As I said, I really enjoyed this piece. Noah shows data for a bunch of new "proxies", variables that can help us with quantifying elite overproduction. Some reactions follow.
.@Noahpinion First, I disagree with the (apparent) criticism that my definition of elite overproduction focuses only on the supply -- it is explicitly the issue of balance of supply/demand. In #AgesOfDiscord I always consider both sides of the equation.
@Noahpinion Elite overproduction is always a relative thing, not an absolute one. The whole point is to understand what process generates frustrated elite aspirants, and how their numbers blow up, when supply starts to massively overwhelm demand.
@Noahpinion Second, Noah focuses on just the overproduction of youth with advanced degrees. This is only one half of the problem. Because the ruling elites in USA are a coalition between the wealth-holders (the notorious 1%) and the credential-holders (let's call them the 10%), ...
@Noahpinion ... both pipelines generate elite aspirants, and when they overwhelm the supply of elite positions, frustrated aspirants, many of whom convert into dissident elites.
@Noahpinion Back to the credentialed class (note that I use "class" in non-Marxian way -- not relations of productions, but simply a group of people with similar social and economic characteristics). ...
@Noahpinion I think it is a mischaracterization to qualify the main engine, producing discontent, as frustration of *rising* expectations. I believe it's not relative, but absolute deprivation. According to Richard Easterlin, children "imprint" on the desirable level of ...
@Noahpinion ... living when growing in the households of their parents. This rings true to me. So it's not frustration of *rising* expectations, but a failure to achieve the same level of well-being that their parents had. "It's not right that children should live worse than their parents"..
@Noahpinion ... cried a protestor in Athens some years ago. The problem is falling levels of well-being for a growing segment of the credential-holders. In absolute terms. This seems strange, as credential holders, on average, have been pulling away from the working classes
@Noahpinion ... (here defined as Americans with less than Bachelor's degree). But this average hides the huge disparities *within* the credential class. When inequality grows (and it does not only between the elites and non-elites, but also within the elite segments)...
@Noahpinion The average -- the mean -- can become meaningless. I'll illustrate it with one of the most important segments of the credentialed class -- holders of law degrees. Some years ago, I noticed a remarkable development. peterturchin.com/cliodynamica/b…
@Noahpinion Between 1996 and 2000 the distribution of starting salaries for graduates of American law schools transformed from a typical one (one peak with a thick right tail) to a bimodal one (with two peaks). Here's what it looked like by 2010:
@Noahpinion As I was working on my forthcoming book, I checked the latest data, and the bimodal distribution not only has gone away, the gulf between the winners and losers continues to deepen. It may be too harsh to call the people in the left peak as losers, but realistically ...
@Noahpinion ... the great majority of them are not earning enough to pay off their student loans. These are the frustrated aspirants, and a bunch of them are converting to dissident elites ready to challenge the established elites.
@Noahpinion A law degree, of course, is the best credential you can get to jump-start your political career. Historically lots of revolutionaries were trained as lawyers (Robespierre, Lenin, Castro...). Here, Yale Law School has been a particularly productive source of counter-elites.
@Noahpinion Summing up, this example of "bimodal lawyers" illustrates that while the average rewards of a law degree have continued to trend up, because of an extreme form of inequality (two modes, Carl!) a growing segment of law degree holders have been falling down, in absolute terms.
2. The author writes, “Peter Turchin and his collaborators have championed a new approach in which history as a discipline will be replaced by cliodynamics”. This is an outrageous falsehood. The relationship between cliodynamics and history is a mutualistic symbiosis.
1. Thanks for this calculation! The starting point is very interesting, but I am not sure the answer is right (there seem to be a few extra orders of magnitude...)
3. 100 k people burn 200 k ha, so we have 2 ha burned per person.
4. Taking median standing crop biomass in grasslands as 300 g per sq.m (it varies, dry steppe is less, moist savanna is more, but let's for the order of magnitude).
5. That works out to 6,000 kg of dry matter (mostly cellulose) per capita burned.
6. Now let's compare it with my previous estimate of firewood burned by a Russian household, 3,000 kg. In per capita terms, 600 - 750 kg.
3. I now have three contenders, one that was a surprise for me, two that I had in mind when asked the question.
4. Let's start with the surprising one: hinter-gatherers burning grass-lands or brush-lands to create habitat suitable for their life-styles.
5. After initial resistance, I decided that this is a valid entry into the race. These people used energy to modify environment to suit their needs. Is that different from people using muscle power to cut forests for agriculture, or a modern farmer using bulldozers to clear land?
@WalterScheidel@BjoernGehrmann We've just experienced a wave of deadly collective violence. That's different from peaceful demonstrations. Of course, dozens killed and hundreds of thousands killed are very different orders of magnitude. But the nature of internal warfare is that it easily escalates.
@WalterScheidel@BjoernGehrmann Historically and statistically, smaller-scale outbreaks of political violence serve as a reliable leading indicators of worse to come. For example, incidence of deadly riots started to increase in Antebellum America in the 1830s and exploded during the 1850s.
@WalterScheidel@BjoernGehrmann If you look at the statistical distribution of sizes (number killed) of internal collective violence, it doesn't have two humps corresponding to "riots" and "civil wars". Instead, it is a continuous "fat-tailed" distribution.