuming this is true, then:
1. Order must've been explicitly/implicitly given by Putin 2. It was Darya, not Alexander who was the target 3. Alexander knew it ofc. He's just making show for a public
If Alexander was notified about the impending assassination of his daughter Darya, that explains the strangeness with changing cars. Alexander took *her* car, while she took his one. Why?
Most probably the plan was to present Alexander Dugin as the real target of assassination
That had an additional benefit. If we make the world believe that assassins targeted Alexander, but got Darya, the entire operation looks clumsy. It looks as if it is done by someone who does not have full control over the situation and over the territory. Not by Russians
It is the perceived clumsiness of the operation (they wanted to get a dad but got his daughter) that makes it look as if it is done by the Ukrainians. If it was done by the FSB, who fully control Moscow, they would kill the person whom they intended to kill
May be they did?
If Putin wants to escalate the war in Ukraine or political purges within Russia, he needs a pretext to justify his "outrage". Some "terrorist attack" preferably. And Putin can't just blow up residential houses with nonames: he had already used this trick before
An overly ambitious golden kid who:
1. Privately advertises *herself* as a person who knows how to fight a war in conversations with influential people 2. Wants to sell *herself* as the Russian nationalist leader 3. Damaged relations with her dad
would be a perfect candidature
It's not that Putin saw Darya as a threat. That's highly implausible. It's much more probable that he was actively looking for a sacrificial animal and sacrificing someone troublesome kinda makes sense. Solve two problems at once: big one (pretext for escalation) and a small one
Alexander was probably notified about this decision only after it was taken. But if it was the dad who suggested his daughter as a sacrificial animal, I wouldn't be much surprised. Perhaps, he knew what she's telling about the great and wise Dugin behind his back. The end
Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.