I’m frequently asked what Muqtada Al-Sadr’s aspirations are as a “religious” leader in Iraq. Today, his statement hinted at the tensions surrounding his lack of religious credentials & his position as an inheritor of the Sadr family legacy.
His tweet announcing his withdrawal from politics came as a response to a statement from Grand Ayatollah Kathem Al-Haeri, a cleric whose followers include a large number of Sadrists & the academic successor to Muqtada’s father & was a student to his uncle, Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr.
What’s interesting about Haeri’s statement is that he himself withdraws from his position (for health reasons) as a marjaa & says his office is closing & is no longer accepting religious taxes. He tells his followers to follow Khamanei, the Iranian supreme leader, instead.
What distinguishes Sadr from his father & from Haeri (& Khamanei for that matter) is that while he is the leader of a mass movement, rooted in religious identity, he is NOT a marjaa (a scholar learned enough to be a religious guide to followers, like Sistani for example).
His followers are then obliged to seek a cleric to follow on religious matters, a role which Haeri played after Sadr’s father’s death. Without Haeri, they will now need a new marjaa. Sadr cannot play this role. He himself followed Haeri & went to Iran to study with him briefly.
In addition, Haeri warns against the divisive rhetoric of those who claim the legacy of the two Sadrs (Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr & Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr), but who do not have the religious authority & credentials, clearly meaning Muqtada Al-Sadr.
In response, Muqtada Al-Sadr tweets that although he has not reached the level of “ijtihad” (the ability to issue jurisprudence) he can still call for the promotion of good & prohibition of evil (something that lay people are obliged to do in Islam).
What does this mean? Haeri is attempting to strip Sadr of religious authority & to redirect Sadrists who follow him to follow Khamanei. I don’t think this will be a successful strategy for several reasons.
Haeri’s relationship with Muqtada has been strained since the mid 2000s & can’t cause more strife among the Sadrists than it has in the past. Most likely, this statement will turn the Sadrists against Haeri & show the generational division amongst them.
Muqtada Al-Sadr knows he is not qualified enough to be a marjaa, but how his followers will respond to his chastisement by a religious authority may herald a change in the nature of religious authority.

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More from @MarsinRA

Oct 11, 2021
Some clarification on counting voter turnout: IHEC uses voters/registered voters as it has done in previous elections in the absence of a meaningful census in Iraq that would allow us to measure voters/eligible voters. This is consistent with previous elections.
The big commotion previously about this was because they wanted to measure it as TURNOUT =voters/those who picked up biometric cards (عدد مستلمين بطاقة الناخب) whereas now it is the more common عدد”المسجلين في سجل الناخبين”
Turnout as voter/registration is not uncommon, many countries don’t have precise “voter age population” or “eligible voter” numbers & rely on registered numbers. What’s critical here is that: 1) Iraq needs a census and 2) clarifying type of turnout calculation
Read 6 tweets
Jun 24, 2020
As promised, a piece summarizing some aspects of my dissertation research kindly published by @IraqiThoughts ... with a thread below on some additional details, elaborating and grounding the piece: 1001iraqithoughts.com/2020/06/24/the…
Where is my data from? I rely on interviews ( & “non-participant” obs.) with clerics (in Kerbala, Najaf, & Baghdad), protestors & opposition actors. I also rely on biographical dictionaries, the Ba’ath party archives, some Najaf archives, @ArabBarometer & event data (@Benrobinz )
I have three case chapters: 1917 & 1920 (colonial), 1977 & 1979 (Baathist, pre & post Saddam and also bordering Iranian Revolution) and 2017-2020 (with different data going towards different chapters)...
Read 22 tweets

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