UK asks what other "low hanging fruits" there might be. especially for TCBMs. #SpaceThreatsOEWG. Dmitri Stefanovich says: total clarity about intended purpose of activities and use of specific capabilities. This is the same in other domains. Can be de-escalating and preventive
Unilateral commitments not to test direct-ascent ASATs are good, says Dmitri, but what will happen if these get challenged? If a capability is being developed that looks like an ASAT but is justified as something else? Will the commitments work?
No easy answers, says @LauraEGrego especially because different activities are understood by different actors in different ways. RPOs are case in point. Need clarity on keep-out zones, communication about intent. Mil activities are fewer than commercial in space!
Side note: I don't think this is an issue at all. The whole point is these are behavioural commitments, not capability commitments, which is why they are useful, meaningful, and of no cost to those making them. More countries should make this commitment, to my mind
Wrong assumption that there are no norms in space may be part of the problem says @bleddb. A norm is not only a good thing, they may be existing norms for things we don't want, as well as good ones governing space. #SpaceThreatsOEWG
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