Thread by @KofmanMichael

A few brief thoughts on the UA offensive. First, its best to manage expectations, these types of operations take weeks or months to play out. In my view its very early, there is limited information available, and far too soon to issue judgments. Thread 1/

My best guess on UA approach is to steadily press Russian forces towards the Dnipro river. Perhaps splitting the main Russian group of forces between those defending the city Kherson and those holding territory east of the Inhulets river. 2/

As Russian forces are pressed to choose between retreat and envelopment, over time they will likely withdraw to secondary defensive lines, steadily compressing the battlespace. If successful, UA may begin to isolate these groupings into several large pockets. 3/

With supply lines strained, given regular strikes against bridges & relatively weak capacity of ferries, this could place Russian forces in an untenable position, eventually forcing a retreat across the river. UA will probably have more success pushing the northern pocket. 4/

I doubt UA seeks a fight for the city of Kherson itself, which would be costly and could destroy much of it. Instead, to steadily compress the pocket around it, make reinforcement impossible, and force a Russian withdrawal (ala Snake Island). 5/

My impression is that there are at least three axes of advance in Kherson, but it’s difficult to tell the composition of UA forces. I'm making an educated guess here - this map is very notional. 6/

So far, there are visible signs of UA gains, with breaks through the first line of Russian defenses. That said, Russian forces will retreat to secondary lines. As friction increases, the pace of the advance could slow down. As I often suggest, outcomes are contingent. 7/

Having used HARM to suppress Russian air defense, and likely EW, UA may have pockets of localized air superiority (enough for TB2 to operate on parts of the front), but it will require sustained suppression against Russian ADS which could regenerate. 8/

To place the offensive in context, much of the front has become active with UA forces launching localized counter attacks around Kharkiv and Donbas. These local initiatives are probably designed to take advantage of lost Russian momentum. 9/

On managing expectations - one thing to consider is that the better military commanders of the 20th century would have struggled to keep up with social media expectations, and a media glare that often seeks to magnify minor tactical events into major strategic indicators. 10/

Overall, the geography is favorable to UA, and in this area they can establish relative advantage if not in forces then in fires and logistics. Russian forces have been reinforced over the summer, but many BTGs are likely at half strength, with strained supply lines. 11/

That said, I have strong priors on this, having seen the right river bank of Kherson as the area where Russia's position is the most vulnerable, and the region overall as of greater strategic significance relative to others. 12/

https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1541806141050654720

https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1517856542434996226

In addition, taking back territory is not a singular objective. Sustainability and force preservation matters. One of the challenges for UA will be to keep relative costs low so as to be better positioned for future operations, and subsequent phases over the long term. 13/

I said much of this earlier on the WOTR podcast. Also, Rob had a good thread

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1565771980720279554

and Jack Watling's article is very helpful in thinking more about the long term and understanding the context for this offensive, views I tend to share. rusi.org/explore-our-re…