Cal-23 #TTF prices have topped 250 €/MWh this week. Everyone agrees that’s crazy, but what does that mean?
Some have suggested to cap the price, i.e. set an administrative price cap on the European wholesale market for gas. What would happen then?
First, supply.
North-West European gas markets have been decoupled from the world market around April.
Russian supply does not respond to prices, Norwegian supply is running at full capacity, and so are LNG terminals. We are an island. And will remain one well into 2023.
Second, price formation.
This implies prices are currently set by demand. That means, prices rise until demand is reduced enough to match whatever supply is there.
Third, a price cap.
If you put a legal ceiling on the price for gas, demand will exceed supply. Any price cap must come along with additional policies that reduce demand accordingly. If that comes too late, we will be physically running out of gas like sooner or later.
Forth, no price cap.
What if reverse the order? *First* do the savings policy and *then* introduce the price cap? Here comes the magic: If you reduce consumption by the same amount that you need to do anyway, prices will fall automatically, without the need to introduce a cap.
Bottom line: If you introduce a gas price cap, you need to introduce savings policies. If you introduce those savings policies, the cap is obsolete. End
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Marginal pricing refers to electricity prices being set by the variable cost of the marginal plant, i.e. the most expensive plant that is required to serve demand.
So far, I agree with von der Leyen. But that's probably the end of the common ground.
First, marginal pricing is not unique to power markets. Commodities price on the margin, and so does electricity.
Oil, gas, copper, milk, solar panels – they are all subject to marginal pricing. Wheat example below.
Ich verstehe den Frust der europäischen Spitzenpolitik von Boris Johnson bis Ursula von der Leyen über die Strommärkte, weil sie einerseits hohe Preise für Konsumenten aber andererseits hohe (wenn auch kleinere als oft angenommen) Profite für manche Energieunternehmen bescheren.
Nur heißt ein unerwünschtes Marktergebnis noch nicht, dass ein Markt oder ganz ökonomische Grundprinzipien falsch sind.
Ich halte den Strom-Großhandelsmarkt im Kern für sinnvoll ausgestaltet und gut funktionierend. Das Problem ist, dass wir zu wenig Gas (wegen Putin) und zu wenig Strom (wg. Trockenheit in Europa und französischer Kernkraftkrise) haben – aber dafür kann das Strommarktdesign nichts.
While we were all watching the 15% gas savings discussion, the Energy Council today also discussed a proposal by the Greek gov’t for an electricity market reform.
Separating the market in two segments: First, a mandatory pool for low-variable cost technologies (RE, nuclear, cogeneration) where they are paid by CfDs based on full costs. Second, a conventional market for the rest. (2)
Consumers pay a weighted average of full-costs and marginal costs. It applies equally to existing and new generators.
One puzzle is that CfDs are financial contracts, it is unclear why you need the proposed two-stage spot market.(3)
Today, the leading European power exchange EPEX SPOT asked, once again, for the introduction of local markets for flexibility.
That’s surprising, since these markets simply do not make sense. Here is why 👇
As any American energy economists will know, local markets embedded in zonal markets will cause market parties game the system.
Everyone else: let me talk you through the basics. (2)
If network constraints can be anticipated, producers in scarcity regions can maximize profits by selling on the (local) redispatch market rather than on the (zonal) spot market. They increase bids on the spot market to not be awarded in the zonal dispatch. (3)