Lots of questions on how DOJ can use/disclose classified (CL) info in a criminal case, such as Mar-a-Lago (MAL), and whether the judge overseeing Trump’s special master request (Judge Cannon) can see the CL info. 🧵below on the Classified Information Procedures Act (#CIPA). 1/
Judges don’t need a security clearance to review CL info. So if Judge Cannon requests access to any of the CL docs seized at MAL, DOJ would be hard-pressed to deny the request. However, her order should not be read as a request to review CL info at this time. 2/
Juries don’t need a security clearance to review CL documents. This can lead to issues charging mishandling of CL docs, discussed in more detail below. 3/
As for defense counsel, their access to CL info is governed by CIPA, which regulates DOJ’s disclosure of CL info in criminal cases (separate rules govern civil cases). CIPA balances the rights of defendants w/ interests of the US govt to protect CL info. 4/
CIPA was primarily established to address the issue of graymail—when a defendant tries to defend themselves by disclosing CL info in a way that could force the US govt to choose between continuing to prosecute them or endangering national security. 5/
Defendant’s counsel must obtain an appropriate security clearance to receive access to CL info. That has led to cases where a def's counsel can't obtain the requisite clearance and so the defendant needs to obtain add'l counsel. 6/
Another challenge with CIPA is that it doesn’t require that the defendant receive access to the CL info. This can be an issue in cases involving terrorists or individuals who never had access to the CL info. 7/
It’s also possible for persons who previously had a security clearance—like spies—to be denied access to CL info they once possessed. This is often an area of significant dispute between the parties and normally requires the judge to weigh in. 8/
DOJ can use CIPA to request that a judge authorize its decision to not provide certain CL info to defense counsel. 9/
In cases involving mishandling of CL info, some of it must be disclosed to defense counsel because the criminal charge involves identifying the specific CL docs that were allegedly mishandled. The CL info must also be shown, in some fashion, to a jury. 10/
That leads DOJ and Intelligence Community to look for Goldilocks docs—not so sensitive that the Intel Community would prohibit disclosure to defense counsel/jury and not so bland that they don’t appear to implicate national security. 11/
In the case of MAL, with hundreds of documents at issue, there may be some CL docs that would be too sensitive to provide to defense counsel and/or a jury, such as the ones marked TOP SECRET/HCS or SI. However, there would likely be plenty of other CL docs to use. 12/
At trial, in a case involving mishandling CL docs, DOJ would need to find a way to provide the mishandled CL docs to the jury. It often involves showing the CL docs to the jury, but not to the public, and not allowing anyone to read info from the CL docs in court. 13/
The procedures and issues above are seldomly at issue in cases and require particularized knowledge and experience. At DOJ, a special section handles CIPA cases—the Counterintelligence & Export Control Section, which is running the MAL case. 14/
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My interpretation of Judge Cannon’s order—in light of her request for jury instructions, brevity of her order, and measured language—is she rejected former President's main claim that would’ve been dispositive but reserved judgment on if a record being “personal” is a defense 🧵
The Court’s request for views on jury instructions had two scenarios. The first is that a jury could make a factual determination that a record is "personal" under the PRA, which could be a defense to the 793 charge.
The second was that a president is sole decision maker as to if a document is "personal," and so the former president removing it automatically made it a "personal" record under the PRA.
This was a banner week for DOJ/FBI in the world of national security. In the last 5 days @DOJNatSec made four big announcements: arrests of spies for China and Russia, guilty plea in a leak case, and arrest of engineer w/ stealing AI tech for Chinese companies.
Details below:
- Arrest of Army solider for being a spy (Korbein Schultz). Schultz allegedly conspired to disclose classified info to China, including info related to US plans if Taiwan came under military attack; also provided info related to hypersonic equipment—all in exchange for $42,000.
- Arrest of a civilian employee of Air Force and retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel for transmitting classified info including military targets and Russian military capabilities relating to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Below are five things to look for at Tuesday’s Classified Information Procedures Act (#CIPA) pretrial conference in the Mar-a-Lago case. Although the conference is not intended to decide substantive issues for using classified info, there should be plenty to dissect.🧵
1. Scheduling. Arguably the most important part of the conference will be scheduling future CIPA filings/proceedings. DOJ proposed a schedule; defendants didn't offer any dates. The closer the Court adheres to DOJ’s dates, the more likely we'll have a trial before the election.
2.Magistrate Judges. The US District Court for the Southern District of Florida sits w/in the 11th Circuit, which has an unusual CIPA practice. The 11th Circuit allows magistrate judges to adjudicate CIPA matters; in most other circuits district court judges run the CIPA process.
The Classified Docs🧵:
There have been lots of questions on why these 31 classified (CL) docs were selected and how they will be used. This thread addresses three questions (1) Why the 31 docs? (2) Will the docs be declassified? (3) How will the CL docs impact the trial?
1. Why so many docs? It’s common in cases involving mishandling of CL docs to charge multiple CL docs to capture extent of harm & protect the case if issues arise w/ a doc—e.g., jury thinks doc doesnt contain “national defense” info (NDI) as required under 18 USC 793(e).
One theme identified by others is that some of the CL docs are grouped by theme and date.
Four reactions to this list🧵(1) Listed Espionage Act charge only mentions 'retention' and not disseminating the classified docs. Disseminating would have signaled that FPOTUS caused more serious harm to nat'l security. Curious if indictment nevertheless describes dissemination
(2) The 'retention' reference could be one count or multiple counts. It's not uncommon for each classified doc allegation to be a separate count.
(3) Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice. We will soon learn with whom FPOTUS conspired. Conspiracy allegation will also potentially help DOJ admit certain evidence.
The Declass Defense 🧵: FPOTUS’s recent stmts that he declassified “everything” and may have done it secretly (“by thinking about it”) merit a review of how a secret declassification order would impact an Espionage Act charge for retaining nat'l defense info (“retention charge").
As a starting point, the fact that a document has been declassified is typically relevant to a retention charge, even though the law does not specifically refer to classified information. The Espionage Act predates our current classification procedures and nomenclature. /1
And although an appellate court just held the declassification question is a “red herring,” that decision concerned the narrow issue of whether FPOTUS could have a personal interest in docs w/ classification markings and thus deprive the DOJ of the docs—he could not. /2