A couple of recent examples of problems with salary payment in Russia, which were important enough to make the news.🧵
The State Traffic Air Management Corporation may not have funds to pay salaries in late September, due in part to the double whammy that the COVID crisis and sanctions delivered to it. moscowtimes.eu/2022/08/30/gos…
CNII Electronica, a Rostec contractor, which plays a key role in the development strategy of the Russian radio-electronic industry (ostensibly itself a priority due to sanctions), where employees turned to Putin himself due to wage arrears. cnews.ru/news/top/2022-…
Ural Compressor Plant, Yekaterinburg, where, after wage arrears and strikes the management apparently decided to “reorganize” (read: reduce) wages from October. The company couldn’t pay workers due to failed export contracts and frozen partner accounts. 66.ru/news/society/2…
Inskoy coal mine, Kemerovo region. The company is in a state of bankruptcy due to sanctions affecting the coal industry and currency transactions. gazeta.a42.ru/lenta/news/143…
Gemont, a Turkish construction firm and partner of Sibur, in Nizhnekamsk, where wage arrears due to the bankruptcy of the company led to a strike in July. activatica.org/content/a47767…
GruzovchikoF transportation company, St. Petersburg, where in July drivers mounted a protest after the company essentially cut their wages in half in an attempt to keep clients. fontanka.ru/2022/07/18/714…
Astek housing utility firm, Tula, where employees started a strike after months of wage arrears and the Investigative Committee opened an investigation into the matter. 1tulatv.ru/novosti/180060…
Several extractive, construction, transportation and other firms in Buryatia. regnum.ru/news/society/3…
Somewhat different, but of course there are also several examples of members of “volunteer battalions” not getting paid, or less than they were promised, e.g. this one from Chuvashia. ridus.ru/news/386056
In total, Rosstat’s figures do not show a huge increase in wage arrears. Actually, after an initial uptick in February-May, arrears started declining and stood at 732 million rubles as of August, far from levels seen in 2020-21 (let alone the 1990s) rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediab…
Of course we need to add that several companies furloughed their workers, temporarily reduced their salaries or took away a part of the salary received as bonuses (as the example of the Altai hospital shows).
Even official figures show significant regional variations with Ingushetia, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Kaluga, etc. facing rapidly increasing wage arrears as of August. Manufacturing and construction have accumulated the most arrears so far, but there will be spillovers.
It is also important to add that wage arrears are by far not a novel problem in Russia – they were a huge problem in the 90s and economic crises have traditionally led to higher arrears rather than high unemployment.
It’s worth reading this excellent recent Stephen Crowley piece on this phenomenon and why protests have stayed localized: ridl.io/sanctions-econ…
Also, many of these companies have been struggling with problems before the February invasion.
However, this underlines the point that sanctions are hitting an already weak economy and exhausted population. What makes this crisis different is that there’s no clear way out.
What can the authorities do? For one, they can prosecute companies that don’t pay wages, as they have done in several of the above cases.
The Ministry of Industry also suggested restarting labor inspections at companies where at least 10 percent of the workforce or at least 10 people have complained of labor rights violations, e.g. wage arrears. delprof.ru/press-center/l…
In some cases, as in the case of the Air Traffic Management Company, the federal government will try to make funds available – or already has – but this doesn’t always work like clockwork, and is not always an available option.
In many cases, regions may be asked to pick up the check (and will then try to lobby for more money from the federal budget), as it happened, for instance, in July when salaries owed to the workers of the Lotos shipyard in Astrakhan were paid. rg.ru/2022/07/04/reg…
Regions will also be able to free up some money by not filling positions. In education and health care salaries of retiring employees can be “spread” to raise the salaries of remaining employees w/o allocating more money to wages. But these systems are already overstretched.
In the private sector, firms can be pressured to keep paying (reduced) salaries just to keep people on the payroll. During the COVID crisis, regional governments required local employers to pick up part of the bill several times, also during the 2021 summer vaccination campaign.
