Thread by @magdagul

The last few days have been some of the most violent and consequential in the independent history of Central Asia. On #Kyrgyzstan's day of mourning, a 🧵 on why the international media should pay attention to what is happening, and why "border clash" isn't helpful.

I’m not alone in making this argument, but I think it is worth restating: the language of “border clash” or “border skirmish”-- to describe Tajikistan’s military attacks on Batken and Chong Alay occludes more than it illuminates. 1/16

What occurred is better described, on the evidence available to date, an armed military incursion by Tajikistan. This includes attacks on infrastructure and civilian objects located at a distance from areas that are politically or juridically disputed. 2/16

Yes, violence occurred in sites that have seen periodic escalations of violence over land, water, pasture use and access to infrastructure. Yes, there is a background of tensions between border populations dating back at least to the 1930s. 3/16

And yes, those tensions have been exacerbated post-91 by population growth + climate change and increased material pressures on life on both sides of the border. Those tensions have been well documented, including in the case of Ak-Sai and Vorukh. 4/16

But folding last spring’s violent events and the dramatic escalation last week into a narrative of ‘border clash’ implies that this is a straightforward or even inevitable extension of those tensions. 5/16

It implies that the use of heavy weapons and what appear to be pre-meditated attacks on civilian infrastructure follow inevitably from local animosities. 6/16

It risks leading us to look to the wrong scale, both geographically and historically, to understand episodes of violent escalation (thus claims that this is merely a ‘sub-regional dispute’ on the one hand, or ‘great game by proxy’ on the other). 7/16

It downplays what seems to me to be critical for understanding this escalation: the importance of Tajik domestic politics and familial succession, intra-elite conflicts, authoritarian rule + stifling of civil society, together with domestic ec. crisis. 8/16

In particular, it bypasses the critical questions of who authorised what use of force when, and why, and what was the role of so-called “chernye” without military uniform or identification equipped, as widely circulating videos suggest, with grenade launchers and mortars. 9/16

And it ignores the wider pol. context, notably the tendency over the last decade+ to militarise border regions while simultaneously failing to make the diplomatic, legal + technical steps to delimit, or addressing the existential concerns of border populations. 10/16

Quite apart from the fact that “border skirmish” is deeply patronising to characterise armed aggression in which dozens have died, hundreds have lost their homes and businesses, and tens of thousands displaced. 11/16

Language matters. It shapes how we frame conflict, how we link past and present, how we evaluate different causal factors, and which questions we ask. 12/16

The evidence to date suggests systematic & targeted destruction of homes and businesses by Tajik forces, attacks on critical infrastructure using heavy weapons and apparently intentional targeting of schools and kindergartens. 13/16

I write "evidence to date" noting that the media landscape in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, like the political landscape, is radically unequal. There is an urgent need for an independent enquiry. 14/16

My concern is that this military aggression will mark a ‘point of no return’ for those from affected villages, creating conditions where life after evacuation is no longer imagined to be viable, especially for those with kids. Thus a de facto exodus. 15/16

I hope I’m wrong, but that’s what I’m hearing with friends who have fled from villages where homes have been destroyed – кележегибиз жок – “no future here for us”. 16/16