Gorbachov's funerals dilemma. Gorbachov allegedly destroyed the USSR. Still, he is an ex-Tsar which is super important in Russian quasi-monarchy. Disrespecting him would undermine the awe before the institution of Tsar's power. So Putin's private farewells were still broadcasted
Many things about Gorbachov would be counterintuitive for the American public. First, few things undermined his reputation in Russia more than his relationship with his wife. They were very close, he took her everywhere and she tried to play a figure of her own. People hated that
In America being a "good family man" is usually considered a prerequisite for the high political career. You must be one, or at least persuade enough voters that you are. So Americans casually assume Russian politics work just like this. But they don't
I don't really like the term "democracy" for too many reasons. I don't want to go into discussion into whether "the people" do actually rule anywhere. I would ask another question. Is this or that regime
1) Contractual 2) Non-contractual
Russia falls under the second category
The thing about the USSR/Russia is not that it is "not democratic". It is that is not contractual. Any contracts dishonour the Tsar. Why?
If Tsar made an agreement with X, it means:
1) X forced him to limit his own power 2) to secure X's interests
That's a huge dishonour
Kirienko's statement that "Russian state is not based upon agreements" should be read in this context.
Contractual = Limited = Dishonourable
Contractual = You faced the interest of the second party and had to back off, giving them concessions. What kind of Tsar you are?
Russian people mostly accept the idea of the non-contractual supreme power. It won't bind itself with agreements with anyone. You can't (openly) lobby your own interests or fight for them, you gonna be destroyed for such blasphemy. You may only accept the sacred will of the Tsar
Accepting the sacred will of the Tsar without questions or complaints is regarded as a semireligious virtue. All the money are the Sovereign's money. All the power derives from the Sovereign. Many regard their obedience as a true, moral behaviour. Unquestioning obedience = virtue
You may think I'm exaggerating. But I'm not. Consider this post by Chadaev - ex official of the Putin's administration. It is very important and I strongly recommend anyone who wants to get Russian political culture or the current war to read it through
You must keep this in mind to understand why Gorbachev's relationship with his wife brought so much hatred. People will obey to the supreme power humbly and patiently, seeing it as a semi religious virtue. The power is unquestionable, impenetrable, no one can influence the Tsar
But. If *someone* can question the Tsar or influence him, even his wife, that destroys our mental model of the world. Is he even a real Tsar? If she questions him, then why don't we? Is our virtue really so much of a virtue?
That's desecration. And a personal attack upon us all
Unlike in America, in Russia too close familial relations are a liability for a politician, and certainly for the supreme ruler. In the public consciousness, Gorbachev rhymes with Nicholas II
Whimp
Henpecked
Destroyed his empire
They're not really hated. They're mostly despised
Meanwhile, Putin's divorce with his old wife - is *correct* behaviour for the Tsar. He is not dependent upon her in anyway. If he is not influenced by her, then he probably can't be influenced by us, his subjects either. Everything is fine and our mental model is undisturbed
PS As a very brief and sketchy introduction to the public perception of monarchs/quasimonarchs and its dynamics, I strongly recommend listening to this song "Tsar Nicky". See lyrics in the description. The end
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In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.
Literacy rates in European Russia, 1897. Obviously, the data is imperfect. Still, it represents one crucial pattern for understanding the late Russian Empire. That is the wide gap in human capital between the core of empire and its Western borderland.
The most literate regions of Empire are its Lutheran provinces, including Finland, Estonia & Latvia
Then goes, roughly speaking, Poland-Lithuania
Russia proper has only two clusters of high literacy: Moscow & St Petersburg. Surrounded by the vast ocean of illiterate peasantry
This map shows how thin was the civilisation of Russia proper comparatively speaking. We tend to imagine old Russia, as the world of nobility, palaces, balls, and duels. And that is not wrong, because this world really existed, and produced some great works of art and literature