At some point, however, as the story of AvtoVAZ’s Izhevsk plant suggests, without a clear outlook to exit the crisis and go back to normal, companies will have to give in. telegra.ph/Bolshe-15-tysy…
If the problem balloons (it hasn't yet), sooner or later regional budgets will run out of money, political capital or repressive force. It will not happen overnight, but every month with a lingering uncertainty of when things can get back to normal pushes them closer to this.
Especially if you consider how debts to contractors and budgets seemed to be increasing already, as of Q2 2022.
Not a crisis yet - but a space to watch as timelines shift and outlooks worsen in the autumn. moscowtimes.ru/2022/08/30/ros…
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
I don’t have much desire to insert myself into the “visa ban” discourse, bc I think time would be better spent discussing energy policy, ramping up weapons shipments to Ukraine, and further sanctions. But it looks like the discussion will impact policy, so here’s my two cents. 🧵
As far as I can see, many people who argue for a visa ban make either a moral or a practical argument, along the lines of “Russians shouldn’t be able to enjoy themselves in Europe while their government wages war in Ukraine”, and/or “They should stay home to topple the regime”.
These may sound morally right and certainly satisfying to many, but how they would be translated into policy makes little practical sense to me.
It's not just the size of the deficit but how it is growing: in July domestic VAT revenues dropped by 41% y-o-y, CIT by 32%, while expenses grew by 25% y-o-y (and 21% overall in January-July).
Given the considerable upfront costs of long-term structural adjustments (export infrastructure reorientation, import substitution, etc.), this is not sustainable. Ministries have asked the government for 5 trillion rubles extra expenses per year.
Many still haven't accepted the need of long-term readjustments, the permanent loss of EU markets, etc. & hope for a resolution allowing a return to the status quo ante. It's getting increasingly clear that this is an illusion. The govt will have to make very painful choices soon
So you're shocked and appalled by Viktor Orban's speech today, in which he talked about Hungarians not being "mixed-race" and not wanting to become that?
I understand the revulsion, but not the shock. Orban has been saying such things for years. A long 🧵
2015 October 30, at a conference, he speaks about organized ethnic replacement.
2016 March 15, in a speech Orban speaks about organized resettlement of foreigners to "reconfigure the ethnic foundations" of Europe.
In this somewhat rambling THREAD 🧵 on some recent developments in the Western discussion on Russia’s war against Ukraine, I would like to focus on our incapacity to keep being focused on the tasks at hand and not to be distracted by our own impatience and fantasies.
As Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth month, a degree of exhaustion is capturing Western countries and organizations providing support to Ukraine. This is inevitable.
This exhaustion comes amidst a looming global food crisis caused by Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s ports and its attacks on Ukraine’s agricultural land, and often poor understanding of how and when sanctions implemented against Russia will work.
It's really bleak to think that we have to resort to the simplest arguments, but lawmakers resisting gun control legislation after all these years sd ask themselves how long before someone who sdn't own a gun turns a semi-automatic rifle against their loved ones or against them.
I want to be very clear that I'm not suggesting someone should - on the contrary. Political violence is unacceptable. But we all need to understand that no one is safe from the lunatics & terrorists that a handful of senators don't want to do anything about. Not even they are.
I immigrated to the United States, bought property and pay taxes here. Despite all its flaws, I have come to appreciate many things about the country. But the abject failure of the country's political institutions to resolve pressing and obvious problems is very, very worrying.
Indication that the Kremlin may not cancel the September regional elections, after all, or at least not yet: the regular spring gubernatoropad has started. The unpopular heads of two "hot" regions, Tomsk and Kirov, are leaving their offices. zona.media/news/2022/05/1…
For context: "gubernatoropad" is the practice of changing governors in potentially problematic regions months before an election in order to avoid protest votes against unpopular incumbents. Tomsk and Kirov are both regions where United Russia's popularity is quite low.
Other interesting regions with gubernatorial elections include Karelia (low United Russia popularity), Buryatia (very high per-capita number of military casualties), Kaliningrad (war-induced industrial breakdown) and Sverdlovsk (the governor's public spat with Solovyov).