Interesting dialogue between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan presidents. They don't conversate in Russian, but in their native tongues. Both languages are Turkic, but belong to different language sub-groups: Azeri is Oghuz, Kazakh is Kipchak. Therefore, pronunciation is very different
Oghuz speaking area stretches from Khwarazm in Uzbekistan to Eastern Thrace. Turkish, Azeri, Turkmen have the most speakers. Oghuz languages have harsh pronunciation, much harsher than Kipchak ones
Kipchak speaking zone is stretching from Kyrgyzstan in the southeast to the Tatarstan in the northwest, plus plenty enclaves in the Caucasus. Kipchak accent is much softer. From my perspective Anatolian Turkish sounds as if Russian who doesn't know Tatar was trying to speak Tatar
Another prominent group is Karluk. It has only two big languages: Uzbek and Uyghur. Anecdotally, some of my Uzbek acquaintances found Uyghur far more understandable than some of the "dialects" (=separate languages ofc) at their home country
While Oghuz, Kipchak and Karluk languages are kinda mutually understandable (though mutually funny sounding), Chuvash language is not. Tatars can understand Kazakhs, and even Anatolian Turks if they speak slowly enough. We cannot understand Chuvashs
Chuvash language is so isolated because it is the last remnant of Old Bulgaria. With its destruction, one group migrated to Danube, another to Volga. Danube Bulgars switched to Slavic (=Bulgaria), Volga Bulgars to Kipchak (=Tatars) by around 1400. Only Chuvashs did not
Apart from the Oghuz, Kipchak, Karluk and Oghur (=Chuvash) languages, there are also languages of Siberia. They are more distant from the rest though as they do not share Islamic heritage and Farsi/Arab vocabulary like others
Most Turkic cultures are very Persianate. That's why they belong to the "Stan" zone, adopting this Farsi work for a country in their official naming. There is only one nation keeping the ancient Turkic name for the country. It's Mari El. Interestingly enough, they're Finno-Ugric
Mari may be the last authentic pagans in Europe, still worshipping in the sacred woods and sacrificing geese to their gods. Their history is poorly known and generally misunderstood
Now Mari people are clustered in the ethnic republic Mari El and also have large enclaves in what is now Bashkortostan, where they escaped from the Russian conquest in the 16th c. Around the year 1500 though they were probably far more numerous
Most probably Finno-Ugrics comprised the bulk of Kazan Khanate population, being only partially touched by the Turkic and Islamic culture. Their mass conversion to Islam happened later. At least its well-documented part starts around the 18th c, long after the Russian conquest
That's a poorly known and somewhat counterintuitive story. Mass Islamization of the Middle Volga happened not under the Muslim power as one could expect, but centuries later, when Islam was a second class and persecuted religion of the Muscovite Tsardom and the Russian Empire
I'll go into details in a next thread on how Volga became Muslim. The end
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I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.