It's time to update the list of introductory threads
1. By February 27, I concluded that Russia would lose this war. Russian army was overrated, Ukrainian - underrated, while Russian political goals misunderstood. They planned for 1968-style pacification
2. Avocado economy: Why Russia cannot manufacture anything?
An industry's level of complexity negatively correlates with the rank of interest groups controlling it in the Russian hierarchy. The more mafia-like, the more dominant, the simpler the industry
3. Russian military industry completely depends upon technological import from the West, not from China. Whereas Kremlin closed their eyes on importing European equipment and pretending it's Russian, it jailed those who tried to do the same with Chinese
4. Russia is primarily the natural resources exporter. This created two problems. First, sources of cheap-to-extract resources are depleting. Second, it can't compensate for losses on Western markets in China. It just doesn't pay off
Russia's spiralling into a deep crisis. It was visible before the war but now it's rapidly accelerating. And every major crisis entails mass redistribution of power, property and status. Because crisis is essentially a Jubilee
10. The motivation behind Z-war is not "security", "alliances" or even political affiliation. It's the need to extinguish wrong cultural memes and impose correct ones. That's why the war has wide popular support and why Russians so easily agreed for it
Case study on supply chains of the Russian nuclear delivery systems producing industry. Krasmash is the only* liquid propellant ICMB producing plant in the country
* MAAZ may be doing it too, but I'll cover it later
Moscow is the city built around a princely court and living off prince's expenses. Its prosperity results from its central status in the imperial system. Moscow is uniquely expensive to feed. That's why its colonies are so destitute
TL;DR Mass Soviet style mobilisation requires expensive infrastructure and cadres being maintained for it even in the peace time, just in case. In the post-Soviet era these inefficient expenses were cut
Innovators create wealth. And yet, they're greenhouse flowers who flourish only in *very* safe societies. They prosper because they've outsourced their security. If they don't get it, ignore their opinion on security and foreign policy
On the fallacies and intellectual dishonesty of Mearsheimer's analysis which is instrumental in legitimising the appeasement advocacy
18. National Divorce
Every Russian setback in Ukraine increases the chance of imperial collapse. Still, debates about Russian breakup are mostly based upon the Wilsonian axiom (ethnolinguistic differences -> nation building). But that's not how it works
TL;DR Started independent political career with hate propaganda. Repeatedly confirmed his ultranationalist platform has not changed, never apologised (except for a few slurs). Enjoyed thorough whitewashing by the Moscow and Western media
@navalny 21. Disintegration of Russia: a plausible scenario
TL;DR It's not some cartoonish regime fighters raising arms. It's moneyed interest groups integrated into the previous regime, deciding that
a) Costs >>> benefits
b) No "doctors" will come from Moscow
TL;DR Westerners are often astonished to see many Ukrainians/Russian minorities being rather unenthusiastic about the @navany's succession to the Russian throne. In this thread I will try to show why
Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.