The Mahābhārata verse 'श्रावयेच्चतुरो वर्णान्…' itself seems clear on the subject of letting all 4 varṇas hear Vedas if Brāhmaṇas are made to sit in the front row.
Śrī Karapātrī Svāmī has refuted such an interpretation by citing some verses from Mahābhārata. +
He finds it to be in contradiction with the verse 'मन्त्रः शूद्रे न विद्यते'. The complete verse is
'उक्तस्त्रयाणां वर्णानां यज्ञस्तस्य च भारत।
स्वाहाकारवषट्कारौ मन्त्रः शूद्रे न विद्यते॥'.
This verse is connected only with mantras which have 'svāhā' & 'vaṣaṭ'.+
Also, the context of the verse is performance of pākayajña. Hence, it does not contradict 'श्रावयेच्चतुरो वर्णान्…' as being an injunction of hearing of Vedas by all varṇas.
Then he cites 'न च तां प्राप्तवान् मूढः शूद्रो वेदश्रुतीमिव'. +
The complete verse is
'रुक्मिण्यामस्य मूढस्य प्रार्थनाऽऽसीन्मुमूर्षतः।
न च तां प्राप्तवान्मूढः शूद्रो वेदश्रुतीमिव।।'.
This is not a verse of injunction or prohibition, but only an example of Śiśupāla not receiving Rukmiṇī, just as a Śūdra does not receive Vedaśruti.+
An example can be given of something which is true about most cases, but where exceptions do exist. Also, the word 'mūḍha' can be taken as an adjective of 'śūdra'.
Then he cites 'भावं न चास्याहमनुप्रदातुमलं द्विजो मन्त्रमिवाद्विजाय' from Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa.+
The complete verse is
'नैवास्ति दोषं मम नूनमत्र वध्याऽहमस्याप्रियदर्शनस्य ।
भावं न चास्याहमनुप्रदातुमलं द्विजो मन्त्रमिवाद्विजाय ।।'.
Here also, it is not an injunction or prohibition, but only an example that which Devī Sītā gives.+
Regarding 'ब्राह्मणायैव दातव्यं…', it would be in contradiction of injunctions which tell initiated Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas to learn Vedas.
Also, there is a variant reading of this 'ब्राह्मणाय सदा देयं…'.+
Hence, it seems that the verses which have been cited as contradictory to the direct interpretation of 'श्रावयेच्चतुरो वर्णान् कृत्वा ब्राह्मणमग्रतः' as an injunction which allows all varṇas to hear Vedas, do not contradict it.
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Based on Vācaspati's argument, Udayana cites a belief that because the anumāna of Nyāyaśāstra has to be unopposed to Vedas, and the knowledge of such non-opposition requires knowledge of Vedas, Śūdras are not eligible for studying Nyāyaśāstra. +
Although this is the pūrvapakṣa, but he accepts it at the end.
The flaw in this argument is twofold.
Firstly, to know that the some idea or behaviour is unopposed to Vedas can be known even through Itihāsas, Purāṇas, and verbal testimony of Śiṣṭas.
+
If not, Śūdras and others couldn't even practise their dharma, which should be unopposed to Vedas, because of the lack of direct access to Vedas. +
Manu says, “सन्तोषं परमास्थाय सुखार्थी संयतो भवेत्” (the one desirous of happiness should be disciplined while having contentment).
Why?
+
He says, “सन्तोषमूलं हि सुखं दुःखमूलं विपर्ययः” (contentment is the cause of happiness, non-contentment is the cause of suffering).
+
He briefly defines happiness and suffering as, “सर्वं परवशं दुःखं सर्वमात्मवशं सुखम्” (all that is in someone else’s control is the cause of suffering, all that which is in one’s own control is happiness).
Yādavācārya (16th century), disciple of Rāmakṛṣṇa Cakravartī, refutes his opponent who says that teaching Nyāya philosophy to Śūdras would lead to sin. The issue is that sage Gautama is said to have created this for the benefit of 'all', which would include Śūdras also.
(1/5)
Yādavācārya specifies 'teaching' as an act directed to a specific person. If another person listens to it, it doesn't count as teaching. When the opponent points out that if 'all' includes Śūdras, it would be inevitably directed towards them also. Yādavācārya responds
(2/5)
Yādavācārya responds by that even in the thesis of the opponent, being directed toward Ātman of a Brāhmaṇa, it is directed towards the Ātman of a Śūdra also. So the same fault could be found with opponent too.
The definitions are like; 'A Brāhmaṇa is the one born of duly wedded Brāhmaṇa & Brāhmaṇī'. Now someone may ask; on what basis is his father a Brāhmaṇa (similar about his mother)?
Such questioning and lack of a definitive proof will lead to an infinite regress.
(2/5)
At this point Medhātithi brings in the idea that collective unbroken memory of a people as being of 'X-jāti' is the definitive proof of them being of 'X-jāti'.
That jāti cannot be identified by merely looking at someone, rules out the possibility of it being biological.