Now we associate Gorbachev with Perestroika, which in its turn is interpreted as nice Gorbachev being nice. In reality, in the beginning of his rule Gorbachev continued Andropov's Neo-Stalinist policies. But then the oil price dropped and didn't bounce back. Hence, Perestroika🧵
Brezhnev's era is usually referred to as Застой, the Stagnation. If Khrushchev unironically aimed to build Communism, Brezhnev dropped any attempts to do so. High oil prices of the 1970s created illusion of prosperity, while in reality system was becoming less and less efficient
Khruchev saw Communism as a realistic goal. He even set a specific deadline - 1980. Brezhnev however, cut all the specific deadlines from the Party program. Future oriented paradigm (building Communism) died and the new, past-oriented one emerged. Worshipping the Great Victory
Even though the Victory-worshipping took its most absurd forms under Putin, it originated under Brezhnev. Since the country was not oriented to the future anymore, it was now oriented to the past. Propaganda accents were gradually shifted from the October Revolution to the WWII
The KGB Chief Andropov who accumulated the immense power under Brezhnev was critical of where the system was going. KGB created a number of formal and informal economic think tanks working on how to overcome the crisis. Many future radical reformers of the 1990s originated there
Upon succeeding Brezhnev, Andropov tried to reinvigorate the USSR. He started a crusade against corruption, all forms of private commerce & business, and idleness. KGB was literally doing raids in cinemas or in stores at the daytime, catching those who were supposed to be at work
Andropov also did a number of cadre changes, promoting younger officials to fight with established gerontocracy. And Gorbachev was probably his favourite, since the 1960s. He tried to lobby him into the higher echelons of power, first unsuccessfully
In 1978 Andropov had a chance. A Central Committee secretary for agriculture died, so they had a vacancy. Andropov organised what would be later called "A meeting of four General Secretaries": Brezhev, Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev. Brezhnev accepted Gorbachev's candidature
Gorbachev's career was incredible and breaking all the established rules. In 1978 he becomes a Central Committee Secretary. In 1980 a Politburo member. He was not even 60 then, only 59 years old! Absolutely incredible.
In the late Soviet gerontocracy, Gorbachev was a Boss Baby
The Boss Baby promoted thanks to Andropov's patronage outlived his superiors. In the 1980s Soviet leaders started dying one by one (=gun-carriage races)
Baby Boss outlived them all and succeeded the throne
Upon inheriting the throne, Gorbachev largely continued Andropov's policies:
1) Neo-Stalinist politics 2) Strong industrial policy 3) Technological import from the West
He didn't aim to liberalise the system. To the contrary, he aimed to harden and reinvigorate it
Agenda of the 27th Party Congress, held in February 1986 was Neo-Stalinist. Under early Gorbachev, Soviet repressions against any form of private enterprises peaked. In May 1986 they issued an order:
"On measures to increase the struggle against the unearned incomes"
To put it simply, only your salary from the state was the "earned" income. All your private hustles were unearned and had to be uprooted. A wave of repressions against all forms of private businesses followed. Small repairment shops or workshops were closed en masse
Rural population suffered, too. Private hothouses, livestock barns were destroyed en masse. You obviously don't need this hothouse for yourself, it looks like you are *selling* what you grow. That's unearned income. Markets on which one could sell the harvest were closed, too
Let me give you an example. Soviet law made a distinction between legal "personal property" (for your own needs) and illegal "private property" (means of production)
So if you rode you car, that's ok. But if you are doing taxi service, it becomes means of production = illegal
In early Gorbachev's era policemen would ambush drivers who were suspected of taking passengers for money. If you act as a taxi, you use you car as the means of production to get the unearned income. Only what you get from the state is earned, any other hustle is a crime
Draconian measures against private entrepreneurship, commerce, etc. were combined with the strong industrial policy. Gorbachev aimed for a new Industrialisation, now with a specific focus on machinery and IT, but totally controlled by the state
They planned "technological renovation", aiming to renew the 1/3 of Soviet industry by the 1990s. They planned to increase investments in the machinery by 80%. They also put a special focus on computers and automation. All under the state control
Early Gorbachev =/= "liberal"
Early Gorbachev = suppress the private sector + pursue a statist industrialisation project with the focus on complex machinery and IT at the cost of the mass suffering. They knew very well that consumption standards gonna drop and planned for it
Crusade on the private business should be regarded in the context of industrial policy. If we plan to invest all the money into industry and drop the consumption, lots of people may say fuck it and just switch to side hustles: hothouse, taxi service, workshop. Don't allow them to
Soviet/Russian anti-business policies were not "madness" as so many presume. They were absolutely rational. Destroy 100% of the private sector, so people would have no other choice but to sell their labour to the state. That allows to keep the real salaries as low as possible
Neither in Soviet Union, nor in Russia low salaries are natural. In both cases, it is the deliberate policy of the state to minimise the cost of labor. In modern Russian (provincial) employers are often punished for paying too much. Gonna elaborate this later
In the early 1986 Gorbachev pursued a Neo-Stalinist policy of suppressing the private sector, reducing consumption and investing it all into the state-owned industry. Much like Stalin did, like Andropov aimed, but did not have a chance to
By the late 1986. the USSR did the U-tun
U-turn of 1986
May 1986 - "On measures to increase the struggle agains the unearned incomes". Extremely statist and anti-market
November 1986 - "Law on Individual Labour Activity". Basically people not obliged to work for the state can do private hustles. Extremely pro-market
If in the early 1986, Gorbachev pursued Neo-Stalinist statist projects, by the late 1986 he did an U-turn and switched to the pro-market policies that only deepened and accelerated till the end of his rule. What did motivate this sudden and unexpected U-turn?
In 1986 oil prices crashed and didn't bounce back. The USSR could not fund the increase in technological import anymore, thus all the Gorbachev's plans for "technological renovation" went to the bin and his industrial policy, too. Thus he did a U-turn towards liberalism. The end
PS When discussing Soviet/Russian policies we tend to focus on irrelevant crap, like which ruler is "liberal"/"democratic" (no one). But the oil prices are a much more important factor behind Kremlin's policy.
Expensive oil -> Aggressive
Cheap oil -> Docile
Now it's expensive
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The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum