Gorbachov's funerals dilemma. Gorbachov allegedly destroyed the USSR. Still, he is an ex-Tsar which is super important in Russian quasi-monarchy. Disrespecting him would undermine the awe before the institution of Tsar's power. So Putin's private farewells were still broadcasted
Many things about Gorbachov would be counterintuitive for the American public. First, few things undermined his reputation in Russia more than his relationship with his wife. They were very close, he took her everywhere and she tried to play a figure of her own. People hated that
In America being a "good family man" is usually considered a prerequisite for the high political career. You must be one, or at least persuade enough voters that you are. So Americans casually assume Russian politics work just like this. But they don't
I don't really like the term "democracy" for too many reasons. I don't want to go into discussion into whether "the people" do actually rule anywhere. I would ask another question. Is this or that regime
1) Contractual 2) Non-contractual
Russia falls under the second category
The thing about the USSR/Russia is not that it is "not democratic". It is that is not contractual. Any contracts dishonour the Tsar. Why?
If Tsar made an agreement with X, it means:
1) X forced him to limit his own power 2) to secure X's interests
That's a huge dishonour
Kirienko's statement that "Russian state is not based upon agreements" should be read in this context.
Contractual = Limited = Dishonourable
Contractual = You faced the interest of the second party and had to back off, giving them concessions. What kind of Tsar you are?
Russian people mostly accept the idea of the non-contractual supreme power. It won't bind itself with agreements with anyone. You can't (openly) lobby your own interests or fight for them, you gonna be destroyed for such blasphemy. You may only accept the sacred will of the Tsar
Accepting the sacred will of the Tsar without questions or complaints is regarded as a semireligious virtue. All the money are the Sovereign's money. All the power derives from the Sovereign. Many regard their obedience as a true, moral behaviour. Unquestioning obedience = virtue
You may think I'm exaggerating. But I'm not. Consider this post by Chadaev - ex official of the Putin's administration. It is very important and I strongly recommend anyone who wants to get Russian political culture or the current war to read it through
You must keep this in mind to understand why Gorbachev's relationship with his wife brought so much hatred. People will obey to the supreme power humbly and patiently, seeing it as a semi religious virtue. The power is unquestionable, impenetrable, no one can influence the Tsar
But. If *someone* can question the Tsar or influence him, even his wife, that destroys our mental model of the world. Is he even a real Tsar? If she questions him, then why don't we? Is our virtue really so much of a virtue?
That's desecration. And a personal attack upon us all
Unlike in America, in Russia too close familial relations are a liability for a politician, and certainly for the supreme ruler. In the public consciousness, Gorbachev rhymes with Nicholas II
Whimp
Henpecked
Destroyed his empire
They're not really hated. They're mostly despised
Meanwhile, Putin's divorce with his old wife - is *correct* behaviour for the Tsar. He is not dependent upon her in anyway. If he is not influenced by her, then he probably can't be influenced by us, his subjects either. Everything is fine and our mental model is undisturbed
PS As a very brief and sketchy introduction to the public perception of monarchs/quasimonarchs and its dynamics, I strongly recommend listening to this song "Tsar Nicky". See lyrics in the description. The end
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I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.